metaphorik.de 25/2014

Herausgeberteam – Editorial Staff – Équipe éditoriale
Anke Beger / Martin Döring / Olaf Jäkel / Katrin Mutz /
Dietmar Osthus / Claudia Polzin-Haumann / Judith Visser
ISSN 1618-2006 (Internet)
ISSN 1865-0716 (Print)

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Vorwort/Preface 25/2014

Redaktion

Deutsch (jump to English)

In der Zählung der Ausgaben von metaphorik.de ist nun die Zahl 25 erreicht – in gewisser Hinsicht eine symbolische Zahl, die zu einer kleinen Zwischenbilanz einlädt. Zwar ist es die einzige Ausgabe des Kalenderjahrs 2014, dafür zeigt sich ein besonders umfangreiches Spektrum an Beiträgen und Überlegungen, aus denen neben einer Bilanz bestehender metaphernbezogener Forschungen auch künftige Perspektiven vorgezeichnet werden.

In besonderer Weise spiegelt die hier vorliegende Ausgabe das weite Feld an Fragestellungen wider, denen sich unsere Zeitschrift seit ihrer Gründung im Jahr 2001 widmet. Es handelt sich dabei sowohl um Fragen der Pragmatik und Funktionalität von Metaphern und Metonymien als auch der Auseinandersetzung um die adäquaten theoretischen Modelle zur Beschreibung und Erforschung dieses zentralen Bereichs der menschlichen Kommunikation. Somit stehen neben konkreten Beobachtungen des metaphorischen bzw. metonymischen Sprachgebrauchs immer auch substanzielle Kontroversen, etwa um die zu Grunde zu legenden Metapherntheorien. Überhaupt ist die Trennung zwischen anwendungsbezogenen und theoriezentrierten Studien in den meisten Fällen nicht ganz scharf. In jeder empirischen Studie stellt sich die Frage nach der Angemessenheit der Analysemodelle, und eine Metapherntheorie muss sich letztlich an ihren Erklärungsleistungen der sprachlichen Wirklichkeit messen lassen.

metaphorik.de hat sich von Beginn an als mehrsprachige Zeitschrift verstanden. Dies zeigt sich auch wieder in dieser Ausgabe: zum einen in der Mehrsprachigkeit der Publikation selbst, zum anderen in der Vielfalt der in die Analysen einbezogenen Objektsprachen.

Julien Perrez und Min Reuchamps untersuchen in ihrem Beitrag, in welchem Rahmen 'unkonventionelle' Metaphern in den politischen Diskurs Eingang finden. Dabei bilden Beispiele aus aktuellen belgischen Debatten die Korpusgrundlage. Anica Rose geht der Frage nach der Vitalität der Doping-Metapher in der deutschen Alltagssprache nach, womit exemplarisch auch die Karriereaussichten einer eher jungen metaphorischen Projektion in den Blick genommen werden. Kaisa Turkkila wiederum betrachtet Okkurrenzen von Synonymie bzw. Para-Synonymie mit verschiedenen Metaphern im US-amerikanischen Englisch, auch hier wieder in Verbindung von Korpuslinguistik und Überlegungen zur Metapherntheorie. Ariadna Strugielska widmet sich in ihrem Beitrag der Rolle von Metaphern im Rahmen der Kognitiven Linguistik, während Ulrike Schröder einen Blick auf nahezu vergessene Kapitel der Metapherntheorie wirft, nämlich die Überlegungen Johann Heinrich Lamberts und Philipp Wegeners aus dem 18. bzw. 19. Jahrhundert. Diese Texte zeigen nicht zuletzt, dass wesentliche Beobachtungen zur Metapher mitunter deutlich älter sind, als es eine rein kalifornische Sicht der Dinge vermuten lässt.

Besonders stolz sind wir daher auch, dass in dieser Ausgabe gleich zwei der renommiertesten Repräsentanten der europäischen Metaphernforschung mit einer Antwort auf Fragen zur Metaphorik und Metonymie vertreten sind: Gerard Steen und Harald Weinrich. Abgerundet wird diese Ausgabe mit einem Rezensionsaufsatz von Judith Visser zu einer Studie von James Underhill zur Metaphorizität in der Konstruktion von Ideologien und Weltanschauungen.

Bedanken möchten wir uns bei Kerstin Sterkel und Lisa Rosprim (Saarbrücken) und besonders bei Alexandra Dominicus (Essen) für die umsichtige Erstellung der Dateivorlagen und unschätzbare Hilfe beim Publikationsprozess.

Wir freuen uns über das nachhaltige Interesse an metaphorik.de und der behandelten Thematik und wünschen allen Lesern einen guten Jahresausklang 2014!

Essen, im Dezember 2014

Anke Beger
Martin Döring
Olaf Jäkel
Katrin Mutz
Dietmar Osthus
Claudia Polzin-Haumann
Judith Visser

English

We have now reached the 25th issue of metaphorik.de – a symbolic number, if you will, inviting us to pause and reflect. While this may be the only issue we are publishing in 2014, it offers an especially wide range of articles and discussions that take stock of existing metaphor research and also outline possible future developments.

This issue particularly captures the stretch of topics our journal has examined since its founding in 2001. This includes the examination of both the pragmatics and functionality of metaphor and metonymy as well as considerations on determining adequate theoretical models for describing and investigating such a central area of human communication. Consequently, concrete data on the use of metaphor and metonymy has always stood side by side with fundamental controversies, such as determining the theories of metaphor that should be applied. In most cases, strictly distinguishing between studies that focus on language use and those that focus on linguistic theories is not possible. Every empirical study must take into account the suitability of the analytical models used. And a theory of metaphor will ultimately be judged by how well it is able to explain linguistic realities.

metaphorik.de has viewed itself as a multilingual journal from its conception. This issue is testament to this, both in the various languages featured in the journal as well as in the diversity of the languages analysed.

Julien Perrez and Min Reuchamps have written an article investigating how unconventional metaphors are introduced into political discourse based on a corpus of examples taken from current Belgian political debates. Anica Rose has studied the vitality of the doping metaphor in German everyday language. Her article thus also touches on the possible life cycle of a rather young metaphoric projection. In another article combining corpus linguistics and deliberations on the theory of metaphor, Kaisa Turkkila has taken a closer look at occurrences of synonymy or para-synonymy with various metaphors in American English. Ariadna Strugielska analyses the role of metaphor in cognitive linguistics, while Ulrike Schröder’s article takes us back to an almost forgotten chapter in the history of the theory of metaphor: Johann Heinrich Lambert’s and Philipp Wegener’s contributions dating back to the 18th and 19th century respectively. One of the things these historical texts shows is that essential metaphor findings are in part significantly older than the purely Californian metaphor approach would suggest.

For this reason, we are especially proud that this issue features not one, but two of Europe’s most renowned metaphor researchers and their thoughts on issues of metaphor and metonymy: Gerard Steen and Harald Weinrich. Finally, this issue includes Judith Visser’s review of James Underhill’s study of metaphoricity in the construction of ideologies and convictions.

We would like to thank Kerstin Sterkel and Lisa Rosprim (Saarbrücken), and especially Alexandra Dominicus (Essen) for their meticulous file preparation as well as their general invaluable help during the publication process.

We appreciate our reader’s loyal interest in metaphorik.de and the topics covered and wish you a wonderful holiday season.

Essen, December 2014

Anke Beger
Martin Döring
Olaf Jäkel
Katrin Mutz
Dietmar Osthus
Claudia Polzin-Haumann
Judith Visser

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Seite 3

Deliberate metaphors in political discourse: the case of citizen discourse

Julien Perrez / Min Reuchamps

Abstract


This article proposes to apply Steen’s (2008) three-dimensional model of metaphor analysis in communication to a corpus of political discourse, in this case citizen discourse. Our corpus has accordingly been analysed by making a distinction between three layers of metaphor, respectively at the linguistic (direct vs. indirect metaphors), conceptual (novel vs. conventional metaphors) and communicative levels (deliberate vs. non-deliberate metaphors). Our results suggest that making the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors leads to meaningful political insights, notably pointing to differences in saliency of the source domains in terms of which citizens make sense of Belgian federalism. In this regard, the family domain, and more especially the metaphor BELGIAN FEDERALISM IS A LOVE RELATIONSHIP appears to function as an important conceptual reference point for the citizens’ understanding of the political relations in the Belgian context.


In diesem Artikel wird Steens (2008) dreidimensionales Modell der Metaphernanalyse auf ein Korpus politischer Reden von Bürgern angewendet. Es wurden drei Metaphernebenen unterschieden, nämlich eine linguistische (direkte vs. indirekte Metaphern), eine konzeptuelle (konventionelle vs. neue Metaphern) und eine kommunikative Ebene (gezielte vs. nicht-gezielte Metaphern). Unsere Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass der Unterschied zwischen gezielter und nicht-gezielter Metapher zu bedeutenden politischen Erkenntnissen führen kann, indem wichtige Unterschiede in der Bedeutung der Quelldomänen für den belgischen Föderalismus bei belgischen Bürgern deutlich werden. Vor allem die Familiendomäne und noch spezifischer die Metapher BELGIAN FEDERALISM IS A LOVE RELATIONSHIP scheinen ein wichtiger konzeptueller Referenzpunkt für das Verstehen der politischen Beziehungen durch die Bürger im belgischen Kontext zu sein.

Keywords: metaphor analysis, political discourse, MIP, deliberate metaphors, citizen discourse, Belgium, federalism

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Deliberate metaphors in political discourse: the case of citizen discourse
Julien Perrez, University of Liege (ULg, Belgium) (Julien.Perrez@ulg.ac.be) Min Reuchamps, Université catholique de Louvain (UCL, Belgium) (min.reuchamps@uclouvain.be)
Abstract
This article proposes to apply Steen’s (2008) three-dimensional model of metaphor analysis in communication to a corpus of political discourse, in this case citizen discourse. Our corpus has accordingly been analysed by making a distinction between three layers of metaphor, respectively at the linguistic (direct vs. indirect metaphors), conceptual (novel vs. conventional metaphors) and communicative levels (deliberate vs. non-deliberate metaphors). Our results suggest that making the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors leads to meaningful political insights, notably pointing to differences in saliency of the source domains in terms of which citizens make sense of Belgian federalism. In this regard, the family domain, and more especially the metaphor BELGIAN FEDERALISM IS A LOVE RELATIONSHIP appears to function as an important conceptual reference point for the citizens’ understanding of the political relations in the Belgian context.
In diesem Artikel wird Steens (2008) dreidimensionales Modell der Metaphernanalyse auf ein Korpus politischer Reden von Bürgern angewendet. Es wurden drei Metaphernebenen unterschieden, nämlich eine linguistische (direkte vs. indirekte Metaphern), eine konzeptuelle (konventionelle vs. neue Metaphern) und eine kommunikative Ebene (gezielte vs. nicht-gezielte Metaphern). Unsere Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass der Unterschied zwischen gezielter und nicht-gezielter Metapher zu bedeutenden politischen Erkenntnissen führen kann, indem wichtige Unterschiede in der Bedeutung der Quelldomänen für den belgischen Föderalismus bei belgischen Bürgern deutlich werden. Vor allem die Familiendomäne und noch spezifischer die Metapher BELGIAN FEDERALISM IS A LOVE RELATIONSHIP scheinen ein wichtiger konzeptueller Referenzpunkt für das Verstehen der politischen Beziehungen durch die Bürger im belgischen Kontext zu sein.
Keywords: metaphor analysis, political discourse, MIP, deliberate metaphors, citizen discourse, Belgium, federalism
1. Scope and issues1
Since the work of Aristotle, or more recently Lakoff’s (1996, 2004) research on the metaphorical patterns underlying American politics, political discourse has frequently been recognized as a genre which quite naturally lends itself to
1 We would like to thank prof. dr. Sabine De Knop for the abstract in German and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this paper. The authors are of course sole responsible for any remaining errors.
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the use of metaphors (see for instance Charteris-Black 2011), an observation that has been confirmed by numerous studies focussing on the analysis of political metaphors (see among others Carver/Pikalo 2008, De Landtsheer 2009, L’Hôte 2011, Musolff 2004, 2010). When analysing metaphors in political discourse, one can however be struck by the varying communicative nature of the identified metaphors, ranging from unnoticed conventional ways of talking about political issues to explicitly used devices aiming at persuading one’s audience and framing the political debate in a conscious manner. While this distinction has often been recognized in the literature (see for instance Charteris-Black 2011: 25-32), it remains strikingly the case that it is not accounted for in the literature on political metaphors. In this contribution, we therefore propose to specifically apply Steen’s (2008) model of metaphor analysis to political discourse, in this case citizen discourse.
Unlike most studies on metaphor in political discourse, which tend to focus on elite discourse with the underlying assumption that the political leaders might consciously use metaphors to convince (or manipulate) their audience (a rather top-down approach to political communication), studying political discourse from a citizen perspective offers a bottom-up way to tackle the question of how metaphors might impact on the citizens’ framing of complex political processes. Indeed, as has been suggested by Bougher (2012) and shown by Reuchamps/Perrez (2012), citizens also produce metaphors when they talk about political issues. However, the metaphors used by the citizens sometimes show various degrees of communicative functions (as has been suggested by Perrez/Reuchamps submitted). In this regard, we suggest that a more thorough analysis of the communicative status of these metaphors, by introducing the notion of deliberateness, might lead to interesting political insights, regarding the way citizens understand and spontaneously frame such political issues.
In this light, the article is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the notion of deliberate metaphors specifically applied to the study of political discourses. In section 3, we discuss the methodological issues specifically raised by the analysis of deliberate metaphors in citizens’ discourses and, on this basis, we present (section 4) and discuss (section 5) the results of our quantitative analysis.
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2. (Deliberate) metaphors in political discourse
In the wake of Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work (1980), much attention has been devoted to the study of metaphors not as rhetoric figures but as conceptual tools structuring complex realities. According to the defenders of CMT, metaphors play a major role on our perception and categorization of abstract entities and make it possible to structure our comprehension of complex processes. Their suggestion that metaphors structure our comprehension of our surrounding environment has led to a widespread scientific endeavour to use conceptual metaphors as analytic tools to explore various areas of social sciences.
While conceptual metaphors occur in every area of life, the political domain remains one prominent area where to find metaphors. As Semino (2008: 90) puts it: “it is often claimed that the use of metaphor is particularly necessary in politics, since politics is an abstract and complex domain of experience, and metaphors can provide ways of simplifying complexities and making abstractions accessible.” The need for more research on the political impact of metaphors has therefore been often emphasized: “if metaphor is at the heart of cognitive framing then it should be crucial to political study” (De Landtsheer 2009: 60).
Accordingly, scholars in linguistics and in political science have moved toward investigating the use and especially the identification of metaphors in various political domains (for an overview, see Bougher 2012). For instance, Lakoff has offered an account of American politics in terms of conceptual metaphors (1996, 2004), Musolff has explored how we conceive and thus speak about Europe (1996, 2000, 2004) but also about the Holocaust (2010) in metaphorical terms, Beers and De Landtsheer have looked at the use of metaphors in international relations (2004), Charteris-Black (2011) has analysed speeches by major British and American politicians and their persuasive power. As suggested by this short overview, many different types of discourses and topics have been uncovered by scholars interested in political metaphors (see also Carver/Pikalo 2008).
Yet, in these accounts of the metaphor’s role in politics, the predominant focus has always been on discourses by the political elites. And even then, the amount of literature has only just recently started to “[reflect] the importance of the subject” (De Landtsheer 2009: 60). What is more, while the metaphors
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used by the elites are definitely relevant because they illustrate how they frame the political debate (L’Hôte 2011), citizens’ discourse about politics should also be taken into account. In fact, beside a few exceptions (see for instance Cameron and Maslen 2010 on the public and expert perceptions of terrorism), such an investigation has been left out of the analysis: “while research on metaphors in political discourse has flourished in recent years, the focus on elite communication has left metaphor’s wider capacity as a reasoning tool for citizens underexplored” (Bougher 2012: 149). Research on citizen data can lead to two specific kinds of insights: on the one hand, it makes it possible to assess to what extent metaphors produced by the political elite are integrated in the citizens’ political reasoning, but on the other hand, it also offers the opportunity to look at how citizens “generate their own metaphors (i.e., spontaneous metaphors) to make sense of the political environment” (Bougher 2012: 149).
Hitherto, following Lakoff’s (1996) seminal work on metaphors in American politics, the focus in the study of political discourse has been on the identification of conceptual structures accounting for our perception and understanding of politics. As stressed by Billig and MacMillan (2005: 459), this results in two main observations, namely (i) that “political speakers can use metaphors in rhetorically effective ways to create new meanings and to challenge previously established ways of understanding” and (ii) that “metaphors can function as routine idioms in political discourse in ways that deaden political awareness”. While such accounts have shown the omnipresence of metaphors in political discourses, they have not paid attention to the rhetorical effectiveness of metaphors and above all to their – possibly – varying nature. As pointed out by Billig and MacMillan (2005: 460) traditional research often fail to consider the “complex rhetorical processes by which a metaphor might pass from a striking, novel comparison into an unthinking idiom.” The two following examples of metaphors found in citizens’ discourses are illustrative of this varying nature of metaphors in political discourses.
(1) Fr. “…le fédéralisme tel qu'il a été construit progressivement,…” (PBF, D8, 3897-3898) 2 3
2 The examples taken from our data are marked with an ID-number, composed of three parts. The first part points to the corpus, the label ‘PBF’ referring to the corpus of
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En. ‘…federalism, as it has been constructed progressively,…’
(2) Fr. “…, parce que pour moi la Belgique reste une espèce de grande famille, malgré tout.” (PBF, D1, 2289-2290).
En. ‘…, because to me, Belgium remains a kind of large family, after all.’
In both examples, Belgium is metaphorically accounted for, being respectively presented in terms of a physical structure in (1) and of a family in (2). While, on the conceptual level, both metaphors are instances of frequent conceptual metaphors in political discourse (respectively ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and THE STATE IS A FAMILY), they appear to have a quite different nature. With the family metaphor in (2), this citizen is explicitly presenting his own conceptualization of Belgium. This is not the case in (1), where the construction metaphor is only indirectly expressed, through the use of a conventional metaphorical extension of the verb construire (‘to build’). While it is not our intention to undermine the importance of conventional metaphors in political discourse, and more specifically their potential impact on collective conceptualizations of complex processes through their automatic diffusion via language, we are convinced that in political discourse analysis, it is crucial to distinguish conventional metaphors, which are the result of common ways of expressing things, from non-conventional ones, which are produced intentionally to achieve some rhetorical goal. Indeed, only such a distinction can help us understand (i) why political actors use metaphors in their discourse and (ii) how they actually perceive and conceptualize complex notions such as state structure and interactions.
In order to take this distinction into account, we based our analysis on Steen’s (2008) three-dimensional model of metaphor analysis in discourse and communication. This discourse analytical framework relies on the distinction between different layers of metaphors at the linguistic, conceptual and communicative levels. At the linguistic level, Steen (2008, 2010) distinguishes
French-speaking citizens, the label ‘PBN’ referring to the corpus of Dutch-speaking citizens. The second part is the ID of the participant and the third part points to the lines the passage is referring to in the respective corpora.
3 In our examples, the relevant metaphorically used expressions are put into italics. The lexical units pointing to potential metaphors are underlined.
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direct metaphors from indirect ones. Direct metaphors “embody a direct expression of a conceptual domain that functions as a source in a metaphorical comparison” (Steen 2010: 55). In this case, “there is some conceptual domain that functions as a source in a metaphorical mapping” (Steen 2010: 54) which “is expressed directly as such by the language” (ibid.). Typical examples of such direct metaphors are metaphors of the ‘A is B’ (see example 3) type, similes ‘A is like B’ (see example 4) or cross-domain mappings made explicit by a lexical signal (see example 5). Indirect metaphors are metaphors in which this cross-domain mapping is not explicitly expressed (see example 1 above).
(3) Fr. “alors on voit qu'actuellement on est en train d'essayer de constituer l'Europe, mais que la Belgique, comme d'habitude, est un laboratoire.” (PBF, D6, 2247-2249)
En. ‘then we see that currently we’re trying to constitute Europe, but that Belgium, as always, is a laboratory.’
(4) Fr. “Alors voilà ce que je dis: fédéralisme entre peuples de cultures différentes, est-ce bien possible ? Est-ce que à un moment donné, comme un couple pas bien associé, est-ce qu’on n’a pas envie de retourner chez papa maman, de rentrer au bercail ?” (PBF, D5, 2545-2548)
En. ‘Here is what I am saying: federalism between peoples with different cultures, is it really possible ? Won’t we at a given moment, like a mismatched couple, want to get back to mam and dad, to come back home?’
(5) Du. “als je vergelijkt [authors’ note: Belgisch federalisme] met een bedrijf, een bedrijf laat je ook niet leiden door de werkman of de kuisvrouw bij wijze van spreken.” (PBN, L3)
En. ‘if you compare [authors’ note: Belgian federalism] with a company, you don’t let a company be run by a workman or a cleaning lady, so to speak.’
At the conceptual level, Steen (2008) makes a distinction between novel and conventional metaphors. Conventional metaphors, sometimes called dead metaphors, are those metaphors which have been lexicalized in the language system and which function as metaphorical extensions of polysemous words.
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As discussed above, in example (1), Belgian federalism is presented as an entity under construction. This use of the verb construire (‘to build’) denoting the construction of abstract entities such as countries can be considered as a lexicalized conventional metaphorical extension of the verb whose basic meaning refers to the construction of concrete entities such as roads or buildings. On the contrary, novel metaphors are based on original mappings between two domains of experience, such as in examples (2) and (4) in which Belgian federalism is compared to a family or a couple, or (3) and (5) in which Belgium is respectively compared to a laboratory and a company.4
Finally, at the communicative level, one should distinguish deliberate metaphors from non-deliberate metaphors. According to Steen (2008: 222), deliberate metaphors are produced on purpose “to change the addressee’s perspective on the referent or topic that is the target of the metaphor, by making the addressee look at it from a different conceptual domain or space, which functions as a conceptual source”. Accordingly, examples (2) to (5) could be considered as deliberate metaphors, whereas example (1) would be regarded as an instance of non-deliberate metaphor.
As suggested by Steen (2008, 2010), and highlighted by Krenmayr (2011) and Beger (2011), the boundaries between these various types of metaphors at various analytical levels (linguistic, conceptual, communicative) are not always clear-cut. Though most direct and novel metaphors often tend to be deliberate, this link is not automatic. And similarly, while indirect and conventional metaphors would often be considered to be non-deliberate, one cannot rule out the possibility of them being deliberately used since “the deliberateness lies in the use of the linguistic metaphor in its discourse context, for a particular purpose on a particular occasion” (Cameron 2003: 101). Krenmayr (2011) for instance suggests that the repeated use of some conventionalized metaphors from the same source domain across a small text span could be considered as an indication of their deliberateness (see also Beger 2011). She gives the example of the English idiom play fire with, which at first sight is a clear case of conventional metaphor. However, when appearing
4 Some authors (see Steen 2008 for an overview) suggest that this difference between conventional and novel metaphors can be accounted for in terms of processing differences, claiming that novel metaphors would rather be processed by comparison between two domains, whereas conventional metaphors would rather be processed by categorization. However, discussing these processing differences lies beyond the scope of this contribution.
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in an article on rugby, next to lexical items belonging to the same source domain, such as consumed, conflagration and ashes (see Krenmayr 2011: 159-160 for the concrete examples), one would obviously draw the conclusion that the idiom play fire with had been intentionally used by the journalist to achieve a given communication goal (see also Beger 2011 for other examples of conventional metaphors used deliberately through repetition in academic discourse). The repetition of lexical items belonging to the same source domain across a small text span is one of the few textual cues on which the researcher can rely to decide whether a conventional metaphor has been used deliberately or not.
Apart from this, considering that the identification of deliberate metaphors comes down to identifying the speakers’ intentions at the moment of speaking, it remains a delicate enterprise, since the researcher, who is virtually cut off from this context of production at the moment of analysis, has to reconstruct it post-hoc on the basis of his/her own methodology. So doing, relying on Steen’s analytical framework should allow us to distinguish the metaphors that fulfil a communicative function in discourse interaction, from those that do not. Further methodological issues regarding the identification and categorization of metaphors are discussed in section 3.2 but before we turn to them, we will present the political context in which our data have been collected.
3. Data and method
3.1 Citizen corpora
To study deliberate metaphors, academic (Beger 2011) and media (Krenmayr 2011) discourses have been used. After all, in such discourses and despite their differences, because their aim is to convince an audience, it is likely to find deliberate metaphors. By contrast, in citizen discourses and in particular citizen discussions, this persuasive function may be less salient. Therefore, citizen corpora offer an interesting ground of investigation to understand the (non-)deliberate nature of metaphors. Nonetheless, as such, public citizens’ discourses hardly exist. Yet, citizens do talk about politics. To apprehend these talks, two different ways are possible: one is to use “recorded” real conversations for instance in online forums, another one is to
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foster such conversations using the focus-group technique (De Cillia, Reisigl/Wodak, 1999). Though the latter offers promising avenues for language and metaphor analysis, it has only occasionally been applied in linguistic and/or metaphor research (see Cameron 2007, Cameron/Maslen 2010 for a few exceptions). The focus-group technique also offers a delineated setting, where some variables may be controlled, such as the number of participants and the issues at stake, allowing for more scientific leverage.
To study the deliberate nature of metaphors, this research relies on original data from eight focus groups composed of 6 to 9 people and held in Belgium after the 2007 federal elections, at a time where there was much discussion about the future of the country (Deschouwer/Reuchamps 2013, Reuchamps/Perrez 2012). Four focus groups were organized in French-speaking Belgium and four in Dutch-speaking Belgium in order to collect citizen discussions on both side of the language border. In each case, for over four hours, the participants, who came from various backgrounds and who held different political beliefs, discussed the future of Belgian federalism with fellow citizens as well as with politicians and experts (Reuchamps 2011, 2013). The discussions with the politicians and the experts were meant to offer the citizens different points of views on the issue at stake. In fact, the purpose of these focus groups was to allow participants to learn about, reflect and then discuss Belgian federalism and specifically its future. In this qualitative research design, the participants discussed and pondered topics relating to federalism for a quite extensive period of discussion. The group discussions were recorded and transcribed. This resulted in two distinct corpora of citizens’ discussions respectively in French (FR-corpus: 52,003 words) and Dutch (NL-corpus: 47,579 words).
3.2 Metaphor identification
In order to assess to what extent the citizens used metaphors to talk about Belgian federalism, we performed a slightly adapted version of the MIP procedure (Pragglejazz Group 2007). To identify the potential metaphorical expressions related to Belgian federalism, we firstly read the entire corpora to come to a global understanding of their respective contents (MIP, step 1) and subsequently determined the different lexical units in the corpora (MIP, step 2). However, unlike the traditional MIP procedure would prescribe, we did
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not consider all the lexical units from the corpora but automatically preselected the potentially relevant contexts, e.g. the contexts in which the citizens talked about Belgian federalism, by performing a concordance search (i) for the lexical units directly referring to the target domain of the Belgian federal state (see table 1 for an overview of the target words included in this concordance search) and (ii) for lexical signals of cross-domain mappings, i.e. words which might explicitly point to metaphorically used expressions (such as comme ‘like’, (zo)als ‘(such) as’, comparer ‘to compare’, vergelijken ‘to compare’, symboliser ‘to symbolize’, symboliseren ‘to symbolize’, représenter ‘to represent’, representeren ‘to represent’, vertegenwoordigen ‘to represent’, évoquer ‘to evoke’, être synonyme de ‘to be synonymous with’, synoniem zijn met ‘to be synonymous with’, …)5. This concordance search resulted respectively in 492 relevant occurrences in the FR-corpus and 496 relevant occurrences in the NL-corpus. Corpus Terms referring to the target domain of Belgian federalism
FR-corpus
Belgique ‘Belgium’, défédéraliser ‘to defederalize’, état ‘state’, fédéralisme ‘federalism’, fédérer ‘to federate’, nation ‘nation’, pays ‘country’, refédéraliser ‘to refederalize’;
Noun + belge ‘belgian’, + communautaire ‘community’, fédéral ‘federal’, + fédéré ‘federated’, + institutionnel ‘institutional’, + national ‘national’.
NL-corpus
België ‘Belgium’, deelstaat ‘federated entity’, federaal ‘federal’, federalisme ‘federalism’, land ‘country’, natie ‘nation’, staat ‘state’;
Noun + Belgisch ‘belgian’, + communautair ‘community’, + federaal ‘federal’, + institutioneel ‘institutional’, + nationaal ‘national’.
Table 1: Terms referring to the target domain of Belgian federalism used for the automatic corpus extraction
The relevant contexts6 have then been analysed to find metaphorically used expressions. It should however be emphasized, that, since we were primarily interested in the way citizens talked about Belgian federalism, we did
5 This list of lexical signals is inspired from Krenmayr (2011: 60-61) and has been adapted for French and Dutch relying on our own intuitions.
6 The analysed contexts consisted of 150 characters to the left and of 150 characters to the right of the target word.
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not assess the metaphorical potential of each lexical units in these contexts, but only of the words that were used to refer to Belgian federalism (hereby departing from the traditional MIP procedure). This implies for instance that we did not take the potential metaphorical uses of function words into account nor the various extensions of the word ‘Belgium’. The latter decision has been made on the grounds that some of these extensions do not directly relate to the citizens’ perception of the Belgian political system but rather encode instances of conventional metonymies, such as in example (6) where the word ‘Belgium’ is used to refer to Belgian authorities (totum pro parte), or present Belgium as an abstract container, such as in (7). Considering such examples were not directly relevant to our central research question, they were left out of the analysis.
(6) Du. “Het heeft geen enkele zin dat bijvoorbeeld België zich alleen bezighoudt met de Schelde rein te houden als Frankrijk en Nederland niet meedoen.” (PBN-L6-1424-1425)
En. ‘It makes no sense that for instance Belgium takes care of keeping the Scheldt clean if France and The Netherlands do not participate’
(7) Fr. “On va parler aussi d’une perception qui est (…) peut-être propre d’une communauté même à l’intérieur de la Belgique.” (PBF-A-393-394)
En. ‘We will also talk of a perception which is (…) perhaps typical of a community within Belgium’
In order to find metaphor-related expressions, we relied on the steps 3a, 3b, 3c and 4 of the MIP procedure by comparing the meaning of the word in context with its more basic meaning, the latter being related to sensory perception, bodily action or being more precise (Pragglejazz Group 2007). As suggested by Steen et al. (2010), however, we did not take the historical dimension into account to establish the basic meanings of the analysed words. For this stage of the analysis, we respectively used the electronic version of Le Petit Robert de la langue française 2014 as reference dictionary for the FR-corpus, and the electronic version of the Van Dale Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse
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Taal7 as reference dictionary for the NL-corpus. This second stage of analysis led to the identification of 99 metaphorical contexts in the FR-corpus (20,1%) and 73 in the NL-corpus (15%).8
FR-corpus
NL-corpus N % N %
Metaphorical contexts
99
20.1%
73
14.8%
Non-metaphorical contexts
393
79.9%
422
85.2%
Total
492
100%
495
100%
Table 2: Metaphorical and non-metaphorical contexts in the FR-corpus and NL-corpus
The difficulty of deciding on the metaphorical character of some lexical units can be illustrated by examples (8) and (9). In example (8), the construction of Belgian federalism is referred to as an “usine à gaz” (literally a ‘gas storage plant’) to denote its complicated structure and lack of efficiency. This inefficiency would, according to citizen K6, partly be explained by mechanisms defined as “wafelijzerpolitiek” (lit. ‘waffle-iron policy’), referring to a mechanism implying that expenses which are initially predestined to one of the federal entities are compensated by other expenses in favour of another federal entity in order to maintain the political balance between the federal entities.
(8) Fr. “Qu’est-ce qui a disparu depuis et qui fait qu’on est obligés de détricoter et de monter une façade qu’on a appelé fédéralisme ? Ça
7 Both dictionaries differ from the dictionaries traditionally used in MIP analyses in that they are historical rather than corpus-based dictionaries. Steen et al. (2010: 130-132) point to potential complications arising from the use of historical dictionaries, especially the Van Dale Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal, for MIP-based analyses. However, considering the absence of corpus-based dictionaries for Dutch and French, and considering that the Van Dale Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse Taal and Le Petit Robert de la langue française both function as reference dictionaries in their respective communities, they can be regarded as the “best option available” (Steen et al. 2010: 130) respectively for Dutch and French..
8 A Pearson Chi-square test performed on the raw frequencies suggests that these differences are significant (χ2 = 4.953, df = 1, p < 0.05). However, since we do not have specific hypotheses regarding possible cultural differences in metaphor usage, we don’t want to draw any conclusion nor to make any claim from this observation. It should however be interesting to address this question more specifically in future research.
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s’est vraiment pour moi la question de fond et quand on ne répond pas à celle-là, on va continuer à monter une usine à gaz et on ne saura pas en fait pas très bien où on veut aller.” (PBF, B8, 249-250)
En. ‘What has disappeared that makes that we have to unravel and to build a façade that we call federalism? This is really for me the question substantive question and if we do not answer it, we are going to continue to set a kludge (lit. ‘gas storage plant’) and we will not know in fact where we want to go’
(9) Du. “Ik denk dat als men het woord wafelijzerpolitiek ook zei als wij al een projectportefeuille op ons werk hebben waar een Europese subsidie moet verdeeld worden.” (PBF, K6, 910-916).
En. ‘I think that if we also said the word ‘wafelijzerpolitiek’ (lit. ‘waffle-iron policy’) if we already had a portfolio at our office where a European subvention should be divided.’
While both compound words appeal to vivid images, respectively an inefficient factory and a waffle iron, which could easily be related to some conceptual metaphors like the STATE IS A MACHINE and in this case, a machine that is not working properly, they have been lexicalized as independent units in Dutch, whose basic meanings (and in fact only meaning) corresponds to the contextual meanings identified in these contexts. Accordingly, these units have to be considered as non-metaphorical expressions.
3.3 Metaphor categorization
In the final stage of the analysis, and in line with Steen’s (2008) three-dimensional discourse analytical framework, we tried to determine for each identified metaphor to what extent it was direct, novel and deliberate and we encoded the source domain to which the metaphorically used expression belonged. As suggested in section 2, categorizing the identified metaphors into this analytical framework is not always an easy enterprise. In order to treat the different metaphorical contexts as coherently as possible, we respected the following procedure.
At the linguistic level, a metaphor was marked as direct or indirect
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depending on whether the cross-domain mapping between the source and target domains was explicitly expressed or not. Accordingly, as stated above, the metaphors in (3), (4) and (5) are instances of direct metaphors, while the metaphor in (1) is an example of indirect metaphor.
At the conceptual level, a metaphor was counted as conventional if the meaning of the metaphorically used expression was listed among the conventional definitions of the expression in the reference dictionaries. If not, the metaphor was regarded as a novel metaphor (compare the examples (3), and (5) above with example (1)). When considering the interactions between the first two levels of analysis, we observe that a large majority of direct metaphors appear to express new mappings at the conceptual level, considering that 85,3% of the identified direct metaphors were coded as novel metaphors. However, this link was not automatic as illustrated by the examples (10) and (11). In (10), the lexical unit façade (‘frontage’, ‘façade’) is used metaphorically. While this metaphor has been made explicit, it refers to a conventional sense of the word denoting the notion of outward appearance. The same analysis applies to the word huwelijk (‘marriage’) in example (11) that conventionally denotes the union between two entities.
(10) Fr. “Qu’est-ce qui a disparu depuis et qui fait qu’on est obligés de détricoter et de monter une façade qu’on a appelé fédéralisme? ” (PBF, B8, 301)
En. ‘What has disapeared since then and which makes to we have to unknit and to build a frontage called federalism.’
(11) Du. “het is vergelijken met dat huwelijk, he. De Belgische staat is een gearrangeerd en geforceerd huwelijk geweest.” (PBN, L2, 2263-2266)
En. ‘it’s comparing to that marriage, right? The Belgian state has been an arranged and forced marriage.’
When looking at indirect metaphors, we observe that 92,8% of them point to conventional mappings between conceptual domains. Still, some examples of indirect metaphors expressing new mappings at the conceptual level can be found in our data (in 7,2% of the cases), confirming the idea that the link between indirect metaphors and conventional ones should not be taken for granted. See for instance example (12) in which the verb co-habiter
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(‘to live together’) is used to describe the relations between the two main entities of Belgian federalism.
(12) Fr. “parce que je ne sais pas comment cohabitent la région flamande et la région wallonne avec le fédéralisme” (PBF, B6, 145-148)
En. ‘because I don’t know how the Flemish region and the Walloon region are living together under federalism’
While the categorization of metaphors at the linguistic and conceptual levels relies on objective criteria, the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate at the communicative level is potentially more dependent on the researchers’ reconstruction of the speaker’s intentions. To be as objective and coherent as possible, we decided that because they explicitly point to the speaker’s intentions of presenting one conceptual domain in terms of another, or because they involve original mappings between two domains, direct metaphors and new metaphors are better inclined to be considered as deliberate metaphors. In our analysis, they were regarded as deliberate metaphors by verifying to what extent they matched the definition by Steen (2008), e.g. to what extent we could easily identify their function in communication, be it a clarifying function aiming at presenting someone’s own conceptualization of abstract entities or relations (such as in examples (2) to (5) above) or a rhetoric function aiming at convincing one’s conversation partner (such as in example (13)).
(13) Fr. “c’est comme dans un ménage, on ne règle jamais les solutions une fois pour toutes.” (PBF, B8, 1630-1636)
En. ‘it’s like in a couple, you can’t get all problems solved once and for all.’
In our data, 97% of the direct metaphors and 92,3% of the novel metaphors have accordingly been analysed as deliberate metaphors. Though it is unusual that direct and novel metaphors are not deliberate as well, for a very limited number of cases, we came to the conclusion that a direct and or a
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novel metaphor did not match the definition of deliberate metaphors by Steen (2008). Consider for instance example (14).
(14) Fr. “Déjà sur le mot, en Belgique, fédéralisme, on pense quand même, en gros, à (…) déglingue de l’État unitaire qu’on connaissait” (PBF, B8, 291-293)
En. ‘already when thinking about the word, in Belgium, federalism, we still think, roughly, of (…) the breaking down of the unitary state we knew’
In this example, this citizen is claiming that the word federalism can be quite commonly associated with the notion of breaking down the former unitary state. This is expressed by the French noun déglingue. This noun is derived from the verb déglinguer, whose basic meaning informally denotes dismantled machines or by extension machines that are not working (properly) anymore. Since the contextual meaning of the word differs from its basic meaning, it can be considered as a metaphorically used word. Using this word to refer to more abstract entities does not turn out to be a conventional usage according to the reference dictionary. It can therefore be regarded as an instance of novel metaphor. We moreover considered this metaphor to be direct because of the presence of the verb ‘think of’, which according to us explicitly points to the cross-domain mapping. At the communicative level, however, we would like to claim that the use of this metaphor is the result of a spontaneous association, rather than an explicit attempt of the speaker to have the addressee reconsider the target domain from the perspective of the source domain. This is the reason why we decided to treat this metaphor as an instance of non-deliberate metaphor.
In the case of indirect metaphors and of conventional metaphors, we firstly proceeded in a similar fashion and assessed to what extent they matched the definition of deliberate metaphors by Steen (2008). In a few cases, indirect and/or conventional metaphors appear to be deliberate on the basis of this criterion. In example (15) for instance, Belgian federalism is presented as not being well-born. This metaphor, indirectly and conventionally referring to the birth of political systems, has been considered as a deliberate metaphor
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because of the speaker’s emphasis on this notion, confirmed by the repetition of words referring to the birth of Belgian federalism and by the following clause providing an argument for the claim that Belgium was not well-born.
Fr. “le fédéralisme belge est une réalité politique qui est beaucoup plus récente, et pour moi elle est née en fait au delà des années 60, sur deux... au fait elle est mal née enfin ce fédéralisme est mal né plutôt. Il est né du côté flamand avec la rancune, la rancoeur, et du côté francophone la peur.” (PBF, D1, 2634-2637)
En. ‘Belgian federalism is a much more recent political reality and according to me, it was in fact born after the 60’s. Actually it was bad born, I mean this federalism was bad born. On the Flemish side, it was born from resentment, bitterness, and on the French-speaking side, from fear.’
In a second stage of the analysis, we closely looked at the immediate context of the metaphorically used expression, e.g. in the same conversation turn, to search for other lexical units belonging to the same source domain as the metaphorically used expression. If we found at least one different unit matching this criterion, we considered the indirect and/or conventional metaphor as a deliberate metaphor. In (16) for instance, the noun mécanisme (‘mechanism’) has been considered as an instance of deliberate metaphor. While this use is indirect, and conventional, the fact that it has been preceded by the verb fonctionner (‘to work), is according to us a sufficient argument to consider the use of this noun as deliberate, globally referring to the Belgian political system as a machine.
(15) Fr. “ Est-ce qu’on dit que c’est fédéralisme comme idée de ce qu’il va rester en commun au niveau belge et qui est une structure permettant de faire fonctionner des entités séparées mais sous un chapeau commun, avec des mécanismes préétablis ou … ? ” (PBF, B8, 716-719)
En. “Do we talk about federalism as the idea of what is going to remain common at the Belgian level and which is a structure
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making it possible to let distinct entities work, but under a common denominator, with pre-established mechanisms or … ?
Following these steps, 10,9 % of the indirect metaphors and 9% of the conventional metaphors have been identified as deliberate metaphors.
3.4 Metaphor counting
A last methodological remark concerns the guidelines we followed to count the metaphorical units in our data. Since we are primarily interested in how citizens talk about Belgian federalism and not so much in the overall percentage of metaphorical units in our corpora, we adopted a different counting method than the one advocated by the MIP procedure (Pragglejazz Group 2007), by considering metaphorical contexts as basic units rather than the lexical units themselves. Example (17) illustrates our counting method:
(16) Fr. “Et alors, j’ai encore une dernière chose, c’est que... je crois que c’est vous qui avez dit... qu’on règle cela une fois pour toute, mais à cela, je n’y crois pas du tout, je pense que c’est pas réaliste… c’est comme dans un ménage, on ne règle jamais les solutions une fois pour toutes. On se marie, ou en vit ensemble, peut importe, à 20 ans, puis on a des enfants, puis les enfants deviennent grands, puis le bonhomme fait sa crise de la quarantaine, puis on se dit que tout compte fait, on se dit que c’était quand même pas si mal et puis rien, et puis entre, temps, madame est ménopausée et puis... (…) puis..... Puis elle a perdu son job, puis les enfants se sont mariés, voilà que la maison est trop grande... les situations évoluent et je ne pense pas qu’on va rêver d’avoir une situation immuable. J’arrête les figures et les fables”. (PBF, B8, 1968-1977).
En. ‘And then, I still have one last comment, it’s that … I think it’s you who who said … that we should solve this once and for all, but I don’t believe in this at all, I think it’s not realistic… it’s like in a couple, you can’t get all problems solved once and for all. You get married, or you’re living together, whatever, at twenty, then you get kids, then the kids grow old, the husband goes through his midlife crisis, but then
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you realize it wasn’t that bad after all, and then nothing, and then in the meantime, his wife gets menopause and then… (…) and then she looses her job, then the kids got married, and then is the house too big… Situations evolve and I don’t think we will dream of having a stable situation. I’m stopping with images and fables.’
This passage is really interesting since this participant practically (and deliberately as he himself admits it in the last sentence) produces a lot of family metaphors to talk about Belgian federalism. From a MIP perspective, from the third sentence (starting with ‘You get married’) on, every single word could be considered as an independent metaphorical unit (except for the last two sentences). However, from a communicative perspective, this extensive comparison functions as an argument to support the claim that one should not believe that the problems Belgian federalism is faced with can be solved once and for all. Like in a couple, we have to accept that situations may evolve with time and that new challenges may come ahead. Of particular interest for the political interpretation of our data is that this citizen is explicitly comparing Belgian federalism to a couple with ups and downs. That is the reason why we counted this whole passage as one metaphor, though it would probably be more accurate to talk about metaphorical contexts than about metaphors. Similar examples were treated accordingly. We think this way of counting metaphorical contexts allows us to avoid any bias in favour of a particular type of metaphor (considering all the metaphorical units of this passage would obviously lead to an overrepresentation of deliberate metaphors) or any source domain (in this case the family domain).
The analyses of the two corpora have been performed independently by both authors. Problematic cases were further discussed to come to an agreement. The results of this quantitative analysis are presented in the following section.
4. Results
Table 3 summarizes the results of our quantitative study. Our data suggest that the majority of the metaphorical contexts identified, relate to indirect, conventional and non-deliberate metaphors. Accurate quantitative comparisons with previous studies (such as Krenmayr 2011) are difficult
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considering our diverging metaphor counting method and the fact that we did not consider the metaphorical nature of every single word from our corpus. However, the proportion of direct (21,2%), novel (26,3%) and deliberate metaphors in citizen discourse a priori appears to be fairly high, suggesting that metaphors belong to the citizens’ standard discourse strategies when they are prompted to talk about complex political issues, in this case their perception of Belgian federalism.
FR-corpus
NL-corpus
Total N % N % N %
Direct vs. indirect?
- Direct metaphors 21 21.2% 13 17.8 % 34 19.8%
- Indirect metaphors
78
78.8%
60
82.2 %
138
80.2% Total 99 100% 73 100% 172 100%
Novel vs. conventional?
- Novel metaphors 26 26.3% 13 17.8% 39 22.7%
- Conventional metaphors
73
73.7%
60
82.2%
133
77.3% Total 99 100% 73 100% 172 100%
Deliberate vs. non-deliberate?
- Deliberate metaphors 32 32.3% 16 21.9% 48 27.9%
- Non-deliberate metaphors
67
67.7%
57
78.1%
124
72.1% Total 99 100% 73 100% 172 100%
Table 3: Distribution of metaphor types in the FR-corpus and NL-corpus
It is further interesting to notice that these observations are similar in both corpora, roughly showing comparable frequencies of the use of the different metaphor types, though the French-speaking citizens tended on average to produce more novel and direct metaphors than the Dutch-speaking citizens. A Pearson Chi-square test performed on the raw frequencies however suggests that these differences are not significant (novel vs. conventional metaphors: χ2 = 1.713, df = 1, p = 0.19; deliberate vs. non-deliberate metaphors: χ2 = 2.261, df = 1, p = 0.13). These results tend to confirm the idea that citizen discourse lends itself to the use of direct, novel and deliberate metaphors, regardless of linguistic differences between citizen groups.
In the next sections we will focus on the use of deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors by the French-speaking and Dutch-speaking citizens. We
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will more particularly consider the relevant source domains on which they are respectively built.
Because our study primarily aims at assessing to what extent the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors provides insightful information to the political interpretation of the data, we will present the results of our quantitative analysis globally without making any further distinction between both citizen groups. We will however discuss some subtle differences when these appear to be relevant.
4.1 Conceptual domains
Source domain
Non-deliberate metaphors
Deliberate metaphors
Total
Fr.-speaking
Du.-speaking Total
Fr.-speaking
Du.-speaking Total
construction
13
33 46
2
0 2
48
personifcation
14
8 22
2
3 5
27
machine
15
5 20
2
0 2
22
journey
15
4 19
1
2 3
22
family
2
0 2
10
4 14
16
disease
0
0 0
5
2 7
7
company
0
3 3
1
3 4
7
entity
1
3 4
0
1 2
5
instrument
1
0 1
3
1 4
5
container
4
1 5
0
0 0
5
food
1
0 1
3
0 3
4
theatre
1
0 1
1
0 1
2
laboratory
0
0 0
1
0 1
1
clothes
0
0 0
1
0 1
1
Total
67
57 124
32
16 48
172
Table 4: Distribution of deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors across the conceptual domains in the FR-corpus and NL-corpus
The most relevant conceptual domains9 emerging from the citizen data are summarized in Table 4. These results show that when speaking
9 Following Cameron (2007: 205), suggesting that “researchers adopting a discourse approach to metaphor have to accept that it is not possible to come up with a limited set of
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metaphorically of Belgian federalism, the citizens frequently use construction metaphors, personifications, machine-metaphors, family metaphors, and to a lesser extent company and disease metaphors. However, when considering the difference between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors across the conceptual domains, it interestingly turns out that the most frequent conceptual domains on which the metaphors used by the citizens are based (respectively the machine, journey and construction domains) consist of a large set of non-deliberate metaphors and a small set of deliberate metaphors, while some other less frequent conceptual domains (like the family, the company or the disease domains, and to a smaller extent the instrument and food domains), show the reversed tendency, including a large set of deliberate metaphors and of a small set of non-deliberate metaphors, as illustrated by Figure 1. These results suggest that making the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors in analysing discourse data makes it possible to identify interesting differences in the way citizens consciously describe their perception of Belgian federalism.
categories into which each linguistic metaphor can be reliably placed” and that “A principled flexibility to the grouping of linguistic metaphors appears to be the most suitable approach with discourse data”, we relied on a bottom-up approach to identify the relevant domains, placing the emerging metaphors in larger conceptual categories that appeared to be consistent with our research goals.
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Figure 1: Distribution of deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors across the conceptual domains in the citizen corpora
4.2 Non-deliberate metaphors in citizen discourse
When considering the non-deliberate metaphors, the construction, machine and journey domains appear to be the most prevailing source domains in terms of which Belgian federalism is thought of, along with some cases of personifications. It is interesting to notice that all these conceptual domains have recurrently been found to structure political discourse in earlier studies on political metaphors (see Charteris-Black 2011, Lakoff 1996, 2004, Musolff 2004, to name just a few). In our study, these metaphorical domains often rely on the frequent occurrence of conventional metaphorical extensions of lexical units such as structure, structuur (‘structure’; see examples 18 and 19), or fonctionner and werken (‘to function’, ‘to work’; see examples 20 and 21) or on the conventional conceptualisation of political entities as persons (see example 22) or of (political) purposes as destinations (see example 23 and 24).
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
N of metaphors (raw frequencies)
Conceptual domains
Non-deliberate metaphors
Deliberate metaphors
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(17) Fr. “un état fédéral, une structure fédérale, ça peut être très différent, ça peut être une structure fédérale forte ou une structure fédérale résiduaire.” (PBF, D8, 2336-2337)
En. ‘a federal state, a federal structure, it can be very different, it can be a strong federal structure or a residual federal structure.’
(18) Du. “Die solidariteit moet je buiten de Belgische structuur zien.” (PBN, L6, 1522-1523)
En. ‘this solidarity must you see outside the Belgian structure’
(19) Fr. “il faut distinguer le fédéralisme belge tel que nous le connaissons à l'heure actuelle, du fédéralisme tel qu'il a fonctionné dans les temps passé” (PBF, D5, 2469-2471)
En. ‘one has to make a distinction between Belgian federalism as we know it today, and federalism as it has worked in the past’
(20) Du. “Maar ik denk dat je kunt concluderen dat het federalisme zoals het nu is dat het niet werkt” (PBN, N4, 3318-3319)
En. ‘But I think you can conclude that federalism as it is now, that it is not working.’
(21) Fr. “et je pense que c’est ce qui est arrivé parce que quand la Flandre galérait en 1930, il était normal que la riche industrie sidérurgique wallonne alimente le pays” (PBF, B8, 556-557).
En. ‘and I think that’s what happened, because when Flanders was in trouble in 1930, it was normal that the rich Walloon steel industry fed the country.’
(22) Du. “die discussie over de toekomst van het Belgisch federalisme, waar we naartoe moeten” (PBN, M, 1219-1220).
En. ‘This discussion over the future of Belgian federalism, where we have to go to’.
(23) Fr. “Je crois qu'à partir du moment où le fédéralisme est évolutif, il ira de crises en crises. ” (PBF, D8, 2561)
En. ‘I think that considering federalism is progressive, it will go from crises to crises.’
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4.3 Deliberate metaphors in citizen discourse
When turning to the analysis of deliberate metaphors, the family domain appears to be the most prevailing conceptual domain in terms of which the citizens perceive Belgian federalism. This tendency can be observed in both corpora, though the French-speaking citizens produced more metaphors related to this domain. These observations tend to confirm the saliency of familial relations for the way citizens commonly make sense of complex political processes, as has been suggested by Lakoff (1996).
When referring to the family domain, the citizens tend to compare it to a love-relationship between the two main federated entities (BELGIAN FEDERALISM IS A COUPLE), presenting them as being married or living together (see examples 4 and 17 above and examples 25 to 27 below).
(24) Fr. “Si l’on compare avec un ménage, certains ménages se marient avec contrat de mariage, d’autres pas” (PBF, B1, 188-190)
En. ‘If we compare this to a couple, some couples get married under a wedding contract, others don’t…’
(25) Fr. “parce que je ne sais pas comment cohabitent la région wallonne et la région flamande avec le fédéralisme etc.” (PBF, B6, 145-148)
En. ‘because I don’t know how the Flemish region and the Walloon region are living together under federalism’
(26) Du. “Normale partijen die een staatshervorming willen enzovoort die willen eigenlijke hetzelfde als we zo zeggen een ernstige LAT relatie in dit land.” (PBN, M5, 3130-3131)
En. ‘Normal parties that want a state reform and so on, they want in fact the same as let’s say a serious LAT relationship in this country.’
This notion of love relationship between the different parts of the country seems to play a particularly significant role in the way citizens frame their understanding of the relations between the main federated entities of the country. More than a simple figure, this metaphor of the love relationship
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makes it possible to reflect different visions on (the future of) Belgian federalism, and by so doing offers a particularly salient conceptual reference point for the citizens to express their own perception of it. This is clearly illustrated by the following fragment (presented as Table 5) in which two citizens express their diverging views on Belgian federalism in terms of a marriage metaphor.
Dutch-speaking citizens
English translation
L2: “het is vergelijken met dat huwelijk he. De Belgische staat is een gearrangeerd en geforceerd huwelijk geweest.” (2263-2266)
L2: ‘it’s comparing to that marriage, right? The Belgian state has been an arranged and forced marriage.’
(…)
(…)
L6: “het is inderdaad een gearrangeerd huwelijk en het is gearrangeerd door de internationale gemeenschap” (2268-2269)
L6 : ‘It is indeed an arranged marriage and it has been arranged by the international community.’
(…)
(…)
L6 : “een gearrangeerd huwelijk kan ook ontbonden worden, zo moeilijk is dat allemaal niet. Het moet gewoon erkend worden door de internationale gemeenschap.” (2279-2280)
L6: ‘an arranged marriage can also be abrogated, it’s not that difficult. It only has to be accepted by the international community’
L2 : “ja maar dat is getrouwd voor goede en kwade dagen en wij zijn nu in kwade dagen.” (2281-2282)
L2: ‘yes, but it has been married for better or for worse and we are now in worse days’
L6 : “maar bij een gearrangeerd huwelijk is het niet in goede en kwade dagen vrijwillig, maar is het verplicht in kwade dagen. (…) ik hoop toch dat we zover zijn dat huwelijken niet meer verplicht zijn ofwel? ” (2283-2287)
L6: ‘but in an arranged marriage, it’s not voluntarily for better or for worse, but it’s forced in worse days. I hope we have come to a situation where marriages are no longer forced, are we?’
L1 : “Neen, maar je kan dan toch karakter tonen, karakter tonen. ” (2288)
L1: ‘No, but you can still show character’
L6 : “Als ons dat ieder jaar 10 miljard euro kost, vind ik dat toch... ” (2289)
L6: ‘If it costs us 10 billion euro a year, I find that…’
Table 5: Discussion structured around the marriage metaphor to depict Belgian federalism (taken from the corpus of Dutch-speaking citizens)
Apart from the marriage metaphor itself, this passage is also a perfect example of how the use of a given metaphor by a citizen can frame the reactions of other citizens. This specific function of metaphors in communication has been described by Steen (2008: 230) as the “creation of a
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common ground of reference”, which he claims particularly occurs “when difficult or complex topics are to be dealt with between interlocutors.”
Another frequent conceptual domain for deliberate metaphors is the disease domain (BELGIAN FEDERALISM IS A DISEASE). When presenting Belgian federalism as a disease, the citizens tend to emphasize that Belgium is an illness (see 28 and 29), an infectious excrescence (30), or suggest that the political crisis the country went through in 2007 and the will for more independence by some Flemish nationalists was the result of the egocentrism typical of rich people (31). These disease metaphors are much more represented in the corpus of French-speaking citizens than in the corpus of Dutch-speaking citizens (5 vs. 2 instances).
(27) Du. “…en dat dat is de ziekte van het federalisme. Ik heb dat niet voor niks daarstraks een noodzakelijk kwaad genoemd.” (PBN, M1, 3069-3070)
En. ‘and that’s the disease of federalism. It’s not for nothing if I just named it a necessary evil’ (PBN, M1, 3070-3071)
(28) Du. “Welke bevoegdheden op het nationale niveau, welke bevoegdheden op het regionale niveau? Het wordt helemaal een pest bij wijze van spreken” (PBN, M, 2533-2534)
En. ‘which responsibilities at the national level? Which responsibilities at the regional level? It is becoming a plague so to speak’
(29) Fr. “On a été créer un espèce de furoncle qui s’appelait Belgique…” (PBF, B8, 1097-1098)
En. ‘they created some kind of boil called Belgium…’
(30) Fr. “le fédéralisme est au départ le résultat d’un égocentrisme et d’une maladie de riches.” (PBF, B8, 134-136)
En. ‘federalism is the result of egocentrism and a rich people disease’
A last conceptual domain frequently used to produce metaphors about Belgian federalism is the company domain (BELGIAN FEDERALISM IS A
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COMPANY). Metaphors based on this source domain turn out to be more frequently used by the Dutch-speaking citizens than by the French-speaking citizens. With this metaphor, the citizens tend to express their comprehension of how a state is working in general, and more specifically how politicians are running the country. These examples also illustrate the growing importance of the economic paradigm in our understanding of political processes, as suggested by Koller (2009).
(31) Du. “hoe werkt een staat, een beetje zoals een bedrijfsleider over zijn bedrijf”. (PBN, K4, 1232-1233)
En. ‘how does a state work, a bit like a ceo with his company…
(32) Du. “als je vergelijkt met een bedrijf, een bedrijf laat je ook niet leiden door de werkman of de kuisvrouw bij wijze van spreken” (PBN, L3, 2327-2329)
En. ‘if you compare with a company, you don’t let a company be run by a workman or a cleaning lady, so to speak.’
5. Discussion
Our findings suggest that the citizens use various conceptual domains to make sense of Belgian federalism. Indeed, citizens do produce a lot of metaphors when prompted to talk about Belgian federalism in the context of focus group discussions. This demonstrates that the role of metaphors is not limited to the production side of political discourse but that the citizens actually think of political processes in metaphorical terms as well. This first observation confirms Bougher’s (2012) hypothesis that we can gain valuable political insights from the analysis of citizen corpora. A closer look at the variety of conceptual domains used points to the conceptual domains that have traditionally been shown to underlie political discourse (be it elite or media discourse). The construction domain, the family domain, the machine domain, the journey domain or personifications emerge from the citizen discussions confirming their importance not only for the way we talk about politics but also for the way we think about politics. However, in our data, these domains are massively represented by non-deliberate metaphors often reflecting conventional ways to talk about politics, with the significant
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exception of the family domain. This brings the discussion to the core of the research question: what is the contribution of deliberate metaphors to the study of political discourses?
Our study aimed at analysing citizen discourse in order to assess to what extent the citizens use – deliberate – metaphors to describe complex political relations and processes. To analyse metaphorical expressions in our citizen corpora, we applied a method combining a slightly diverging version of the MIP procedure and Steen’s (2008) three-dimensional model of metaphor analysis in communication to political discourse. Our results suggest that this method, based on the distinction between direct and indirect metaphors at the linguistic level, between novel and conventional metaphors at the conceptual level and between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors at the communicative level, is particularly effective to the study of metaphors in citizen political discourses, and this in at least two respects.
On the one hand, our data show a high proportion of deliberate metaphors, suggesting that, as in elite discourses, citizens do rely on conscious comparisons between conceptual domains in order to explain their opinion and possibly make their case more convincingly. On the other hand, making the distinction between non-deliberate and deliberate metaphors more specifically allowed us to suggest various degrees of saliency of conceptual domains in terms of which the citizens make sense of abstract political processes. While the conceptual domains recurring the most frequently in the metaphors produced by the citizens (e.g. construction domain, personifications, machine domain, journey domain) mainly rely on a large proportion of non-deliberate metaphors often (but not always) reflecting conventional metaphorical extensions of lexical units, other domains (such as the family domain) are characterized by a reversed tendency, showing more deliberate metaphors than non-deliberate ones.
But one could still wonder whether deliberate metaphors are “really deliberate”, to quote Gibbs (2011). Indeed, to assess the (non-)deliberate nature of a metaphor is always a linguistic process of a posteriori re-contextualization. In other words, linguistically we can only rely on an indirect procedure. On this very issue, political science can bring interesting cross-fertilization. All the participants have been surveyed before and after the focus groups. While there was not much difference between the pre- and post-questionnaire, there
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were many more differences between the participants, especially in regard with their opinion about Belgium and its future. What is striking is that participants who have diverging opinions on this issue use different metaphors of the same conceptual domains. Furthermore, they do not differ in the conceptual domains that, as we have shown, resort to most often non-deliberate metaphors but rather within the family domain, which is the one where deliberate metaphors were mostly identified. Indeed, citizens who believe in the unity of Belgium (Belgians, beside their different language, are all the same and should live together) use the metaphor of a marriage of love, while citizens who hold a regionalist or even separatist vision of Belgium (Flemings and Walloons should live in two different countries, or at least in two very distinct entities) put forward the metaphor of the forced marriage, which therefore should be broken up. In between, we have also identified citizens who see Belgium as the union of two people (that is they are different but should have a common future) resort often to the vision of Belgium as a marriage of reason, or others who wish that Belgium remains one single country while still granting much freedom to her two main communities and who, to express this specific vision, rely on a living-apart-together (LAT) relationship metaphor (Perrez/Reuchamps submitted).
A political science approach complements thus well the linguistic approach of deliberate metaphors. Indeed, the former confirms what the latter has shown: the use of some metaphors is deliberate and matches or at least reflects one’s political opinion. This demonstrates that the various conceptual domains are not different ways of saying the same thing. Choosing a particular source domain to depict Belgian federalism does have conceptual consequences. For instance, while speaking of Belgium in terms of a complicated structure or a deficient machine emphasizes the way the different layers of Belgian federalism have been put together and how these different political levels relate to one another, comparing Belgium to a love relationship more specifically highlights the human aspects of the federal state, alluding to the links existing between the members of the two main communities. Identifying deliberate metaphors in such context is thus a good tool to capture the saliency of a particular conceptual domain as a way to express one’s political views. In this regard, the different manners to express the notion of a love relationship have been shown to function as conceptual reference point
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on which the citizens could rely to express their diverging views of Belgian federalism and its future.
Finally, another interesting insight emerging from the analysis of the conceptual domains used by the citizens to produce metaphors is the similarity between the citizen groups under study. Except for a few minor differences, both the French-speaking and the Dutch-speaking citizens tend, on the one hand, to use the same proportion of direct, indirect, novel, conventional, deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors, and, on the other hand, to resort to the same conceptual domains to make sense of Belgian federalism. This does not mean that they have the same vision on its functions and further developments, but that the conceptual domains in terms of which they make sense of it, show a high degree of overlap. What is more, the fact that we found a similar diversity of deliberate metaphors within each language group is an additional hint that deliberate metaphors are indeed – politically – deliberate, and not a mere linguistic consequence.
6. Further work
On the methodological side, by applying Steen’s (2008) three-dimensional model of metaphor analysis in communication, this article has to some extent contributed to further explicate the relationships existing between direct, indirect, novel, conventional, deliberate and non-deliberate metaphors on the basis of actual discourse data and to provide further thoughts on the identification of deliberate metaphors. This methodological approach has appeared to lead to interesting political insights. We would suggest this method should be extended to the analysis of other forms of political communication, including elite discourse and media discourse on political issues. For instance, applying Steen’s (2008) framework to elite discourse might allow us to distinguish the metaphors the political leaders consciously use with the rhetorical goals of framing their audience’s understanding of political issues, from more conventional political metaphors relying on semantic extensions of polysemous lexical units.
A second research avenue for the study of metaphors in political discourse is to consider how these metaphors circulate between the different political actors, by tracing them down in various kinds of political discourses. More specifically, one could wonder to what extent these metaphors follow a
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linear top-down direction, going from the sphere of political elite, possibly via the media, to the citizens’ minds, but also on what grounds some political actors choose their metaphors, and to what extent common citizen or media metaphors play a role on the selection of the metaphors that the leaders produce in a given political context. Hereby, it would be worth broadening the scope of what is classically considered as political discourse by paying attention to the whole range of communication mediums making up this broad category (consider for instance personal websites of political leaders, Twitter accounts, manifestos, public speeches and debates for the elite discourse, editorials, press articles, interviews for media discourse on political issues or focus group discussions, everyday conversations or internet forums for the citizen perspective). Taking these various genres of political communication into account might also lead to the identification of differences in metaphor usage.
Finally, future research on political metaphors should also tackle the question of how metaphors impact upon citizens. As Bougher (2012: 157) posits, metaphors offer “a cognitive mechanism that explains how citizens make sense of the political world by drawing from their non-political knowledge and experiences.” Metaphors therefore do not only reflect the perceived reality, but they also function as cues through which citizens come to understand political positions, and through which they shape their political behaviours. Further analysing how metaphors impact upon citizens can efficiently contribute to an overall understanding of what role and functions metaphors play in political discourse, and more globally in our everyday political interactions.
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Zur Funktion der Doping-Metapher in der deutschen Alltagssprache

Anica Rose

Anica Rose, Universität Münster (anica.rose@uni-muenster.de)

Abstract

Doping ist in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten zu einem zentralen Thema des Sports geworden. Darüber hinaus hat das Lexem Doping einen festen Platz im deutschen Sprachgebrauch. Dieser Artikel untersucht seine metaphorische Verwendung anhand von über 1.100 Zeitungstexten der beiden Medien Die Zeit und Der Spiegel in einem Zeitraum von 1950 bis 2009. Dabei befasst sich die empirische Analyse zum einen mit der sprachlichen Beschaffenheit der Doping-Metapher und zum anderen mit den potentiellen Funktionen, die die Doping-Metapher einnimmt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Doping-Metapher entgegen dem Dopingbegriff im Sport überwiegend positiv konnotiert ist, und weisen so auf eine gesellschaftliche Wahrnehmung und Bewertung von Leistung und Leistungsbereitschaft hin, in der Versuche der Leistungssteigerung positiv beurteilt werden.

Doping became one of the central themes of sport in recent decades. In addition, the lexeme doping has a permanent place in the German language. This article explores its metaphorical use with reference to more than 1,100 newspaper texts of the two German weekly paper Die Zeit and Der Spiegel from 1950 to 2009. Here, the empirical analysis on the one hand is concerned with the linguistic constitution of the doping metaphor and on the other hand with the potential functions of the doping metaphor. The results reveal that the doping metaphor tends to have positive connotations. Accordingly, attempts to improve performance are seen positively by society. This contradicts the negative perception of doping in the field of sport.

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Seite 43

Zur Funktion der Doping-Metapher in der deutschen Alltagssprache

Anica Rose, Universität Münster (anica.rose@uni-muenster.de)

Abstract

Doping ist in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten zu einem zentralen Thema des Sports geworden. Darüber hinaus hat das Lexem Doping einen festen Platz im deutschen Sprachgebrauch. Dieser Artikel untersucht seine metaphorische Verwendung anhand von über 1.100 Zeitungstexten der beiden Medien Die Zeit und Der Spiegel in einem Zeitraum von 1950 bis 2009. Dabei befasst sich die empirische Analyse zum einen mit der sprachlichen Beschaffenheit der Doping-Metapher und zum anderen mit den potentiellen Funktionen, die die Doping-Metapher einnimmt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Doping-Metapher entgegen dem Dopingbegriff im Sport überwiegend positiv konnotiert ist, und weisen so auf eine gesellschaftliche Wahrnehmung und Bewertung von Leistung und Leistungsbereitschaft hin, in der Versuche der Leistungssteigerung positiv beurteilt werden.

Doping became one of the central themes of sport in recent decades. In addition, the lexeme doping has a permanent place in the German language. This article explores its metaphorical use with reference to more than 1,100 newspaper texts of the two German weekly paper Die Zeit and Der Spiegel from 1950 to 2009. Here, the empirical analysis on the one hand is concerned with the linguistic constitution of the doping metaphor and on the other hand with the potential functions of the doping metaphor. The results reveal that the doping metaphor tends to have positive connotations. Accordingly, attempts to improve performance are seen positively by society. This contradicts the negative perception of doping in the field of sport.

1. Einleitung

  1. Am Brunnen im Dorf folgt die Belohnung: Ein alter Mann lädt uns auf einen Schluck vinho tinto in seinen Keller ein. Der Wein ist genau das richtige Doping für die letzten Kilometer zum Barragem. (Zeit, 20.05.1994)

Das ausgewählte Beispiel zeigt stellvertretend den metaphorischen Gebrauch des Lexems Doping außerhalb eines sportlichen Kontextes. Der „Schluck vinho tinto“ wird als Mittel der Wahl für den noch verbleibenden Anstieg der Wanderung bis zum Gipfel empfunden und positiv als „genau das richtige Doping“ hierfür bezeichnet.

Im Bereich des Sports gilt das Phänomen Doping, vereinfacht dargestellt, als künstliche Leistungsmanipulation, die ethisch-moralisch verurteilt und sportrechtlich verfolgt wird. Die genaue Definition des Phänomens Doping unterliegt einem stetigen Anpassungs- und Entwicklungsprozess, der von den verschiedenen Akteuren des Sports und in sozialen Diskursen ausgehandelt wird (Meier/Rose/Woborschil 2012; Reinold/Meier 2012). Seit der Gründung der World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) im Jahr 1999 fällt die Definition dessen, was als Doping verstanden und sanktioniert wird, in ihre Verantwortung. Der Bereich des Dopings wird seitdem durch den WADA-Code festgeschrieben. Entgegen den definitorischen Prozessen des Sports scheint die in der Alltagssprache gebrauchte Doping-Metapher, so die These dieses Aufsatzes, zwar auch Formen der Leistungssteigerung zu repräsentieren, die aber nicht zwingend eine ethisch-moralische Verurteilung implizieren, so dass das Lexem Doping im metaphorischen Gebrauch entgegen seiner Ursprungssemantik eine andere Konnotation entwickelt. Hobermans These der „unresolved cultural crisis“ (2005:6) bezüglich der unterschiedlichen gesellschaftlichen Bewertung von Dopingpraktiken im Sport einerseits und Formen von Enhancement im Alltag andererseits würde sich so auch auf sprachlicher Ebene zeigen.

Die zentralen Fragestellungen dieser Untersuchung[1] sind demnach erstens, wie sich die Doping-Metapher sprachlich konstituiert und wie sie verwendet wird. Zweitens wird danach gefragt, welche Denkmuster und Wertvorstellungen durch die Art der Verwendung der Doping-Metapher enthüllt werden.

Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, wird zunächst der Forschungsstand zu Sportmetaphern und Metaphern im Sport zusammengefasst, um die Doping-Metapher als Metapher aus dem Bereich des Sports zu kontextualisieren. Dabei werden vor allem die durch die Forschungsliteratur erarbeiteten Funktionen dieser Metaphern zusammengefasst. Dann soll das der Doping-Metapher zugrunde liegende metaphorische Konzept nach Lakoff/Johnson (1980, 2003a) beschrieben werden. Im Anschluss daran wird das in dieser Analyse verwendete Textkorpus vorgestellt und erläutert, wie die Doping-Metaphern identifiziert und kodiert wurden. Zuletzt folgen dann die empirische Analyse und die weitere Ergebnispräsentation, bei der der Fokus neben den ermittelten Merkmalen der Doping-Metapher auf ihren verschiedenen möglichen Funktionen liegt.

2. Theoretischer Hintergrund

2.1 Sportmetaphern und Metaphern im Sport

Das Auftreten von Sportmetaphern in nicht-sportlichen Kontexten wird mindestens seit den 1970er Jahren bemerkt. So thematisieren Hardaway (1976) und Lipsky (1979) die auffällige Sportrhetorik beim damaligen US-Präsidenten Richard Nixon sowie den damit einhergehenden Einfluss von Sportmetaphern in der amerikanischen Alltagssprache. Im weiteren zeitlichen Verlauf gibt es zahlreiche Arbeiten, die sich mit dem Phänomen der Sportmetaphern auseinandersetzen. Die Untersuchungen lassen sich zum einen in Studien, die sich mit Sportmetaphern in der Alltagssprache bzw. in nicht-sportlichen Kontexten befassen (Hardaway 1976; Lipsky 1979; Cosentino 1994; Jansen/Sabo 1994; Segrave 1994; Semino/Masci 1996; Segrave 2000; Wörsching 2000; Cudd 2007), und zum anderen in Arbeiten, die (‘allgemeine‘) Metaphern im sportlichen Kontext thematisieren (Michels 2002; Döring/Osthus 2002; Schmidt 2004; Ryall 2008; Stewart/Smith/Sparkes 2011; Shields/Bredemeier 2011), unterscheiden. Gemeinsam ist beiden Gruppen, dass sie jeweils eine Verbindung zwischen Sport und Nicht-Sport ziehen und die Verflechtung der Domäne Sport mit anderen Domänen anhand von Metaphern untersuchen.

Der Dopingbegriff als eine Metapher für die Steigerung von etwas bzw. von x in einem nicht-sportlichen Kontext wurde bisher weder von der englisch- noch von der deutschsprachigen Forschung aufgegriffen. Eingehend thematisiert wurde aber beispielsweise die metaphorische Verknüpfung von Sport und Krieg (Cosentino 1994; Jansen/Sabo 1994; Semino/Masci 1996; Segrave 2000; Michels 2002; Döring/Osthus 2002; Schmidt 2004; Stewart/Smith/Sparkes 2011). Es wird quantitativ nachgewiesen, dass der Bereich Krieg/Militär der häufigste Metaphernspender für den Sport ist; das metaphorische Konzept nach Lakoff/Johnson (2003) hierzu lautet sport ist krieg. Sowohl Michels (2002) als auch Schmidt (2004) zeigen dies in ihren Analysen zur Fußball-WM 1998 in Frankreich und zum Tennis in Wimbledon, wenngleich sie sich auf ein relativ kleines Korpus stützen. Cosentino (1994) sowie Jansen und Sabo (1994) beschäftigen sich Anfang der 1990er Jahre mit dem Zweiten Golfkrieg, indem sie die mediale Berichterstattung in den USA untersuchen. Die Sportmetaphern, die in diesem Zusammenhang verwendet wurden, entstammen vornehmlich dem US-amerikanischen Football (Cosentino 1994). Hier ist umgekehrt der Sport der Ursprungsbereich bzw. Metaphernspender für den Bereich Krieg/Militär. Das metaphorische Konzept lautet dementsprechend krieg ist sport. Darüber hinaus kommen Jansen und Sabo (1994) zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Gebrauch von Sport-Kriegs-Metaphern einem stark maskulin geprägten, gesellschaftlichen Bild geschuldet ist, bei dem Frauen als Randfiguren marginalisiert und homophobe Elemente identifiziert werden. Dieser Gender-Aspekt wird von Segrave (1994, 2000) bestätigt, der nachweist, dass die von ihm untersuchten Sportmetaphern die Herstellung von Gender-Kategorien begünstigen, und zu dem Schluss kommt, dass diese den heterosexuellen Mann idealisieren. Weitere Untersuchungen bekräftigen den Transport maskuliner Ideale über (Sport-)Metaphern (Wörsching 2000; Stewart/Smith/Sparkes 2011).

Die hier diskutierten Untersuchungen haben unterschiedliche Funktionen von (‘allgemeinen‘) Metaphern im Bereich Sport und Sportmetaphern im nicht-sportlichen Kontext erkannt. Dabei lassen sich die folgenden Funktionen zusammenfassen: Vielfach wird in den Untersuchungen, die sich auf Sportmetaphern im politischen Umfeld konzentrieren, ausgemacht, dass die Sportmetaphern der jeweiligen politischen Thematik eine andere Konnotation verleihen. Die Sportmetaphern „bringen potenziell etwas von ihrer eigenen Lebensluft mit sich“ (Küster 2009:74). Durch die Verwendung von Sportmetaphern bekommt das Themenfeld Politik einerseits einen zugänglicheren und interessanteren Anstrich (Semino/Masci 1996:251; Walk 1995:51f.; Segrave 1994:109). Andererseits werden Sportmetaphern in diesem Zusammenhang auch genutzt, um eigene politische Ideen populär zu transportieren (Jansen/Sabo 1994: 8; Walk 1995:52). Semino und Masci (1996) zeigen dies am Beispiel Silvio Berlusconis, der mit seiner Fußballrhetorik während seines Wahlkampfes 1994 einen Großteil der italienischen Wähler hinter sich weiß:

Overall, then, one of the effects of football metaphor is to turn politics into a spectator sport. Within the POLITICS IS FOOTBALL equation, the position of ordinary people is not one of distant and cynical observation but one of involved and enthusiastic support for one's particular side. (Semino/Masci 1996:251)

Diese integrierend-verbindende Wirkung in Bezug auf ein nationales Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl bemerkt auch Küster (2009:71). Während bei Sportmetaphern im Bereich Politik eine eher positive Wirkung festgestellt wird, weisen Sportmetaphern im Bereich „sexual relations“ eine negativ-sexistische Konnotation auf. Hier zeigt sich, dass Sportmetaphern Unpersönlichkeit und Abstraktheit erzeugen (Segrave 1994:109; Semino/Masci 1996:251) sowie den heterosexuellen Mann als alleiniges Ideal darstellen (s.o.). In diesem Zusammenhang zeigt sich darüber hinaus auch, dass die Sportmetaphern eine simplifizierende Funktion haben können, wenn durch ihre Verwendung eine unbekannte Domäne erschließbar wird, wie Semino und Masci (1996) dies am Beispiel der Fußballmetaphern illustrieren. Durch sie kann für einige italienische Wähler Vertrautheit in den Bereich der Politik Berlusconis transportiert werden (Semino/Masci 1996:250; vgl. auch Hardaway 1976:78). Schließlich können Metaphern auch eine emotionalisierende und bewertende Funktion einnehmen, um bestimmte Themen oder Spielsituationen im Sport ggf. interessanter darzustellen oder den Fokus darauf zu legen (Michels 2002:64; Schmidt 2002:88; Küster 2009:71).

2.2 Die Doping-Metapher als metaphorisches Konzept

In der deutschen Metaphernforschung werden sowohl die Arbeiten von Max Black (1987:535-552) und Harald Weinrich (1976:295ff.) als auch Metaphors we live by von Lakoff und Johnson (2003a), das im Jahr 1980 erstmalig erschienen ist, als wichtige Metapherntheorien rezipiert und weiterentwickelt (vgl. z.B. Liebert 1992; Baldauf 1996; Rolf 2005; Skirl/Schwarz-Friesel 2013). Dagegen konzentriert sich die englischsprachige Forschung vornehmlich auf die Arbeiten von Lakoff/Johnson (vgl. Deignan 2010; Knowles/Moon 2006; Kövecses 2002, 2007; Semino 2008). Auch die Untersuchungen zu Sportmetaphern und Metaphern im Sport legen größtenteils die kognitive Metapherntheorie von Lakoff/Johnson zugrunde (vgl. Segrave 1994, 2000; Semino/Masci 1994; Michels 2002; Schmidt 2004; Cudd 2007; Ryall 2008; Stewart/Smith/Sparkes 2011; Shields/Bredemeier 2011).

Lakoff/Johnson (2003a:3f.) gehen davon aus, dass Metaphern im Leben der Menschen eine wichtige Rolle spielen, und argumentieren, dass nicht nur die Sprache, sondern auch das Denken und Handeln metaphorisch strukturiert sei. Ihre grundlegende Annahme dabei ist: „The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind in terms of another.“ (Lakoff/Johnson 2003a:5). Nach Jäkel (2003:31f.) beschreibt dieses Zitat zugleich die „explanatorische Hauptfunktion“ von kognitiven Metaphern. Wenn Lakoff/Johnson (2003a:6) sich auf Metaphern beziehen, sind damit immer metaphorische Konzepte von ihnen impliziert. Diese bestehen aus der Verbindung zweier konzeptueller Bereiche: dem Herkunfts- und dem Zielbereich. Während der Herkunftsbereich konkret ist, ist der Zielbereich eher abstrakt und übernimmt seine Struktur vom Herkunftsbereich (vgl. auch Deignan 2010:44-45). Nach Baldauf (1996:92; Kursiv im Original) fließen die „als Herkunftsbereich genutzten Erfahrungen […] in ihrer idealisierten, prototypischen Version in den metaphorischen Prozeß“ ein (vgl. auch Knowles/Moon 2006:10). Lakoff/Johnson (2003a:9-13) führen weiter aus, dass die metaphorische Übertragung partiell und nicht total sei. Das metaphorische Konzept bediene sich der Struktur des Herkunftsbereichs nur teilweise, sei aber nicht damit gleichzusetzen. Gleichzeitig bleiben andere Aspekte des Herkunftskonzeptes verborgen. Lakoff/Johnson sprechen in diesem Zusammenhang von „highlighting and hiding“. Interessant ist nach Jäkel (2003:33 und 36ff.) hierbei die Frage, welche Optionen im jeweiligen Kontext realisiert werden, er bezeichnet dies als Fokussierungseffekt und zugleich als eine weitere Funktion von kognitiven Metaphern. Eine dritte Funktion resultiert aus ihrer „potentiellen Bedeutungsfülle“ (Jäkel 2003:33), auf die auch Knowles und Moon (2006:12) hinweisen:

By using metaphors, much more can be conveyed, through implication and connotation, than through straightforward, literal language. […] It is this imprecision, this 'fuzziness' of meaning, which makes metaphor such a powerful tool in the communication of emotion, evaluation, and explanation too.

Übertragen auf den hier relevanten Untersuchungsgegenstand bedeutet dies Folgendes: Die Untersuchung der Doping-Metapher zeigt, dass ihr das metaphorische Konzept mehr x ist doping zugrunde liegt. Während doping das Konzept des Herkunftsbereichs ist, stellt mehr x, im Sinne einer Steigerung von etwas, das Konzept des Zielbereichs dar. Das Konzept doping besteht in seiner prototypischen Version aus der mentalen Repräsentation der einzelnen Konzepte sport, leistungssteigerung, substanz, unerlaubt und ist damit im Vergleich zum abstrakten Konzept mehr x relativ konkret. Beim metaphorischen Konzept mehr x ist doping werden also unsere Alltagserfahrung mit Doping auf das Konzept mehr x übertragen. Mit anderen Worten: Das Verständnis des Zielkonzeptes mehr x speist sich aus dem Herkunftskonzept doping und wird hierdurch strukturiert (vgl. zu den Termini Lakoff/Johnson 2003b; Skirl/Schwarz-Friesel 2013:7-9).

Zur besseren Illustration soll an dieser Stelle nochmals das einleitende Beispiel angeführt werden:

  1. Am Brunnen im Dorf folgt die Belohnung: Ein alter Mann lädt uns auf einen Schluck vinho tinto in seinen Keller ein. Der Wein ist genau das richtige Doping für die letzten Kilometer zum Barragem. (Zeit, 20.05.1994)

Während der Herkunftsbereich hier Doping im Sport ist, liegt der Zielbereich im kodierten Bereich Leben bzw. genauer der Wanderung zu einem Gipfel. Die Konzeptualisierung des Konzepts doping auf den Bereich Leben gestaltet sich so, dass die substanz durch den Wein repräsentiert wird. Dieser ist das sogenannte Dopingmittel, um die „letzten Kilometer zum Barragem“, die die leistungssteigerung konzeptualisiert, zu bewältigen.

2.3 Methodische Vorgehensweise

Das Korpus, aus dem die gewonnenen Ergebnisse resultieren, besteht aus 1.147 Print-Texten der beiden Wochenpublikationen Der Spiegel (Spiegel) und Die Zeit (Zeit) im Zeitraum von Januar 1950 bis Dezember 2009 und wurde für das vom Bundesinstitut für Sportwissenschaft (BISp) geförderte Forschungsprojekt „Doping in Deutschland von 1950 bis heute aus historisch-soziologischer Sicht im Kontext ethischer Legitimation“ erhoben. Für beide Medien konnte eine Vollerhebung realisiert werden, so dass sich diese Untersuchung auf eine breite empirische Basis authentischer Sprachdaten stützen kann. Das maßgebliche Kriterium für die Zugehörigkeit der Texte zum Untersuchungskorpus ist, dass das Lexem Doping in dem jeweiligen Artikel enthalten ist. Insgesamt weist das Korpus 1.349.218 Millionen Textwörter auf, durchschnittlich umfasst ein Text 1.176 Wörter.[2]

Die Identifikation der Doping-Metaphern erfolgt in verschiedenen Schritten: Um eine reliable Kodierung zu garantieren, wurde zu Beginn ein Codebuch erstellt (Rose 2013b). Anschließend wurden diejenigen Textstellen kodiert, bei denen das Lexem Doping in metaphorischer Verwendung wahrgenommen wurde. Es wurde entweder der gesamte Satz oder der gesamte Absatz kodiert. Die Kodierungen wurden zunächst als potenziell metaphorisch gewertet und dann anschließend nochmals überprüft, ob sie tatsächlich als Metaphern beurteilt werden können (Cameron/Maslen 2010:102).

Die Tabelle 1 bildet die identifizierten Doping-Metaphern nach Dekaden gegliedert ab. Die dritte Spalte zeigt die normierten Werte auf die jeweiligen Teilkorpora pro Hunderttausend Wörter (pHW) (Perkuhn/Keibel/Kupietz 2012).


 

 

 

Dekade

Metaphern

pHW

1950

1

8

1960

5

11

1970

7

9

1980

10

6

1990

27

6

2000

39

6

n

89

 

Tab. 1  Doping-Metaphern pro Dekade

Die 89 identifizierten Doping-Metaphern bilden 1,3 Prozent der gesamten Token für Verwendungen des Lexems Doping (n=6.605). Es zeigt sich also, dass die metaphorische Verwendungsform von Doping im Vergleich zu den nicht-metaphorischen recht gering ist. Die absoluten Zahlen weisen darauf hin, dass diese kontinuierlich ansteigen, wohingegen die normierten Werte der ursprünglich unterschiedlich großen Teilkorpora zeigen, dass die Verwendung von Doping als Metapher in Relation leicht zurückgegangen ist, zuletzt aber stabil bei sechs Token pro Hunderttausend Wörtern liegt. Einerseits wird so deutlich, dass die metaphorische Verwendung von Doping kein neues sprachliches Phänomen darstellt, andererseits wird sie auch nicht über die 60 Jahre zunehmend genutzt. Die Doping-Metapher kann dementsprechend als eine kreative (nicht aber innovative) Metapher gewertet werden (vgl. Skirl/Schwarz-Friesel 2013:29ff.).

In einem nächsten Schritt wurden die Doping-Metaphern nach verschiedenen Kriterien kodiert (vgl. Rose 2013b): Es wurde erstens jede Metapher auf ihren Herkunfts- und Zielbereich untersucht (vgl. Deignan 2010:52). Dabei stellt der Zielbereich auf der Ebene der sozialen Analyse zugleich den gesellschaftlichen Bereich dar, in den das Konzept doping übertragen wird. Zweitens wurde jede Metapher hinsichtlich ihrer positiven, neutralen oder negativen Konnotation in Bezug auf Doping als Form einer Leistungssteigerung geprüft bzw. kodiert. Außerdem wurde drittens zum einen kodiert, welche Substanz oder welches Verfahren explizit als sogenanntes Dopingmittel genannt wurde oder impliziert wurde (womit wurde „gedopt“?). Zum anderen wurde der Zweck oder das Ziel des Dopens kodiert (wofür wurde „gedopt“?). Schließlich wurden verschiedene Funktionen der Doping-Metapher ermittelt, indem kodiert wurde, welche der prototypischen Optionen bzw. Konzepte im jeweiligen Kontext übertragen und welche auch nicht übertragen wurden, um daraus abzuleiten, welcher Fokus durch die Doping-Metapher gelegt wurde (vgl. Jäkel 2003).

3. Empirische Analyse

3.1 Zur Beschaffung der Doping-Metapher

Nach den methodischen Erläuterungen des vorherigen Kapitels soll nun die Konstitution der Doping-Metapher untersucht werden. Dabei liegt der Fokus auf den unterschiedlichen Zielbereichen des metaphorischen Konzepts mehr x ist doping, auf der Konnotation bzw. der moralischen Bewertung von Doping und auf den Realisierungen des Konzeptes doping des Herkunftsbereichs. Die Tabelle 2 präsentiert zum einen die Doping-Metaphern nach gesellschaftlichen Bereichen (Zielbereiche) gegliedert und zum anderen die positive, neutrale oder negative Bewertung der jeweiligen Metapher.

 

Gesellschaftlicher Bereich

n

positiv

neutral

negativ

Sport

25

17 (68,0%)

1 (4,0%)

7 (28,0%)

Wissenschaft

19

17 (89,5%)

1 (5,3%)

1 (5,3%)

Wirtschaft

15

10 (66,7%)

0 (0,0%)

5 (33,3%)

Politik

10

6 (60,0%)

3 (30,0%)

1 (10,0%)

Kultur

10

8 (80,0%)

1 (10,0%)

1 (10,0%)

Leben

9

7 (77,8%)

1 (11,1%)

1 (11,1%)

Technik

1

1 (100%)

0 (0,0%)

0 (0,0%)

N

89 (100%)

66 (74,2%)

7 (7,9%)

16 (18,0%)

Tab. 2  Doping-Metaphern in verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen mit Bewertung

Es zeigt sich, dass das metaphorische Konzept mehr x ist doping recht variabel ist und sich auf verschiedenste gesellschaftliche Bereiche übertragen lässt. Im Falle von mehr x ist doping gibt es bei allen Beispielen einen Herkunftsbereich, den Sport, und mindestens sieben Zielbereiche. Vermutlich wird diese Variabilität durch das abstrakte Konzept mehr x gewährleistet, da seine abstrakte Gestalt mehr Interpretationsspielraum offen lässt. Die Tabelle bestätigt klar, dass das Lexem Doping als Metapher außerhalb des sportlichen Kontextes verwendet wird. Ein überraschendes Ergebnis ist aber, dass der Sport selbst den größten Zielbereich der metaphorischen Verwendungsweise von Doping darstellt (28 Prozent), so dass die Doping-Metapher nicht nur außerhalb des sportlichen Kontextes, sondern auch innerhalb desselben funktioniert. Das folgende Beispiel veranschaulicht dies im Radsport:

  1. Merckx gab nur psychologisches Doping zu: „Ich stelle mir vor, daß meine Gegner sich noch mehr quälen als ich.“ (Spiegel, 14.07.1969)

Bei diesem Zitat sind sowohl der Herkunfts- als auch der Zielbereich der Doping-Metapher der Bereich Sport. Das Konzept substanz wird im Zielbereich als mentale Einstellung des belgischen Radrennfahrers Eddie Merckx, die durch sein Zitat zum Ausdruck gebracht wird, konzeptualisiert. Der sich bei Merckx einstellende sportliche Erfolg, der anfangs im Text thematisiert wird, repräsentiert das Konzept mehr x.

Weiterhin äußert sich durch die Kodierungen, dass das metaphorische Konzept mehr x ist doping grundsätzlich im Gegensatz zum Doping im Sport eher positiv konnotiert ist. Bei allen gesellschaftlichen Bereichen sind deutlich mehr als die Hälfte der Beispiele positiv kodiert. Es zeigt sich die allgemein positive Darstellung der (Leistungs-) Steigerung, was das nachfolgende Beispiel verdeutlicht. Hier konzeptualisiert das Spielen von Musik das Konzept substanz des Herkunftsbereiches, während die „längere Verweildauer“ das mehr x repräsentiert:

  1. Durch das musikalische Doping werde die „Bereitschaft zum Kauf günstig beeinflußt“, und es führe auch zu einer „längeren Verweildauer der Kunden“. (Spiegel, 22.04.1968)

Die Wahrnehmung von Doping als devianter Strategie ist zunächst also vor allem dem Sport genuin, als Ergebnis einer jahrzehntelangen, prozessualen Aushandlung von Doping und Antidoping im Sport (vgl. Reinold/Becker/Nielsen 2012; Reinold/Meier 2012). Damit bestätigt sich auch, dass beim metaphorischen Gebrauch nicht alle Eigenschaften des Konzepts doping übertragen werden müssen. Wenn das prototypische Konzept doping aus sport, leistungssteigerung, substanz, unerlaubt besteht, muss neben der Konstituente sport zumindest letztere Komponente des Konzepts nicht immer gewährleistet sein. Im Gegensatz zum Herkunftsbereich Sport muss Doping in den Zielbereichen also nicht zwangsläufig als deviante Strategie markiert werden. Ein Beispiel für die Doping-Metapher mit negativer Konnotation stammt aus dem Spiegel:

  1. Schon vor dem wirtschaftlichen Aufbruch war die mentale Prägung der Volksrepublik China, auf Englisch „People's Republic of China“, deshalb die einer „People's Republic of Cheats“, einer Schwindlerrepublik, wie das Hongkonger Wirtschaftsblatt „Far Eastern Economic Review“ spottet. Doch mit dem ehrgeizigen Ziel, in einer Tour de Force zur Wirtschaftsnation Nummer eins aufzusteigen, wurde der Ideenklau nun zum Doping der chinesischen Volkswirtschaft: ein Turbomittel, das hemmungslos eingesetzt wird, um auf jeden Berg zu kommen, vor allen anderen, am besten ohne alle anderen. (Spiegel, 27.08.2007; Hervorhebungen A.R.)

Während der ‘Ideenklau‘ als Dopingmittel konzeptualisiert ist und hier auch als unerlaubte Strategie markiert wird, repräsentiert der Aufschwung „der chinesischen Volkswirtschaft“ das mehr x. Darüber hinaus ist an diesem Beispiel bemerkenswert, dass die Doping-Metapher durch weitere Lexeme konzeptualisiert wird, die im Text fett markiert sind. Die Konzeptualisierung in Form von weiteren Lexemen scheint aber nur möglich zu sein, wenn bei dem metaphorischen Konzept mehr x ist doping eine negative Konnotation mitschwingt. Ob eine positive, neutrale oder negative Konnotation beim jeweiligen Beispiel mitschwingt, hängt also vom Kontext und damit vermutlich auch von der Sprecherintention ab.

Lakoff/Johnson (2003a:10-13) haben schon argumentiert, dass die Übertragung metaphorischer Konzepte partiell und nicht total ist. Für das metaphorische Konzept mehr x ist doping zeigt sich bei der Auswertung der kodierten Beispiele der Doping-Metaphern, dass zwei Aspekte in nahezu allen Fällen übertragen werden. Dies sind einerseits die Darstellungen, womit und andererseits wofür „gedopt“ wird. Die Textstellen übernehmen von der Struktur des Herkunftskonzeptes also immer das Mittel (substanz) und den Zweck des Dopings (leistungssteigerung) und übertragen dies auf ihren jeweiligen Zielbereich. Im Falle der Doping-Metapher gestaltet sich die Realisierung dieser beiden Aspekte sehr variabel, wie die nachfolgenden Tabellen 3 und 4 veranschaulichen.

 

Kodiertes „Dopingmittel“

Anzahl

Prozent

Substanz

23

25,8%

Psyche

10

11,2%

Lebens- und Genussmittel

8

9,0%

Person

8

9,0%

Politische Maßnahmen

7

7,9%

Medien

6

6,7%

Geld

6

6,7%

Musik

4

4,5%

Kleidung

1

1,1%

Sonstiges

16

18,0%

 

89

100,0%

Tab. 3  Kodierte „Dopingmittel“ zusammengefasst in Kategorien

Während die Tabelle 3 die kodierten „Dopingmittel“ abbildet, zeigt die Tabelle 4 die kodierten Ziele bzw. die verschiedenen Repräsentationen des Konzeptes mehr x.

 

Kodierter „Dopingzweck“

Anzahl

Prozent

Sportlicher Erfolg

19

21,3%

Wirtschaftliche Leistung

15

16,9%

Mentale Leistung

14

15,7%

Selbstwertgefühl

6

6,7%

Bewegung im Alltag

5

5,6%

Behandlung von Krankheiten

4

4,5%

Vergnügen

4

4,5%

Körperliches Ideal

3

3,4%

Motivation

2

2,2%

Sonstige

17

19,1%

 

89

100,0%

Tab. 4  Kodierte „Dopingzwecke“ zusammengefasst in Kategorien

Bemerkenswert ist, dass sich das „Dopingmittel“, das mit 25,8 Prozent deutlich am häufigsten kodiert wurde, eng an der mentalen Repräsentation des Konzepts doping des Herkunftsbereichs orientiert (vgl. Tab. 3). Bei fast allen Kodierungen handelt es sich hierbei um Medikamente, größtenteils Psychopharmaka oder Hormone; lediglich beim ältesten Text des Korpus (Spiegel, 05.01.1950) wird die Einnahme eines Dopingmittels im heutigen Sinne thematisiert. Das Aufputschmittel Pervitin wird dort vom Karnevalsprinzen Peter I. genutzt, um die Anforderungen des Kölner Karnevals zu meistern. Am zweithäufigsten (11,2 Prozent) wird die ausschließlich als positiv gewertete Beeinflussung der Psyche beispielsweise durch mentales Training, Therapie oder einen festen Glauben als „Dopingmittel“ verstanden. Darüber hinaus werden Lebens- und Genussmittel wie Kaffee, Wein, Bananen und Zigaretten als „Dopingmittel“ gewertet, wie es auch am Textbeispiel der Einleitung zu sehen ist. Grundsätzlich offenbaren die Metaphernbeispiele, dass sich das Konzept substanz sowohl auf konkrete Mittel als auch auf Abstrakta wie beispielweise „Ideenklau“ (Spiegel, 27.08.2007, s.o.) übertragen lässt.

Dahingegen zeigt die Tabelle 4, dass sportlicher Erfolg mit 21,3 Prozent der häufigste „Dopingzweck“ des Lexems Doping in metaphorischer Verwendung ist. Die beiden nachfolgenden Kategorien sind die Steigerung der wirtschaftlichen und mentalen Leistungsfähigkeit. Während die drei häufigsten „Dopingzwecke“ eine direkte oder relative Nähe zum Konzept leistungssteigerung offenbaren, zeigt das folgende Textbeispiel eine abstraktere Übertragung des Konzepts leistungssteigerung auf den Zielbereich:

  1. Sacco 898 Mark – What a feeling – leicht und komfortabel. Das ist Doping für die Seele. Sacco 898 Mark – Wann haben Sie sich das letzte Mal verwöhnt? (Zeit, 03.05.1996)

Das Lexem Doping ist hier vermutlich anstelle von Balsam verwendet worden, so dass das Konzept leistungssteigerung dadurch realisiert ist, dass eine Steigerung des individuellen Wohlbefindens impliziert wird.

3.2 Funktionen der Doping-Metapher

In der Analyse wird ebenfalls untersucht, inwiefern sich die Eigenschaften des Herkunftsbereichs der Doping-Metapher auf den jeweiligen Zielbereich übertragen. Im Anschluss daran sollen entsprechende Schlussfolgerungen gezogen werden, indem danach gefragt wird, „welche Funktionen die verwendeten Metaphern im Kommunikationsprozess […] erfüllen können“ (Kirchhoff 2010:134). Die Tabelle 5 bildet die Realisierung der verschiedenen Aspekte des Konzepts doping ab, wobei jede einzelne ermittelte Textstelle des Korpus auf die vier prototypischen Eigenschaften überprüft und mit „ja=realisiert“ oder „nein=nicht realisiert“ kodiert wird.

 

 

ja

nein

weitere

Summe

Konzept

n

%

n

%

n

%

n

%

SPORT

25

28,1

64

71,9

0

0

89

100

LEISTUNGSSTEIGERUNG

89

100

0

0

0

0

89

100

SUBSTANZ

31

34,8

56

62,9

2

2,2

89

100

UNERLAUBT

16

18

66

74,2

7

7,9

89

100

Tab. 5  Übertragung prototypischer Eigenschaften des Konzepts DOPING

Dass das Konzept sport überwiegend (71,9 Prozent) nicht übertragen wird, erstaunt weniger, sondern eher, dass die Doping-Metapher auch im Zielbereich Sport verwendet wird (s.o.). Schließlich bildet der Sport grundsätzlich den Herkunftsbereich der Doping-Metapher, die dann auf den jeweiligen Zielbereich übertragen wird.

Da die Doping-Metapher sich durch das metaphorische Konzept mehr x ist doping konstituiert, ist es augenscheinlich, dass das Konzept leistungssteigerung maßgeblich realisiert sein muss. Die Kodierungen bestätigen dies entsprechend; bei 100 Prozent der Metaphernbeispiele ist es auf den Zielbereich übertragen worden. So kann diese Eigenschaft eindeutig als Hauptfunktion der Doping-Metapher verstanden werden. Unterstrichen wird dies dadurch, dass die anderen drei Eigenschaften nicht zwingend (in einem engen Sinne) realisiert sein müssen. Dies zeigt sich im Besonderen daran, dass Doping in metaphorischer Verwendung größtenteils nicht negativ konnotiert ist (siehe vorheriges Kapitel), es aber auch je nach Kontext sein kann. Bei 74,2 Prozent der untersuchten Beispiele wird das Konzept unerlaubt nicht übertragen. Auf kommunikativer Ebene unterstreichen diese beiden Aspekte die Funktion der positiven Bewertung einer gesellschaftlichen Leistungsmentalität oder des Erreichens einer Leistung. Diese kann, wie das vorhergehende Kapitel gezeigt hat, in ganz unterschiedlicher Form durch die Doping-Metapher realisiert werden, größtenteils aber wird sie gesellschaftlich bejaht, da sie nicht zwingend wie Doping im Sport als deviant bewertet wird. In den Fällen, bei denen die Konnotation negativ ist, liegt eine entscheidende Funktion der Doping-Metapher in der expliziten Markierung des als abweichend empfundenen Verhaltens.

Das Konzept substanz wird in über der Hälfte der Beispiele (62,9 Prozent) nicht explizit übertragen. Allerdings diskutierte das vorhergehende Kapitel unter anderem, dass im Kontext von Dopingmitteln bei ‘verwandten‘ Substanzen wie Psychopharmaka und Hormonen das metaphorische Konzept mehr x ist doping durchaus übertragen wird. Eine (kognitive und vielleicht auch kommunikative) Funktion der Doping-Metapher kann in diesem Kontext sein, eine erklärende Verbindung zwischen den beiden Bereichen herzustellen. Bei den Metaphernbeispielen, bei denen das Konzept substanz als nicht übertragen kodiert wurde, werden einerseits Lebens- und Genussmittel und andererseits beispielsweise Kleidung oder Musik etc. als Dopingmittel bezeichnet (s.o.), die die Funktion innehaben, mittels der Doping-Metapher teilweise einen gewissen modern-sportlichen Lifestyle zu implizieren und transportieren.

4. Zusammenfassung

Zusammenfassend lässt sich bilanzieren, dass der metaphorische Gebrauch des Lexems Doping mindestens seit den 1950er Jahren belegt ist. Es zeigt sich, dass Doping sowohl innerhalb als auch außerhalb des sportlichen Kontextes als Metapher fungieren kann. Grundsätzlich besteht bei den meisten Textbeispielen eine Übertragung der Konzepte leistungssteigerung und substanz des Herkunftsbereiches auf den Zielbereich, wenngleich dies für das Konzept substanz eher in einem weiteren Sinne der Fall ist, da bei den jeweiligen Textbeispielen die ‘Dopingmittel‘ nicht Substanzen in einem engeren Sinne sind, sondern ganz unterschiedlich ausfallen können (s.o.). Wie eingangs vermutet, besitzt die Doping-Metapher entgegen der Konnotation ihres Herkunftsbereichs, dem Sport, vorwiegend eine positive Konnotation. Diese positive Wertung hat sie überraschenderweise oftmals auch inne, wenn die Doping-Metapher innerhalb des Sports eingesetzt wird. Damit markiert sie in ihren verschiedenen möglichen Zielbereichen nicht explizit abweichendes Verhalten, sondern betont vorwiegend den Aspekt der Leistungssteigerung.

Dieser Aufsatz zeigt des Weiteren, dass die positive Konnotation der Doping-Metapher auf eine gewisse gesellschaftliche Faszination gegenüber Leistungssteigerung im Allgemeinen hinweist. Die Steigerung von etwas, in dieser Untersuchung repräsentiert durch das mehr x, wird außerhalb des sportlichen Kontextes zunächst grundsätzlich begrüßt. Im Sport ist das Erzielen von Best- bzw. Höchstleistungen ein wichtiges Merkmal, so dass die Steigerung der sportlichen Leistung dem Hochleistungssport inhärent ist. Im Zuge einer Antidopingpolitik wird dann durch die verschiedenen Akteure des Sports definiert, welche Mittel dafür legitim und welche illegitim sind. Bei den untersuchten Metaphernbeispielen hingegen geht teilweise mit der positiven Sicht auf Leistungssteigerung eine moralische Indifferenz bzw. die Ausblendung moralischer Fragen einher, die sich auf eine Annäherung der Bewertung von einer allgemeinen Leistungssteigerung als gesellschaftlich wichtiges Gut begründet und die These einer gesellschaftlichen Leistungsmentalität stützt (Hoberman 2005; Singler 2012).

Darüber hinaus scheint die Doping-Metapher bei einigen Textbeispielen auch als unkonventionelles sprachliches Mittel zu fungieren, das der Textstelle einen gewissen Wortwitz bzw. Originalität verleihen soll. In diesem Zusammenhang wird die jeweilige Form der Leistungssteigerung nicht problematisiert, sondern als nützliches Gut aufgefasst. So kann, wie im Eingangsbeispiel formuliert, ein „Schluck vinho tinto“ als Dopingmittel konzeptualisiert werden und damit ein Stück Lebensqualität repräsentieren. In diesem Beispiel steht die Doping-Metapher dann nicht für deviantes, sondern für erwünschtes Verhalten.

5. Literaturverzeichnis

5.1 Sekundärliteratur

Baldauf, Christa (1996): Metapher und Kognition. Grundlagen einer neuen Theorie der Alltagsmetapher, Frankfurt am Main.

Black, Max (1987): „Metaphor“, in: Margolis, Joseph (ed.): Philosophy looks at the arts. Contemporary readings in aesthetics, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 535-552.

Cameron, Lynne/Maslen, Robert (2010). “Identifying metaphors in discourse data”, in: Cameron, Lynne/Maslen, Robert (eds.): Metaphor Analysis. Research Practice in Applied Linguistics, Social Sciences and the Humanities, London, 97-115.

Cosentino, Frank (1994): „War, the Persian Gulf and the Sporting Metaphor – A Discussion“, in: Sport History Review 25 (2), 42-49.

Cudd, Ann E. (2007): „Sporting Metaphors: Competition and the Ethos of Capitalism“, in: Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 34, 52-67.

Deignan, Alice (2010): „The cognitive view of metaphor: Conceptual metaphor theory“, in: Cameron, Lynne/Maslen, Robert (eds.): Metaphor Analysis. Research Practice in Applied Linguistics, Social Sciences and the Humanities, London, 44-56.

Döring, Martin/Osthus, Dietmar (2002): „Black, Blanc, Bleur: Metaphorische Identität, identische Metaphern? – Formen und Funktionen der Metaphorik der französischen Tagespresse zum Mondial 1998“, in: metaphorik.de 3, 17-43.

Hardaway, Francine (1976): „Foul Play: Sports Metaphors as Public Doublespeak“, in: College English 38 (1), 78-82.

Hoberman, John M. (2005): Testosterone Dreams. Rejuvenation, Aphrodisia, Doping, Berkeley.

Jäkel, Olaf (2003): Wie Metaphern Wissen schaffen. Die kognitive Metapherntheorie und ihre Anwendung in Modell-Analysen der Diskursbereiche Geistestätigkeit, Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Religion (Sprachwissenschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse, 59), Hamburg.

Jansen, Sue Curry/Sabo, Don (1994): „The Sport/ War Metaphor: Hegemonic Masculinity, the Persian Gulf War, and the New World Order“, in: Sociology of Sport Journal 11, 1-17.

Kirchhoff, Susanne (2010): Krieg mit Metaphern. Mediendiskurse über 9/11 und den "War on Terror" (Critical media studies, 2), Bielefeld.

Knowles, Mark/Moon, Rosamund (2006): Introducing Metaphor, London.

Kövecses, Zoltán (2002): Metaphor. A Practical Introduction, Oxford.

Kövecses, Zoltán (2007): Metaphor in Culture. Universality and Variation, Cambridge.

Küster, Rainer (1998): „Kriegsspiele – Militärische Metaphern im Fußballsport“, in: Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Linguistik 28 (112), 53-70.

Küster, Rainer (2009): „Metaphern in der Sportsprache“, in: Burkhardt, Armin/Schlobinski, Peter (eds.): Flickflack, Foul und Tsukahara. Der Sport und seine Sprache, Mannheim, 60-79.

Lakoff, Geroge (1990): „The Invariance Hypothesis: is abstract reason based on image-schemas?“, in: Cognitive Linguistics 1 (1), 39-74.

Lakoff, George/Johnson, Mark (2003a): Metaphors we live by, Chicago.

Lakoff, George/Johnson, Mark (2003b): Leben in Metaphern. Konstruktion und Gebrauch von Sprachbilder, Heidelberg.

Liebert, Wolf-Andreas (1992): Metaphernbereiche der deutschen Alltagssprache. Kognitive Linguistik und die Perspektiven einer Kognitiven Lexikographie, Frankfurt am Main.

Lipsky, Richard (1979): „The Athleticization of Politics: the Political Implication of Sports Symbolism“, in: Journal of Sports & Social Issues 3, 28-37.

Meier, Henk Erik/Rose, Anica/Woborschil, Stefanie (2012): „Der Dopingdiskurs der fünfziger und sechziger Jahre in den Leitmedien ‘Der Spiegel’ und ‘Die Zeit’“, in: Sportwissenschaft 42 (3), 163-177.

Michels, Anke (2002): „Metaphern in französischen Fußballreportagen“, in: metaphorik.de 2, 42-68.

Perkuhn, Rainer/Keibel, Holger/Kupietz, Mark (2012): Korpuslinguistik, Paderborn.

Reinold, Marcel/Becker, Christian/Nielsen, Stefan (2012): „Die 1960er Jahre als Formationsphase von modernem Doping und Anti-Doping“, in: Sportwissenschaft 42 (3), 153-162.

Reinold, Marcel/Meier, Henk Erik (2012): „Difficult Adaptations to Innovations in Performance Enhancement: ‘Dr Brustmann’s Power Pills’ and Anti-Doping in German Post-war Sport“, in: Sport in History 32 (1), 74-104.

Rolf, Eckard (2005): Metapherntheorien. Typologie, Darstellung, Bibliographie, Berlin.

Rose, Anica (2013a): „Von der Dopingbande zur Dopingmafia – Eine linguistische Analyse des Dopingbegriffs am Beispiel von Dopingakteuren“, in: Spectrum der Sportwissenschaften 25 (1), 21-43.

Rose, Anica (2013b): Codebuch zur Wortfamilie Doping und zur Doping-Metapher in den beiden Leitmedien Die Zeit und der Spiegel, Münster.

Ryall, Emily (2008): „The language of genetic technology: Metaphor and media representation“, in: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 22 (3), 363-373.

Schmidt, Torben (2004): „Cutting the Russian Bear down to size in the graveyard of champions – An analysis of the metaphors used in the 2002 Official Wimbledon Film“, in: metaphorik.de 7, 76-104.

Segrave, Jeffrey O. (1994): „The Perfect 10: ‚Sportspeak‘ in the Language of Sexual Relations“, in: Sociology of Sport Journal 11, 95-113.

Segrave, Jeffrey O. (2000): „The Sports Metaphor in American Cultural Discourse“, in: Culture, Sport, Society 3 (1), 48-60.

Semino, Elena/Masci, Michaela (1996): „Politics is football: metaphor in the discourse of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy“, in: Discourse Society 7 (2), 243-269.

Shields, Davis/Bredemeier, Brenda (2011): „Contest, Competition, and Metaphor“, in: Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 38, 27-38.

Singler, Andreas (2012): Doping und Enhancement. Interdisziplinäre Studien zur Pathologie gesellschaftlicher Leistungsorientierung, Göttingen.

Skirl, Helge/Schwarz-Friesel, Monika (22013): Metapher, Heidelberg.

Stewart, Carly/Smith, Brett/Sparkes, Andrew C. (2011): „Sporting autobiographies of illness and the role of the metaphor“, in: Sport in Society 14 (5), 581-597.

Walk, Stephan R. (1995): „The Footrace Metaphor in American Presidential Rhetoric“, in: Sociology of Sport Journal 12 (1), 36-55.

Weinrich, Harald (1987): Sprache in Texten, Stuttgart.

Wörsching, Martha (2000): „Sporting Metaphors and the Enactment of Hegemonic Masculinity: Sport and Advertising in the German Newsmagazine 'Der Spiegel'“, in: Journal of Popular Culture XXXIV (3), 59-85.

5.2 Korpus

5.2.1 Quellenverzeichnis Der Spiegel

Wer soll das bezahlen. DS, 5.1.1950.

Der große Schatten. DS, 20.2.1952.

Gift im Rennstall. DS, 12.3.1952.

Dr. Brustmanns Kraftpillen. DS, 16.7.1952.

Sauerstoff-Stürmer. DS, 19.5.1954.

Faktor X im Spiel. DS, 24.11.1954.

Wagner des Fußballs. DS, 8.12.1954.

Fahren mit Dynamit. DS, 3.8.1955.

Tennis. DS, 29.7.1959.

Pfeffer in der Kiste. DS, 7.9.1960.

Eine Spur von Doping. DS, 13.11.1963.

Zur Halbzeit Gift. DS, 18.3.1964.

Gold verloren. DS, 4.11.1964.

Wodka vor dem Schuß. DS, 13.10.1965.

Krummer Arm. DS, 20.10.1965.

Giftig ohne Gift. DS, 18.7.1966.

Totaler Sieg. DS, 20.3.1967.

Dynamit geladen. DS, 24.7.1967.

Pille im Tee. DS, 25.9.1967.

Aus der Dusche. DS, 22.4.1968.

Lachen gelernt. DS, 9.9.1968.

Geistig gedopt. DS, 13.9.1968.

Kampf im Hochland. DS, 7.10.1968.

Hohlspiegel. DS, 16.2.1976.

"Aha, deswegen so schnell?". DS, 16.2.1976.

Echter Ackermann. DS, 21.6.1976.

Sieg oder schieb. DS, 26.7.1976.

Noch diesseits. DS, 2.8.1976.

Kraft durch Spritzen. DS, 30.8.1976.

Hätt' Ma was gescheites g'lernt. DS, 20.9.1976.

Bisschen Damenbart. DS, 4.4.1977.

Ihr verfluchten Mörder. DS, 18.7.1977.

Mein lieber Ede. DS, 17.10.1977.

Der muß wirklich verrückt sein. DS, 22.5.1978.

Weiß wie Schnee. DS, 17.7.1978.

Ist jetzt Willi, der Retter, da?. DS, 4.12.1978.

DDR: Schluck Pillen oder kehr Fabriken aus. DS, 19.3.1979.

"Kopp mang die Beene und bumm weg". DS, 8.10.1979.

Ganz verdutzt. DS, 10.12.1979.

Register gestorben. DS, 20.1.1980.

Ganz Rußland wurde renoviert. DS, 28.1.1980.

Intern Dynamit. DS, 30.6.1980.

Unsere Apparate lügen nicht. DS, 7.7.1980.

Stars auf dem Trip. DS, 27.10.1980.

Die leiden alle an Gedächtnisschwund. DS, 27.10.1980.

Hauptsache, es hilft und fällt nicht auf. DS, 27.10.1980.

Größere Leidensbereitschaft. DS, 22.6.1981.

Tricks beim Endspurt. DS, 20.7.1981.

Begräbnis für eine Mumie. DS, 21.9.1981.

Dritte Kraft. DS, 5.10.1981.

Geschwächte Abwehr. DS, 26.10.1981.

Unheimliche Angst. DS, 22.2.1982.

Als erster da. DS, 22.3.1982.

In meinem Film bin ich der Star. DS, 26.4.1982.

Rote Karten. DS, 24.5.1982.

As und Pik sieben. DS, 19.7.1982.

Hilf mir. DS, 30.8.1982.

Unglaubliche Angst. DS, 4.10.1982.

Personalien. DS, 22.11.1982.

Zitate. DS, 2.3.1987.

Schlucken und spritzen. DS, 2.3.1987.

Es ist verlogen, Doping abzustreiten. DS, 2.3.1987.

Ich kam mir vor wie Schlachtvieh. DS, 2.3.1987.

Datum: 2. März 1987 Betr.: Schumacher. DS, 2.3.1987.

Zitate. DS, 9.3.1987.

Ich kam mir vor wie Schlachtvieh. DS, 9.3.1987.

Die Spieler sind leitende Angestellte. DS, 23.3.1987.

Wacker rackern. DS, 30.3.1987.

Weiße Riesen. DS, 11.5.1987.

Vom Mann zum Monster. DS, 18.5.1987.

Viel Heuchelei. DS, 25.5.1987.

Ich hasse diesen Berg. DS, 29.6.1987.

Wir haben uns blind auf die Ärzte verlassen. DS, 10.8.1987.

Er ist einer von uns. DS, 7.9.1987.

Rutschbahn in den legalen Drogensumpf. DS, 7.9.1987.

Wie lebenslänglich. DS, 5.10.1987.

Mensch, jetzt haste Steuern verschwendet. DS, 12.10.1987.

Willige Sklaven. DS, 19.10.1987.

Hör mal Doc. Ich hab' so 'n Durchhänger. DS, 26.10.1987.

Athleten der Präzision. DS, 30.11.1987.

Steril und impotent. DS, 30.11.1987.

Garri hat Karpow unterschätzt. DS, 14.12.1987.

Fuß rumdrehen. DS, 4.1.1988.

Wie die Tiere. DS, 15.2.1988.

Hilfe vom Hamster. DS, 28.3.1988.

Sprung aus dem Fenster. DS l, 16.5.1988.

Früher gab's Erich. DS, 6.6.1988.

Die Tour ist immer mit Qualen verbunden. DS, 4.7.1988.

Das Zeug hat mich wild gemacht. DS, 26.3.1990.

Wir müssen das Drama vermarkten. DS, 2.4.1990.

Zitate. DS, 9.4.1990.

Wir sind Zeugen eines Krieges. DS, 30.4.1990.

Da wird alles geschluckt. DS, 30.4.1990.

Zitate. DS, 14.5.1990.

Gegendarstellung. DS, 18.6.1990.

Peter Geyer. DS, 3.7.1990.

Urin aus dem Bierkühler. DS, 27.8.1990.

Ohne das Zeug geht es nicht. DS, 27.8.1990.

Mit ihm essen? Lieber hungern. DS, 1.10.1990.

Doping-Kälber entlaufen. DS, 29.10.1990.

Ihr könnt uns kreuzweise. DS, 5.11.1990.

Immer gut gerüstet. DS, 12.11.1990.

Anabolika im Vatikan besorgt. DS, 12.11.1990.

Doping im Kopf. DS, 26.11.1990.

Postkarte genügt. DS, 26.11.1990.

Ganz schnell handeln. DS, 3.12.1990.

Extrem viel reimgepumpt. DS, 3.12.1990.

Hausmittel Betr.: Doping. DS, 3.12.1990.

Schicksalsstunde des Sports. DS, 10.12.1990.

Tabletten mit Bruchrille. DS, 10.12.1990.

Das muß man nehmen. DS, 10.12.1990.

Applaus beim Massaker. DS, 10.12.1990.

No dope, no hope. DS, 24.12.1990.

Aus einer anderen Welt. DS, 24.12.1990.

Schöne Gedanken - schöne Volleys. DS, 14.1.1991.

Bäng im Kopf. DS, 14.1.1991.

Delikate Frage. DS, 4.2.1991.

Einfach alle rausschneißen. DS, 11.2.1991.

Auch für Bomber Piloten gut. DS, 18.2.1991.

Immer mehr Geld scheffeln. DS, 8.4.1991.

Hetzjagen und weiche Knie. DS, 13.5.1991.

Schlamm in den Adern. DS, 10.6.1991.

Der große Knall. DS, 1.7.1991.

Hast wohl viel getrunken?. DS, 1.7.1991.

Verrat und Lüge. DS, 5.8.1991.

Zitate. DS, 23.8.1993.

Höhentraining im Schlaf. DS, 30.8.1993.

Feuer für den Drachen. DS, 20.9.1993.

Ideale im Sonderangebot. DS, 27.9.1993.

Fast wie der liebe Gott. DS, 18.10.1993.

Ein paar Ärzte opfern. DS, 8.11.1993.

Beichtstuhl für Spitzel. DS, 8.11.1993.

Untertan und Größenwahn. DS, 27.12.1993.

Kraft aus Affenhoden. DS, 3.1.1994.

Schweig oder stirb. DS, 24.1.1994.

Anwendung erfolgt. DS, 21.3.1994.

Eine große Mafia. DS, 21.3.1994.

Aphrodite für alle. DS, 28.3.1994.

Grüner Punkt des Sports. DS, 4.4.1994.

Die Akte Telekom. DS, 18.4.1994.

Warum lügen alle?. DS, 25.4.1994.

Teure Medaillen. DS, 2.5.1994.

Wir waren Versuchskaninchen. DS, 6.6.1994.

Im Rausch des Ruhms. DS, 4.7.1994.

DS berichtet ... DS, 18.7.1994.

Alle vermissen mich. DS, 25.7.1994.

Katrins Scherben. DS, 25.7.1994.

Hausmitteilung Betr.: Krabbe. DS, 25.7.1994.

Fräulein Unschuld. DS, 1.8.1994.

In der Sackgasse. DS, 8.8.1994.

Viel Geld, keine Gnade. DS, 5.9.1994.

Schwein mit Husten. DS, 3.10.1994.

Überall Feindesland. DS, 17.10.1994.

Reich der Mittel. DS, 5.12.1994.

Pille für das Gedächtnis. DS, 12.12.1994.

Die erigierte Freude. DS, 2.1.1995.

Ewiger Vater, hilf. DS, 9.1.1995.

Alles, was knallt. DS, 6.2.1995.

Der bessere Deutsche. DS, 13.3.1995.

Lockruf des Geldes. DS, 27.3.1995.

Unter der Decke. DS, 24.4.1995.

Innere Not. DS, 8.5.1995.

Schuldhafte Bakterien?. DS, 15.5.1995.

Flirt mit Folgen. DS, 5.6.1995.

Immun gegen alles böse. DS, 19.6.1995.

Spuren nach Sibirien. DS, 9.6.1997.

Puzzlespiele im Sumpf. DS, 9.6.1997.

Wie ein Hund an der Kette. DS, 16.6.1997.

Hausmitteilung betr.: Doping. DS, 16.6.1997.

Zitat. DS, 23.6.1997.

Der Bölts will was. DS, 14.7.1997.

Zitat. DS, 21.7.1997.

Das ist gut für die Zähne. DS, 18.8.1997.

Heiner Geißler. DS, 1.9.1997.

Bayer, Berg. Ideologischer Schießbefehl. DS, 1.9.1997.

Die größte Ära geht zuende. DS, 8.9.1997.

Zu Tode gepillt. DS, 29.9.1997.

Alte Möhren aus dem Keller. DS, 6.10.1997.

Sklavenmarkt der Sprinter. DS, 20.10.1997.

Schweigen im Westen. DS, 3.11.1997.

Traum vom Medaillenregen. DS, 17.11.1997.

Versuchter Rauswurf. DS, 24.11.1997.

Vom Tiger zum Bettvorleger. DS, 8.12.1997.

Das Hormonpräparat. DS, 29.12.1997.

Die Macht der blauen Pillen. DS, 29.12.1997.

Einblick ins Gruselkabinett. DS, 29.12.1997.

Das muß jetzt vom Tisch. DS, 5.1.1998.

Beweise aus dem Archiv. DS, 12.1.1998.

Kartell des Schweigens. DS, 2.2.1998.

Ralf Reichenbach. DS, 16.2.1998.

Beim Bauchschuß nützt kein Helm. DS, 16.3.1998.

Befohlene Abtreibungen?. DS, 30.3.1998.

Alles Lügen. DS, 13.4.1998.

20 Kartons voller Akten. DS, 13.4.1998.

Jeden Tag einen dicken Hals. DS, 4.5.1998.

Freak-Show mit Mastochsen. DS, 18.5.1998.

Schau mal, hier steht was. DS, 18.5.1998.

Zitat. DS, 25.5.1998.

Jobs für Täter. DS, 15.6.1998.

Die Woche 4. bis 10 .Juli 1998. DS, 13.7.1998.

Die Kontrollen sind ineffizient. DS, 20.7.1998.

Gefährliche Grenzgänger. DS, 20.7.1998.

Wohl zuviel jenommen. DS, 20.7.1998.

Chronik 14. bis 20. August. DS, 23.8.1999.

Unter Geiern. DS, 23.8.1999.

Den Gigantismus bekämpfen. DS, 6.9.1999.

Glauben verloren. DS, 6.9.1999.

System gesprengt. DS, 13.9.1999.

Stille Nacht mit Valium. DS, 20.9.1999.

Eine Art von Doping. DS, 20.9.1999.

Spiegel des Wohlbefindens. DS, 20.9.1999.

Medizinischer Schrott. DS, 4.10.1999.

Ab ins Labor. DS, 22.11.1999.

Das ist ein Schattenbereich. DS, 29.11.1999.

Chronik 27. November bis 3. Dezember. DS, 6.12.1999.

Eine Art Handel. DS, 6.12.1999.

Zweimal täglich frisch gedopt. DS, 6.12.1999.

Boxershorts mit Judenstern. DS, 13.12.1999.

Es lebe die Show. DS, 27.12.1999.

Klage wegen Missbildungen. DS, 10.1.2000.

Dilettanten am Werk. DS, 17.1.2000.

Spuren in den Osten. DS, 17.1.2000.

Alessandro Donati. DS, 24.1.2000.

Die Lawine rollt. DS, 24.1.2000.

Baumann entlastet. DS, 24.1.2000.

Eine deutsche Karriere. DS, 7.2.2000.

Liste mit Sprengstoff. DS, 7.2.2000.

Vorsprung in den Genen. DS, 21.2.2000.

Blaue Bohnen von Dr. Mabuse. DS, 28.2.2000.

Dritte Tube?. DS, 28.2.2000.

Therapie aus dem Weltraum. DS, 6.3.2000.

Doping mit der Klinge. DS, 13.3.2000.

Hilfe von Dottor Epo. DS, 20.3.2000.

DS berichtete ... DS, 3.4.2000.

Heikes Himmelfahrt. DS, 1.5.2000.

Mit unglaublicher Brutalität. DS, 1.5.2000.

Wahrheit + 10. DS, 8.5.2000.

Neuer Dopingtest. DS, 12.6.2000.

Radio aus, Feind kommt. DS, 3.7.2000.

Viagra für den ganzen Körper. DS, 17.7.2000.

Einfach die Spritze ins Bein. DS, 14.8.2000.

Muff muss raus. DS, 30.7.2001.

Authentisches Nichts. DS, 13.8.2001.

Beauty-Queen am Scheideweg. DS, 10.9.2001.

DS berichtete ... DS, 15.9.2001.

Totbringende Kraft. DS, 15.9.2001.

Tückische Wunderwaffen. DS, 8.10.2001.

Supermarkt des Grauens. DS, 26.11.2001.

Niedlicher Appell. DS, 17.12.2001.

Drohungen gegen Baumann-Buch. DS, 14.1.2002.

Es soll menscheln. DS, 9.2.2002.

Der Vorkämpfer. DS, 4.3.2002.

Der Zickenkrieg ist nützlich. DS, 30.3.2002.

Einfach durchgeknallt. DS, 8.7.2002.

Jobbörse am Berg. DS, 15.7.2002.

Fast so schön wie früher. DS, 5.8.2002.

Gedopte Rösser. DS, 12.8.2002.

Farce im Traumland. DS, 19.8.2002.

Die Pferde bei Laune halten. DS, 9.9.2002.

Blitz-Trip zum Gemütsfrieden. DS, 16.9.2002.

Milde Gabe. DS, 21.10.2002.

GESTORBEN Manfred Ewald. DS, 28.10.2002.

Steilpass ins Parlament. DS, 21.12.2002.

GESTORBEN Dieter Lindemann. DS, 6.1.2003.

Das Phantom der Laufbahn. DS, 6.1.2003.

Geheimakten geflutet. DS, 24.2.2003.

Blaupause von Erich. DS, 19.4.2003.

Wie die Ochsen. DS, 30.6.2003.

Rechte Hand aufs Herz. DS, 7.7.2003.

Wir wollen globale Symbole. DS, 14.7.2003.

Der undurchsichtige Adonis. DS, 11.8.2003.

Von den Socken. DS, 18.8.2003.

Geil kickt gut. DS, 8.9.2003.

Stich ins Wespennest. DS, 22.9.2003.

Cocktail aus der Badewanne. DS, 27.10.2003.

Der olympische Patient. DS, 17.11.2003.

Dopingtests mangelhaft. DS, 1.12.2003.

Starke Schwächen. DS, 20.12.2003.

Das Projekt Dream Team. DS, 19.1.2004.

Im Griff der Stasi. DS, 2.2.2004.

Springstein droht Knast. DS, 15.8.2005.

Sprengstoff im Kühlregal. DS, 29.8.2005.

Das fehlende Teil im Puzzle. DS, 17.9.2005.

Blaue Schatten. DS, 24.10.2005.

Allahs Ausnahmeathlet. DS, 31.10.2005.

Fehlerhafte Tests. DS, 7.11.2005.

Die Wüste bebt!. DS, 21.11.2005.

Modedroge auf Kreditkarte. DS, 28.11.2005.

Sport ist schizophren. DS, 23.12.2005.

Schrille camper. DS, 9.1.2006.

Bodybuilder verhaftet. DS, 9.1.2006.

Mail-Verkehr nach Spanien. DS, 23.1.2006.

Bode Miller. DS, 30.1.2006.

Kontakt zur wirklichen Welt. DS, 13.2.2006.

Republik Biathlon. DS, 20.2.2006.

Keine Hand ins Feuer. DS, 25.2.2006.

Sportfest der Unterwelt. DS, 25.2.2006.

Journalistische Korruption. DS, 3.4.2006.

Gegen die Nebelwand. DS, 24.4.2006.

Der Fluch der alten Dame. DS, 22.5.2006.

Verlogene Veranstaltung. DS, 10.7.2006.

Deckname Bella. DS, 10.7.2006.

Bier, Whiskey und ein Absturz. DS, 31.7.2006.

Kumpeliges Miteinander. DS, 7.8.2006.

Roter Retter. DS, 7.8.2006.

Projekt Goldfisch. DS, 14.8.2006.

Nur die ganz Dummen. DS, 14.8.2006.

Monopoly der Netz-Giganten. DS, 14.8.2006.

GESTORBEN Heiner Schimmöller DS, 21.8.2006.

Ich liebe auch die Frauen. DS, 21.8.2006.

ARD trennt sich von Ullrich und Zabel. DS, 28.8.2006.

BKA greift ein. DS, 28.8.2006.

Betrüger bestrafen. DS, 11.9.2006.

Glaube nichts. DS, 18.9.2006.

Hormone töten Nervenzellen. DS, 2.10.2006.

Leck im System. DS, 2.10.2006.

Hartes Bayern-gesetz gestoppt. DS, 9.10.2006.

Kehrt Ullrich zurück?. DS, 16.10.2006.

Sprinter ohne Füße. DS, 16.7.2007.

Ganoven statt Helden. DS, 16.7.2007.

Der goldene Schuss. DS, 23.7.2007.

Stars vor Gericht?. DS, 23.7.2007.

Sturm im Wasserglas. DS, 23.7.2007.

Wo Starfriseure regieren. DS, 23.7.2007.

Im Einzelfall abwägen. DS, 30.7.2007.

Biologisches Profil. DS, 6.8.2007.

T-Mobile -Profis müssen zahlen. DS, 13.8.2007.

Das Rekordspiel ist vorbei. DS, 20.8.2007.

Gegen die Mauere. DS, 20.8.2007.

70 neue Substanzen. DS, 20.8.2007.

Prinzip Sandkorn. DS, 27.8.2007.

Der Traum vom sauberen Sport. DS, 17.9.2007.

17. September 2007 Betr.: Doping. DS, 17.9.2007.

Schlaffe Spritze. DS, 24.9.2007.

Steroide zum Nachschlagen. DS, 1.10.2007.

Chinas dunkle Kanäle. DS, 8.10.2007.

Brisanter Gipfel. DS, 15.10.2007.

Im Kopf zum Sieg. DS, 22.10.2007.

Schmutzige Karrieren. DS, 22.10.2007.

Zitate. DS, 5.11.2007.

Das gehört zu meinem Job. DS, 5.11.2007.

5. November 2007 Betr.: Doping. DS, 5.11.2007.

Zitate. DS, 12.11.2007.

Plötzlich krank. DS, 12.11.2007.

Attacke auf das Privatleben. DS, 12.11.2007.

Rick Wakeman gedopt?. DS, 26.11.2007.

Das Ende des Neuanfangs. DS, 3.12.2007.

Die Ventile sind offen. DS, 3.12.2007.

Doping-Tests ab 2008. DS, 10.12.2007.

Synergien geschaffen. DS, 17.12.2007.

Trainer unter Verdacht. DS, 22.12.2007.

Das Ende für T-Mobile. DS, 31.12.2007.

Unkenntnis bei Nahrungszusätzen. DS, 14.1.2008.

Grenzen der Leistung. DS, 14.1.2008.

Mach mit und sei glücklich!. DS, 21.1.2008.

21. Januar 2008 Betr.: China. DS, 21.1.2008.

Warten auf den ersten Toten. DS, 18.8.2008.

Hohlspiegel. DS, 25.8.2008.

Machen wir uns doch nichts vor. DS, 25.8.2008.

Sehr naiv. DS, 25.8.2008.

Steigende Flut. DS, 15.9.2008.

Epo per Klick. DS, 22.9.2008.

Schach ist Schauspielerei. DS, 29.9.2008.

Reinheit und Klarheit. DS, 29.9.2008.

Zerstrittenheit ist Gift. DS, 6.10.2008.

Komplett krank. DS, 13.10.2008.

Pharmazeutische Waffen. DS, 20.10.2008.

Es lebe das Hobby. DS, 20.10.2008.

Illegale Pillenschwemme. DS, 27.10.2008.

Chronisch in Behandlung. DS, 3.11.2008.

Erscheint Jan Ullrich?. DS, 3.11.2008.

Doping für Rentner?. DS, 10.11.2008.

Frivole Verse. DS, 10.11.2008.

Brutale Knechtung. DS, 17.11.2008.

Kinderkrebsarzt als Dopingdealer?. DS, 24.11.2008.

Wir haben zu wenig Waffen. DS, 1.12.2008.

Wahnsinn und Vergebung. DS, 8.12.2008.

Der Sport kann nicht alle Fälle lösen. DS, 15.12.2008.

Pevenage unter Eid?. DS, 15.12.2008.

Der gelaserte Athlet. DS, 20.12.2008.

Der Sport ist ein Eisbrecher. DS, 29.12.2008.

Zitate 2008. DS, 29.12.2008.

Im Abwärtstrend. DS, 29.12.2008.

Moderner Zirkussport. DS, 5.1.2009.

Der Krieger. DS, 5.1.2009.

Gläserne Athleten. DS, 5.1.2009.

Die unverdünnte Hölle. DS, 5.1.2009.

Sie modellieren ihre Körper. DS, 12.1.2009.

Der berechtigte Sieg. DS, 19.1.2009.

Etwas simpel. DS, 19.1.2009.

Milde für Kokser?. DS, 2.2.2009.

Das Leben der Amateure. DS, 2.2.2009.

Kein Doping bei L' Equipe. DS, 9.2.2009.

Mahlzeit. DS, 16.2.2009.

Lebensverändernde Wende. DS, 9.11.2009.

Angst vor Millionenklagen. DS, 16.11.2009.

Kein neuer TV-Vertrag?. DS, 30.11.2009.

Wasserdichte Begründung. DS, 30.11.2009.

Maschinen sind einfach lockerer. DS, 7.12.2009.

Signifikantes Risiko. DS, 14.12.2009.

Rückblick 2009. DS, 28.12.2009.

 

Tod läuft mit. DS, 21.10.1968.

Eddy 1. DS, 14.7.1969.

Griff zum Gift. DS, 21.7.1969.

Wundes Wunder. DS, 15.9.1969.

Hilfe durch Hormone. DS, 30.3.1970.

Tritte für die Nation. DS, 1.6.1970.

Finale vermasselt. DS, 22.6.1970.

Nie wieder. DS, 28.9.1970.

Gift und Gegengift. DS, 5.10.1970.

Wenn sie nicht fressen, spritze ich sie selbst. DS, 21.6.1971.

Dumme Geschichte. DS, 3.1.1972.

Trip mit Minis. DS, 17.1.1972.

Lobby der Letzten. DS, 21.2.1972.

Kraft durch Strom. DS, 10.4.1972.

Bei uns ist immer Olympia. DS, 14.8.1972.

Gleitende Wirbel. DS, 18.9.1972.

Seide und Helium. DS, 9.10.1972.

Keine Amateure. DS, 27.11.1972.

Füße und Fäuste. DS, 1.1.1973.

Neuer Schub. DS, 5.3.1973.

Um jeden Preis. DS, 24.6.1974.

Mehr geht nicht. DS, 8.9.1975.

Unterhosen sind nicht erlaubt. DS, 4.4.1983.

Herz und Hirn. DS, 2.5.1983.

Stars aus dem Schatten. DS, 25.7.1983.

Wem wieviel. DS, 25.7.1983.

Zwingende Zweifel. DS, 29.8.1983.

Teurer Glaube. DS, 19.12.1983.

Typen wie aus dem Panoptikum. DS, 23.7.1984.

Betr.: Olympia-Titel. DS, 23.7.1984.

Wer nicht da ist, kann nicht gewinnen. DS, 6.8.1984.

Ganz Amerika schwimmt in Tränen. DS, 6.8.1984.

Frust statt Lust. DS, 27.8.1984.

Tödliche Hamburger. DS, 8.10.1984.

Wie die Stiere. DS, 14.1.1985.

Unheilbarer Drang. DS, 8.4.1985.

Der kriegt wa sauf die Nase. DS, 15.4.1985.

Feudaler Glanz. DS, 15.4.1985.

Viel Profit. DS, 1.7.1985.

Prügel im Endkampf. DS, 22.7.1985.

Würden Sie Ihre Tochter dazu raten?. DS, 26.8.1985.

Genug ist genug. DS, 26.9.1985.

Die Kindheit zum Beruf gemacht. DS, 25.11.1985.

Warum gerade ich?. DS, 2.12.1985.

Brundage würde sich im Grabe umdrehen. DS, 30.12.1985.

Knips, W. Kartellbrüder und Ganoven. DS, 5.5.1986.

Eigene Spiele. DS, 14.7.1986.

Fällt und steckt. DS, 11.8.1986.

Länge läuft. DS, 25.8.1986.

Viel Scheinheiligkeit. DS, 8.9.1986.

Wie im Krimi. DS, 10.11.1986.

Zitate. DS, 8.12.1986.

Ich kam mir vor wie Schlachtvieh. DS, 23.2.1986.

Tabus gebrochen. DS, 23.2.1987.

Ich hätte auch Arzt werden können. DS, 11.7.1988.

Die Deutschen haben aufgehört zu glauben. DS, 15.8.1988.

"Wir müssen erst Tote bringen". DS, 15.8.1988.

Da reißen Mädels Bäume aus. DS, 12.9.1988.

Geld und Pillen. DS, 19.9.1988.

In einem Land wie hier kann man klotzen. DS, 19.9.1988.

Steife Rechte. DS, 26.9.1988.

Geistige Baisse, erbarmungsloser Kampf. DS, 26.9.1988.

Wirkt wie eine chemische Kastration. DS, 3.10.1988.

Der liebe Gott wird sie schon strafen. DS, 3.10.1988.

Proper aussehen. DS, 10.10.1988.

Es wird dunkel auf dem Planeten. DS, 31.10.1988.

Generell lauwarm. DS, 12.12.1988.

Alles verwässert. DS, 20.2.1989.

Rosen für den Prinzen von den Heilquellen. DS, 27.3.1989.

Helfendes Plätschern. DS, 6.3.1989.

Ich gab ihm die Spritze in meine Wohnung. DS, 13.3.1989.

Der Deutsche ist der ideale Türke. DS, 12.6.1989.

Unheimliche Armut. DS, 19.6.1989.

Barer Unsinn. DS, 26.6.1989.

Vertuscht und vertagt. DS, 17.7.1989.

Quellende Schinken. DS, 28.8.1989.

Aufforderung zum Doping. DS, 13.11.1989.

Bisher war hier kein Fremder. DS, 22.1.1990.

Sind denn alle bescheuert?. DS, 5.2.1990.

Gib das mal den Mädels. DS, 12.3.1990.

Pillen wie das tägliche Brot. DS, 12.3.1990.

Schnell den Arm in Gips. DS, 19.3.1990.

Ratten strampelten für Olympia. DS, 19.3.1990.

Dann machen wir einfach bum. DS, 27.7.1992.

Netter Onkel. DS, 3.8.1992.

Alles erlaubt. DS, 3.8.1992.

Makellos rein. DS, 10.8.1992.

Ein feines Fingerzittern. DS, 10.8.1992.

Das ganze System kippt. DS, 10.8.1992.

Hausmitteilung: Betr.: Doping. DS, 10.8.1992.

Blinde Kuh in Barcelona. DS, 14.9.1992.

Wie eine Epidemie. DS, 14.9.1992.

Jeden Dreck, jeden Blödsinn reingehauen. DS, 14.9.1992.

Wir müssen mitbetrügen. DS, 5.10.1992.

Verlogen und ängstlich. DS, 26.10.1992.

Tödliche Hatz. DS, 16.11.1992.

Unmündig wie früher. DS, 16.11.1992.

Aufs übelste ausgenutzt. DS, 16.11.1992.

Waren doch alle bei der Stasi. DS, 23.11.1992.

Wer, zur Hölle, bin ich?. DS, 7.12.1992.

Aktive Verdrängung. DS, 28.12.1992.

Jahresrückblick 1992. DS, 28.12.1992.

Schön muskulös, aber tot. DS, 1.2.1993.

Jeder andere ist zweiter. DS, 8.2.1993.

Mutanten-Jagd a la francaise. DS, 15.2.1993.

Feldhoff. Gegendarstellung. DS, 15.2.1993.

Schlimme Finger. DS, 22.2.1993.

Immer so gemacht. DS, 1.3.1993.

Turbolader für die Muskeln. DS, 15.3.1993.

Kniebeuge mit Kondom. DS, 22.3.1993.

Da sträuben sich die Haare. DS, 22.3.1993.

Die Mauer wieder höher gezogen. DS, 7.6.1993.

Dagoberts Flohmarkt. DS, 21.6.1993.

Knüller im Angebot. DS, 21.6.1993.

Die Stars müssen leiden. DS, 5.7.1993.

Heike und Rainer Henkel. DS, 12.7.1993.

Das ist ein Witz. DS, 9.8.1993.

Der Verdacht im Stadion. DS, 9.8.1993.

Es ist kalt in Europa. DS, 16.8.1993.

Das Steroidprofil. DS, 16.8.1993.

Schwarzbrot und Möhren. DS, 16.8.1993.

Wir sind keine zweite DDR. DS, 3.7.1995.

Etwas explodiert in dir. DS, 17.7.1995.

Zuneigung entzogen. DS, 7.8.1995.

Wir brauchen die Vorbilder aus Europa. DS, 14.8.1995.

GESTORBEN Manfred Donike. DS, 28.8.1995.

Heile Welt vorgespielt. DS, 11.9.1995.

Schlupfloch geschlossen. DS, 30.10.1995.

Athleten sind pfiffig. DS, 1.1.1996.

Die geteilte Moral. DS, 1.1.1996.

Tröpfchen für Tröpfchen. DS, 15.1.1996.

Neuer Muskelmacher aus den USA. DS, 22.1.1996.

Moderner Lazarus. DS, 5.2.1996.

Ode an die Schreibmaschine. DS, 1.3.1996.

Steak oder Spritze. DS, 18.3.1996.

Frauen gehen lieber essen. DS, 1.4.1996.

Umhauen und kassieren. DS, 1.4.1996.

Immer noch auf Posten. DS, 8.4.1996.

Doping im Altersheim. DS, 15.4.1996.

Blond, stark und tot. DS, 22.4.1996.

Alles gute Bodys hier. DS, 22.4.1996.

Morgen mit Tusch. DS, 6.5.1996.

Blanke Dose. DS, 13.5.1996.

Die alte Konfrontation. DS, 13.5.1996.

Medaillen gehen vor Moral. DS, 8.7.1996.

Eine blöde Situation. DS, 8.7.1996.

Darauf einen Schluck. DS, 8.7.1996.

Soll ick ewig trauern?. DS, 15.7.1996.

Wir werden über den Tisch gezogen. DS, 29.7.1996.

Zeug zum Weltstar. DS, 29.7.1996.

Die Zukunft ist schwarz. DS, 2.9.1996.

Köpfe unter den Tisch. DS, 23.9.1996.

Der Herr der Fäuste. DS, 4.11.1996.

Helm auf, Hirn aus. DS, 3.2.1997.

Die Schmerzgrenze erreicht. DS, 17.2.1997.

Ketchup in den Adern. DS, 31.3.1997.

Herings Hoffnung. DS, 1.4.1997.

Mein Ego ist wie Stahl. DS, 1.4.1997.

Ausblenden und Gesundbeten. DS, 27.7.1998.

Verlogene Szenerie. DS, 27.7.1998.

Alles verstehen, alles verzeihen. DS, 3.8.1998.

Arsch beiseite. DS, 3.8.1998.

Sklaven nützen uns nichts. DS, 3.8.1998.

Vom Leben begünstigt. DS, 17.8.1998.

Die Woche 15. bis 21. August 1998. DS, 24.8.1998.

Stiche im Hintern. DS, 24.8.1998.

Schwaches starkes Geschlecht. DS, 7.9.1998.

Bonne chance. DS, 7.9.1998.

Von Männern geschlagen. DS, 14.9.1998.

Das deutschere Deutschland. DS, 14.9.1998.

Viagra für den ganzen Körper. DS, 9.11.1998.

Wie ein Knall. DS, 23.11.1998.

Go for Gold. DS, 30.11.1998.

Praller Bizeps mit 60. DS, 21.12.1998.

Hoffnung auf Einmalspritze. DS, 11.1.1999.

Auf Rot gesetzt. DS, 25.1.1999.

Kurze Gabe. DS, 25.1.1999.

Der kühne Jupp. DS, 1.2.1999.

Staatsanwalt in der Turnhalle. DS, 1.2.1999.

Wirtschaftliche Interessen. DS, 8.2.1999.

Der Kugel knapp entkommen. DS, 8.2.1999.

Einmal noch Centre Court. DS, 1.3.1999.

Zur Pille gedrängt. DS, 1.3.1999.

Pille im Getränk. DS, 26.4.1999.

Streit um Doping. DS, 3.5.1999.

Wow, das ist starker Stoff. DS, 17.5.1999.

Hoffen auf Mutter Courage. DS, 31.5.1999.

Papst Gregor vom Zürichsee. DS, 7.6.1999.

Schon ein bißchen merkwürdig. DS, 21.6.1999.

Zitate. DS, 28.6.1999.

Verführer in Weiß. DS, 28.6.1999.

Zitate. DS, 5.7.1999.

Talente aus dem Township. DS, 5.7.1999.

Die Friedensfahrt de Nr.69. DS, 12.7.1999.

Die Leidenschaft des Herrn Ho. DS, 1.8.1999.

Im Land des Unbekannten. DS, 16.8.1999.

Probleme in der Familie. DS, 16.8.1999.

Anklage gegen Olympiasiegerin. DS, 14.8.2000.

Gift auf Stasi-Rezept?. DS, 4.9.2000.

Der Marathonmann. DS, 11.9.2000.

Tabu beim Interview. DS, 11.9.2000.

11. September 2000 Betr.: Titel. DS, 11.9.2000.

Mobbing im Krisengebiet. DS, 18.9.2000.

Go for Gold, America!. DS, 18.9.2000.

18. September 2000 Betr.: Bennent. DS, 18.9.2000.

Der lange Abschied. DS, 25.9.2000.

Doping spaltet das deutsche Team. DS, 25.9.2000.

Doping fürs Gehirn. DS, 2.10.2000.

Der deutsche Ring. DS, 2.10.2000.

Doping im Essen. DS, 2.10.2000.

Chronik. DS, 23.10.2000.

Notizen aus Absurdistan. DS, 23.10.2000.

Das war aber Zeit, mein Junge. DS, 30.10.2000.

Werde riesig!. DS, 6.11.2000.

Schulausflug im Kotzbomber. DS, 13.11.2000.

Pillen aus der Schattenwelt. DS, 4.12.2000.

Feind im eigenen Haus. DS, 1.1.2001.

Lizenzentzug für Daum?. DS, 15.1.2001.

GESTORBEN Christian Gehrmann. DS, 22.1.2001.

Ikone am Haken. DS, 5.3.2001.

Infektionen durch Doping. DS, 23.4.2001.

Rebellion der Anti-Franzi. DS, 7.5.2001.

GESTORBEN Helmut Meyer. DS, 21.5.2001.

Neues Leben. DS, 28.5.2001.

Doping für Zwölfjährige. DS, 11.6.2001.

Schlupflöcher für Schummler. DS, 18.6.2001.

Geldbuße für Weltrekordler. DS, 2.7.2001.

Teure Fehler. DS, 2.7.2001.

Signale der grauen Eminenz. DS, 9.7.2001.

Volle Härte des Gesetzes. DS, 9.7.2001.

Das Geschäft mit dem Mythos. DS, 9.7.2001.

Heimlicher Trunk. DS, 9.7.2001.

Ein Meer der Freude. DS, 16.7.2001.

Männer sind so kompliziert. DS, 9.2.2004.

Spuren im Müll. DS, 1.3.2004.

Drohung im Freiherrn. DS, 5.4.2004.

Laborratten des Sports. DS, 10.4.2004.

Ewiger Knaben Wunderhorn. DS, 26.4.2004.

Pingpong mit Geheimakten. DS, 3.5.2004.

Geldbuße für Star-Trainer Gneupel. DS, 3.5.2004.

Tortur de France. DS, 7.6.2004.

Weite Reise. DS, 5.7.2004.

Die Reden von Bagdad-Bob. DS, 19.7.2004.

Aufstand im Gottes Wartezimmer. DS, 19.7.2004.

Leugnen, leugnen, leugnen. DS, 9.8.2004.

Spiele der Wahrheit?. DS, 16.8.2004.

Wir leben wieder. DS, 23.8.2004.

Staatsfeind Nummer eins. DS, 23.8.2004.

Die kontrollierten Spiele. DS, 23.8.2004.

Jubel zum Widerruf. DS, 30.8.2004.

Vorbild DDR. DS, 20.9.2004.

Deckel drauf. DS, 4.10.2004.

Schwellung unterm Sattel. DS, 11.10.2004.

Gold für Paragrafenreiter. DS, 11.10.2004.

Indiz gegen Springstein. DS, 11.10.2004.

Red Bull statt roter Asche. DS, 30.10.2004.

Es geht auch um Tierschutz. DS, 8.11.2004.

Teure Tests. DS, 15.11.2004.

Kreisrunde Schürfwunde. DS, 22.11.2004.

Machtlos gegen Hintermänner. DS, 29.11.2004.

Angriff auf die Schattenwelt. DS, 3.1.2005.

3. Januar 2005 Betr.: Doping. DS, 3.1.2005.

Ein Tal der Dürre. DS, 21.2.2005.

Wer schweigt, hat Schuld. DS, 14.3.2005.

Füße im Eiskübel. DS, 9.5.2005.

Raus aus dem Mauseloch. DS, 14.5.2005.

Hauptsache menscheln. DS, 30.5.2005.

Autonome Zelle. DS, 6.6.2005.

Doping gegen die Depression. DS, 4.7.2005.

Das ewige Versprechen. DS, 11.7.2005.

Zehn Jahre jünger. DS, 18.7.2005.

Diskussion ist aufgeheizt. DS, 23.10.2006.

Wasser und Brot. DS, 30.10.2006.

Ein Professor zum Vorzeigen. DS, 13.11.2006.

Die allerletzte Hoffnung. DS, 20.11.2006.

Der größte Schrecken. DS, 27.11.2006.

Verschwiegene Zirkel. DS, 11.12.2006.

Zitate. DS, 22.12.2006.

Ich bin ein Stier. DS, 8.1.2007.

Schweinischer Prozess. DS, 17.2.2007.

Senioren-Athleten. DS, 12.3.2007.

Die Deutsche und die Diva. DS, 19.3.2007.

Dann wäre Schluss. DS, 19.3.2007.

Ist Doping Betrug?. DS, 7.4.2007.

Einstieg ins Abenteuer. DS, 16.4.2007.

Epo war Alltag. DS, 30.4.2007.

Falsche Behauptungen. DS, 30.4.2007.

Schweigen bis ins Grab. DS, 30.4.2007.

Der einzige Zeuge. DS, 30.4.2007.

30. April 2007 Betr.: Titel . DS, 30.4.2007.

Zitate. DS, 7.5.2007.

Glühende Geistesblitze. DS, 7.5.2007.

Doc, jetzt mach mal was. DS, 7.5.2007.

Rotes Doping. DS, 7.5.2007.

Härter gegen Doping. DS, 7.5.2007.

Teures Doping. DS, 14.5.2007.

GESTORBEN Horst Michna. DS, 26.5.2007.

Beichten aus dem Schattenreich. DS, 26.5.2007.

Zitate. DS, 4.6.2007.

Ich entschuldige mich. DS, 4.6.2007.

Verseuchter Rekord. DS, 4.6.2007.

T-Mobile contra ARD. DS, 11.6.2007.

Das System aufdecken. DS, 11.6.2007.

Wenig Forschungsgelder. DS, 18.6.2007.

Angemeldete Kontrollen. DS, 18.6.2007.

Bellas Blut. DS, 2.7.2007.

Unmut in Amerika. DS, 2.7.2007.

2. Juli 2007 Betr.: Doping. DS, 2.7.2007.

Zitate. DS, 9.7.2007.

Zitate. DS, 9.7.2007.

Die wahre Droge. DS, 9.7.2007.

Schneller als der Lift. DS, 28.1.2008.

Lenas heile Welt. DS, 2.2.2008.

Ein Volksfest. DS, 11.2.2008.

Die Mafia vergisst nie. DS, 25.2.2008.

Aus der Luft gegriffen. DS, 10.3.2008.

Schmutziger Grenzverkehr. DS, 10.3.2008.

Freiburgs Epo-Forschung. DS, 17.3.2008.

Protest vor Ort. DS, 22.3.2008.

Erbschutzgut vor Dopingkontrollen. DS, 7.4.2008.

Der Kongress der Verlierer. DS, 14.4.2008.

Die Firma. DS, 14.4.2008.

Begehrte Akten. DS, 14.4.2008.

Die Bank zahlt alles. DS, 21.4.2008.

Grenzwertig. DS, 28.4.2008.

Mäuse auf dem Everest. DS, 5.5.2008.

Frisierte Körper. DS, 19.5.2008.

19. Mai 2008 Betr.: Preise. DS, 19.5.2008.

Jan Ullrich muss vor Gericht aussagen. DS, 26.5.2008.

Codename Phylax. DS, 2.6.2008.

Systematisches Doping. DS, 16.6.2008.

Als Dealer angeklagt. DS, 23.6.2008.

Es klingt noch nicht wie Musik. DS, 30.6.2008.

Projekt Glaube. DS, 7.7.2008.

Hundsgewöhnliche Proletarier. DS, 7.7.2008.

Das Mantra der Naiven. DS, 21.7.2008.

Überzogene Doping-Hysterie?. DS, 21.7.2008.

Mutter als Comebacks. DS, 28.7.2008.

Diktatur der Labore. DS, 28.7.2008.

Peking-Enten. DS, 28.7.2008.

Die Suche nach dem Limit. DS, 4.8.2008.

Der Dealer Olympias. DS, 11.8.2008.

Allein auf dem Mond. DS, 11.8.2008.

Aller Anfang ist Rom. DS, 11.8.2008.

Leserbriefe. DS, 11.8.2008.

Galopp und HipHop. DS, 18.8.2008.

Kampf der Kulturen. DS, 18.8.2008.

Auf der Suche nach General Ma. DS, 18.8.2008.

Globalisierte Körper. DS, 18.8.2008.

Schlüpfrige Spekulationen. DS, 16.2.2009.

Viel Geld für nichts. DS, 21.2.2009.

Ein Sargnagel für den Leistungssport. DS, 21.2.2009.

Zitat. DS, 2.3.2009.

Zwei Jahre Sperre. DS, 2.3.2009.

Ein Präzedenzfall. DS, 16.3.2009.

Haare als Waffe. DS, 23.3.2009.

Gesetz gegen Doping. DS, 1.4.2009.

Beichte im Kaffeehaus. DS, 6.4.2009.

Auch mal ein Törtchen. DS, 20.4.2009.

Weltformel der Seele. DS, 27.4.2009.

Wow! Mehr davon. DS, 27.4.2009.

Der Abschluss. DS, 27.4.2009.

27. April 2009 Betr.: Doping. DS, 27.4.2009.

Zitate. DS, 4.5.2009.

Zitate. DS, 4.5.2009.

Eine Spritze zu viel. DS, 4.5.2009.

Jedermann ein Supermann. DS, 11.5.2009.

Black Box Bonn. DS, 11.5.2009.

Profis aus Ruanda. DS, 30.5.2009.

Doping gestrichen. DS, 8.6.2009.

Das passt zur Bank. DS, 22.6.2009.

Ich bin keine Kriminelle. DS, 29.6.2009.

Projekt Mr. Nice Guy. DS, 29.6.2009.

Geld, Macht und Ruhm. DS, 6.7.2009.

Gleich, aber anders. DS, 6.7.2009.

Präzedenzfall Pechstein. DS, 6.7.2009.

Blutspuren. DS, 13.7.2009.

Ich höre auf meinem Körper. DS, 20.7.2009.

BMI blockiert Gelder. DS, 20.7.2009.

Fertig, aus, Schluss, basta!. DS, 27.7.2009.

Krabbe als Zeugin vorgeladen. DS, 3.8.2009.

Genereller Zweifel. DS, 10.8.2009.

Laufen in der Matrix. DS, 10.8.2009.

Zitate. DS, 17.8.2009.

Wettlauf um die Wahrheit. DS, 17.8.2009.

The German Mädel. DS, 24.8.2009.

Nicht bis zum GAU warten. DS, 24.8.2009.

Es reicht!. DS, 7.9.2009.

Die Seele einer Mannschaft. DS, 14.9.2009.

Heimatabend. DS, 14.9.2009.

Wiener Blut. DS, 26.9.2009.

Deutsche Funktionäre am Pranger. DS, 5.10.2009.

Bewusstsein schärfen. DS, 12.10.2009.

Globale Sportpolizei. DS, 12.10.2009.

Der Sündenfall. DS, 19.10.2009.

19. Oktober 2009 Betr.: Jan Ullrich. DS, 19.10.2009.

Das Wort Zahnpasta. DS, 26.10.2009.

Wow, was für ein Gefühl!. DS, 26.10.2009.

Staatsanwälte in Not. DS, 26.10.2009.

Ein Haufen Metall und Gummi. DS, 26.10.2009.

Extreme Gefahr. DS, 2.11.2009.

Im Griff der Väter. DS, 9.11.2009.

Coole Überlegung. DS, 9.11.2009.

 

5.2.2 Quellenverzeichnis Die Zeit

Doping als Prinzip. DZ, 24.11.1949.

Wunderpillen endgültig verboten. DZ, 20.11.1952.

Ein Rennbahngespenst. DZ, 16.9.1954.

Allzu theoretische Sorgen des Berliner Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung. DZ, 1.5.1958.

Drogen im Handgepäck. DZ, 3.4.1964.

Ulbricht gegen Daume 76:53. DZ, 24.7.1964.

Groß und merkwürdig. DZ, 1.1.1965.

Rätsel Tour de France. DZ, 7.16.1965.

Doping oder nicht. DZ, 19.5.1966.

Der Sportler und die Droge. DZ, 11.11.1966.

Malen, malen, malen. DZ, 17.11.1966.

Im Paradies der Snobs. DZ, 23.6.1967.

Tod bei der Tour. DZ, 21.7.1967.

Rate. DZ, 24.5.1968.

Streit um eine. DZ, 2.8.1968.

Gefängnis für Doping?. DZ, 9.8.1968.

Prof. Dr. Manfred Steinbach. DZ, 16.8.1968.

Ist Olympia am Ende?. DZ, 4.10.1968.

Züchten wir Monstren?. DZ, 5.12.1969.

Die Haschischgemeinde. DZ, 5.12.1969.

Ein Pop-Roman von 1902. DZ, 19.12.1969.

Mißbrauch pharmalogischer Leistungssteigerung im Sport. DZ, 7.8.1970.

Doping in der Bundesliga?. DZ, 30.10.1970.

Die Gladiatoren des Programms. DZ, 7.11.1970.

Jeder kämpft für sich allein. DZ, 23.5.1980.

Letzte Nachricht aus dem Mediendorf. DZ, 9.1.1981.

Bilanz der mageren Hoffnung. DZ, 10.7.1981.

Allerlei Fehlleistungen. DZ, 15.10.1982.

Gepriesen und gescholten. DZ, 20.5.1983.

Im Würgegriff der Politik. DZ, 18.5.1984.

Doping, Doping über alles. DZ, 27.7.1984.

Toni griff daneben. DZ, 6.3.1987.

Zeitmosaik. DZ, 9.10.1987.

Doping im Kuhstall. DZ, 11.3.1988.

Der Spritzensport. DZ, 29.7.1988.

Der Sieger am Pranger. DZ, 30.9.1988.

Sieger ohne Gewähr. DZ, 7.10.1988.

Ein weicher Mensch. DZ, 21.10.1988.

Mit Doping zur Weltspitze. DZ, 11.11.1988.

Olympischer Nachsommer. DZ, 18.11.1988.

Perfekt präpariert auf die Pisten. DZ, 9.12.1988.

Rabatt vom "Doc". DZ, 16.12.1988.

Vom alten Denken eingeholt. DZ, 28.12.1990.

Bangen in Barcelona. DZ, 11.1.1991.

Über Doping spricht man nicht. DZ, 8.2.1991.

Ich bin der Idiot. DZ, 10.5.1991.

Die drei Tage von Moskau. DZ, 12.9.1991.

Wider westliche Heuchelei. DZ, 12.9.1991.

Dem falschen Hasen nach. DZ, 19.9.1991.

Wie bestellt und nicht abgeholt. DZ, 3.10.1991.

Gold für Chemie. DZ, 11.10.1991.

Das Letzte. DZ, 6.12.1991.

Dabei sein ist nicht genug. DZ, 21.2.1992.

Laufen und laufen lassen. DZ, 21.2.1992.

Wohlmeinende Amateurdilletanten. DZ, 21.2.1992.

Im globalen Kampf um den. DZ, 20.3.1992.

Gelackmeiert. DZ, 10.4.1992.

Ärgerlich. DZ, 17.4.1992.

Doping mit der Geldspritze. DZ, 12.6.1992.

Adieu Katrin. DZ, 19.6.1992.

Was war, ist wahr. DZ, 23.1.1998.

Baßstimmen-Prozess. DZ, 19.3.1998.

Was ich beginne, bringe ich zuende. DZ, 19.3.1998.

Schlechte Verlierer. DZ, 19.3.1998.

Seit 1990. schmückt sich der Westen mit den Sportlern aus DDR-Produktion. Ihre Schöpfer stehen nun vor Gericht. DZ, 19.3.1998.

Östliches. DZ, 26.3.1998.

Kicks, Koks, Kohl. DZ, 16.4.1998.

Des Radlers schöne Märchen. DZ, 23.4.1998.

Die blaue Pille. DZ, 20.5.1998.

Lügen und Wahrheit. DZ, 23.7.1998.

Alles ganz normal, oder?. DZ, 23.7.1998.

Am Zipfel des gelben Trikots. DZ, 30.7.1998.

Sauber fährt am längsten. DZ, 6.8.1998.

Saubere Helden. DZ, 6.8.1998.

Doping für Tisch und Bett. DZ, 3.9.1998.

Saubere Muskeln. DZ, 10.9.1998.

Die Profis von Morgen. DZ, 17.9.1998.

Das Leben, eine Schußfahrt. DZ, 5.11.1998.

Nichts wie weg!. DZ, 24.6.1999.

Ein Leben wie die Schweine. DZ, 24.6.1999.

BERLIN. DZ, 2.9.1999.

Sport modern. DZ, 23.9.1999.

Alles Sense. DZ, 23.9.1999.

Geschütze Werkstatt. DZ, 18.11.1999.

Die Einsamkeit des Langstreckenläufers. DZ, 16.12.1999.

Dann wurde gemotzt und gemault. DZ, 22.12.1999.

Weltrevolution ist schöner als Mittelstand. DZ, 6.4.2000.

Sie hat noch nicht, Sie will nochmal. DZ, 15.6.2000.

Renner, Radler, Richter. DZ, 29.6.2000.

Radsportler sterben gesund. DZ, 13.7.2000.

Offline. DZ, 27.7.2000.

Das ist bodenloser Wahnsinn. DZ, 25.4.2002.

Nicht wir, Erich ist's gewesen. DZ, 2.5.2002.

Sagen Sie mal, Herr Schümann, wieso sind Sie und Korea so cool?. DZ, 27.6.2002.

Hohe Ziele. DZ, 11.7.2002.

Wer hat, dem wird gegeben. DZ, 22.8.2002.

Der gute Rutsch. DZ, 2.1.2003.

Erste Hilfe. DZ, 9.1.2003.

Eilige Familie. DZ, 13.2.2003.

Verordneter Pillenknick. DZ, 13.3.2003.

Aus der Zeit 12/2003. DZ, 13.3.2003.

In alter Frische. DZ, 20.3.2003.

Marc Blume und die verlorene Zeit. DZ, 3.4.2003.

Die Helden-Maschine. DZ, 5.6.2003.

Sklaven der Presse. DZ, 26.6.2003.

Heute ist Gipfeltag!!!. DZ, 30.6.2003.

Doping für Anfänger. DZ, 10.7.2003.

Honis heitere Welt. DZ, 28.8.2003.

Dahinter steckt kriminelle Potenz. DZ, 23.10.2003.

Fußballdeutschland: Die Ost-Erweiterung. DZ, 8.1.2004.

Es starben ihnen die Liebsten. DZ, 22.1.2004.

Die sauberen Athleten sind über Jahre betrogen worden. DZ, 22.1.2004.

Sich quälen statt tricksen. DZ, 22.1.2004.

Auf dem Olymp der Verlogenheit. DZ, 22.1.2004.

Hört die Signale. DZ, 5.2.2004.

Die Teilnahme ist alles. DZ, 11.3.2004.

Aufbruch im Osten. DZ, 11.3.2004.

Die Dopingvorwürfe gegen Fußballelf 1954. DZ, 7.4.2004.

Der Ringer. DZ, 15.4.2004.

Unnötige Helden. DZ, 9.6.2004.

Das große Rätsel. DZ, 8.7.2004.

Das Gebot des Schweigens. DZ, 15.7.2004.

Aus der Zeit 30/2004. DZ, 28.7.2004.

Die Pathos-Maschine. DZ, 12.8.2004.

Keine Angst, die will nur spielen. DZ, 7.6.2007.

Da drin machen wir Epo. DZ, 21.6.2007.

Harald Martenstein. DZ, 21.6.2007.

Wir sind auch Schuld. DZ, 4.7.2007.

Reiten für Arme. DZ, 5.7.2007.

Superheld für acht Tage. DZ, 5.7.2007.

Mein Epos mit Epo. DZ, 5.7.2007.

Abgefahren. DZ, 10.7.2007.

Schach. DZ, 11.7.2007.

Vom Profiradsport wende ich mich angewidert ab. DZ, 26.7.2007.

Der letzte Gläubige. DZ, 30.7.2007.

Die Tour ist aus. DZ, 2.8.2007.

Wir müssen distanziert Berichten. DZ, 3.8.2007.

Der Pillenknick. DZ, 6.8.2007.

Reinemachen. DZ, 9.8.2007.

Erforscht und Erfunden. DZ, 9.8.2007.

Das fängt ja gut an!. DZ, 23.8.2007.

Tod auf dem Platz. DZ, 11.9.2007.

Wer braucht schon Haltungsnoten?. DZ, 4.10.2007.

Lebensgeschichte. DZ, 18.10.2007.

Siegerin nach Punkten. DZ, 18.10.2007.

Vor der Klausur zur Urinprobe. DZ, 18.10.2007.

Doping ohne Reue?. DZ, 22.11.2007.

90 Prozent sind sauber. DZ, 29.11.2007.

Die Medizin des Glaubens. DZ, 19.12.2007.

Wiener Blut. DZ, 24.1.2008.

 

Ist Training repressiv?. DZ, 10.9.1971.

Die Alpträume der Favoriten. DZ, 15.10.1971.

Staatsamateure. DZ, 18.2.1972.

Sätze für München. DZ, 30.6.1972.

Kein Ende der Rekorde. DZ, 18.8.1972.

Sie machten das Rennen Spitz und Gould. DZ, 8.9.1972.

Olympia als Literatur. DZ, 5.1.1973.

Kommunikation statt Kommerz. DZ, 29.6.1973.

Sich wie Netzer verkaufen. DZ, 29.3.1974.

Der Skat Weltmeister. DZ, 7.6.1974.

Rekorder aus der Retorte. DZ, 25.10.1974.

Künstler gegen Kollektiv. DZ, 15.11.1974.

Von sehr gut bis ungenügend. DZ, 3.1.1975.

Flut der Rekorde blieb aus. DZ, 1.8.1975.

Spieler-Streit als Doping. DZ, 24.10.1975.

Der besondere Saft. DZ, 4.6.1976.

Herkules der Hantel. DZ, 6.25.1976.

Kampf dem Doping. DZ, 13.5.1977.

Keine Sportpolizei. DZ, 16.12.1977.

Der Motor C stottert immer noch. DZ, 28.4.1978.

Merkwürdiges im Doping-Fall. DZ, 18.8.1978.

Verhinderung des Schlimmsten?. DZ, 8.12.1978.

Die Weltmacht und der Griff zum Wodka. DZ, 17.8.1979.

Ein unfreiwilliges Opfer?. DZ, 26.10.1979.

Unerwünschtes Doping. DZ, 8.2.1980.

Die Kids kennen nur die Helden. DZ, 26.6.1992.

Selbstkritik ist überfällig. DZ, 17.7.1992.

Aus Ehrgeiz in den Osten. DZ, 24.7.1992.

Neue Warnung. DZ, 24.7.1992.

Sport ist schön ist Mord. DZ, 7.8.1992.

Funke ohne Freude. DZ, 2.10.1992.

David spielt Olympia. DZ, 26.2.1993.

Schluckauf. DZ, 2.4.1993.

Die Natur – Ein Mißverständnis. DZ, 16.4.1993.

Auftragseingang in Westdeutschland. DZ, 30.4.1993.

Feuerwirtschaft. DZ, 6.8.1993.

Die mit der Pille tanzen. DZ, 10.9.1993.

Ein Leben voller Glücksfälle. DZ, 11.2.1994.

Sieg. DZ, 15.4.1994.

Ins Innere Borneos. DZ, 20.5.1994.

In der Hitze der Serra. DZ, 20.5.1994.

Ein Schlag ins Weiße. DZ, 3.2.1995.

Rangeln und Regeln. DZ, 10.3.1995.

Verräterische Muster. DZ, 14.4.1995.

Für immer schlank. DZ, 15.9.1995.

Hormone im Sturzflug. DZ, 12.1.1996.

Die wilde Schlittenjagt. DZ, 19.1.1996.

Huhn und Ei. DZ, 2.2.1996.

Hundert Jahre und 42,195 Kilometer. DZ, 29.3.1996.

Knigge, Tag und Nacht. DZ, 3.5.1996.

Doping durch Dublin?. DZ, 5.7.1996.

Die Sprache des Sports. DZ, 19.7.1996.

Das Kreuz mit Drogen. DZ, 19.7.1996.

Die Priester der Muskelkraft. DZ, 19.7.1996.

Olympia Spezial I: Ein Wettlauf mit allen Übeln dieser Welt. DZ, 19.7.1996.

Krank nach Gold. DZ, 2.8.1996.

Endspurt im Stakkato. DZ, 9.8.1996.

Resistenz. DZ, 3.1.1997.

Gut gedopt durchs Alter. DZ, 4.4.1997.

Doktoren und Athleten. DZ, 12.7.1997.

Östliches. DZ, 31.10.1997.

Sind die Olympischen Spiele am Ende bevor sie begonnen haben?. DZ, 13.9.2000.

Schwimm, Eric Moussambani, schwimm! DZ, 20.9.2000.

Sydney, Bahn vier. DZ, 21.9.2000.

Sportförderung und Doping. DZ, 28.9.2000.

Olympische Spielereien XIII. DZ, 29.9.2000.

Olympische Spielereien. DZ, 1.10.2000.

Zank, Gewalt und ein letztes Hurra. DZ, 2.10.2000.

Yahoo: Ein Stern hinter den Wolken. DZ, 5.10.2000.

Die Kehrseite der Medaille. DZ, 17.10.2000.

Gesund mit Bayer-Tech. DZ, 18.10.2000.

Das Leibeigene. DZ, 25.10.2000.

Die Herren des Balls. DZ, 25.10.2000.

Verlorene Spiele – Journal eines Doping-Prozesses. DZ, 31.5.2001.

Saniert und abserviert. DZ, 21.6.2001.

Wer nichts nimmt, der bringt auch nichts. DZ, 28.6.2001.

Im Zeichen der Wade. DZ, 4.7.2001.

Ein Matchball im Visier des Ultraschalls. DZ, 17.7.2001.

Der Thüringer vom Bökelberg. DZ, 26.7.2001.

Bittere Kraftpillen. DZ, 11.10.2001.

Lauter kleine Dorian Grays. DZ, 3.1.2002.

Nachrichten aus Orwells Unterwelt. DZ, 10.1.2002.

Flanke von rechts. DZ, 17.1.2002.

Tacheles – Das Streitgespräch am Freitagabend. DZ, 1.2.2002.

Illusion Olympia. DZ, 7.2.2002.

Spiele in Not. DZ, 22.2.2002.

Die Tage der Propheten. DZ, 28.2.2002.

Sichtung und Wahrheit. DZ, 7.3.2002.

Ach, Zatopek. DZ, 7.3.2002.

Fehlendes Ballgefühl. DZ, 14.3.2002.

Geschichten, die das Leben schrieb. DZ, 4.4.2002.

Ganz vorne. DZ, 12.8.2004.

Kehrseite der Medaille. DZ, 2.9.2004.

Die Tiefkühlreligion. DZ, 7.10.2004.

Die Meistersinger. DZ, 13.1.2005.

Fußball ist kein Sport wie jeder andere. DZ, 19.5.2005.

Romingers Qualen. DZ, 30.6.2005.

Wada-Fifa 1-0. DZ, 30.6.2005.

Aus der Spur. DZ, 7.7.2005.

Epo allein reicht nicht. DZ, 1.9.2005.

Originelle Doping-Ausflüchte. DZ, 1.9.2005.

Wir sind Helden!. DZ, 13.10.2005.

Von nun an per Sie. DZ, 26.1.2006.

Was macht Behle?. DZ, 9.2.2006.

Lizenz zum Ballern. DZ, 23.2.2006.

Doper vor den Kadi. DZ, 2.3.2006.

Mittwoch ist Schicksalstag. DZ, 16.3.2006.

Tour ohne Helden. DZ, 5.7.2006.

Die Stasi-Rentner. DZ, 19.7.2006.

Training macht den Körper zum Genie. DZ, 19.7.2006.

Das Urteil über Dopingsünder ist verlogen. DZ, 20.7.2006.

Absteigen, bitte. DZ, 2.8.2006.

Unglaublich. DZ, 10.8.2006.

Mörderisches System. DZ, 11.8.2006.

Radprofi macht Werbung. DZ, 17.8.2006.

Schlecht und billig. DZ, 20.9.2006.

Die anarchistische Wiki-Welt. DZ, 13.11.2006.

Alles wird besser. DZ, 22.11.2006.

Aufschrei eines Bewunderers. DZ, 6.2.2007.

Es muss Hunger da sein. DZ, 23.4.2007.

Radrennfahrer Basso packt aus. DZ, 17.5.2007.

Null Toleranz für Grauzonen. DZ, 24.5.2007.

Eine Spirale ohne Ende. DZ, 31.5.2007.

Im fahlen Glanz der Sieger. DZ, 31.5.2007.

Blut und Gold. DZ, 31.5.2007.

Rezepte für den Sieg. DZ, 31.5.2007.

Ich wusste bescheid. DZ, 7.6.2007.

Wir fahren mit. DZ, 7.6.2007.

Blut für die Piste. DZ, 1.2.2008.

Simulierter Höhenrausch. DZ, 18.2.2008.

Man muss Zeichen setzen. DZ, 23.4.2008.

Man muss sich manchmal ändern. DZ, 4.8.2008.

Im Goldrausch. DZ, 13.8.2008.

Nur Mut!. DZ, 13.8.2008.

Achtung, fertig – Los!. DZ, 13.8.2008.

Uns fehlen Siegertypen. DZ, 22.8.2008.

Das IOC verrät die olympischen Ideale. DZ, 24.8.2008.

Schleichendes Gift. DZ, 25.8.2008.

Heimat der Medaillenträger. DZ, 8.9.2008.

Wenn das mal klappt. DZ, 8.10.2008.

Politik mit anderen Mitteln. DZ, 13.10.2008.

Ich würde gerne allen beweisen, dass ich sauber bin. DZ, 5.1.2009.

Nano-Konferenz im Netz. DZ, 8.1.2009.

Eine Pille für die Eins. DZ, 22.1.2009.

Im besten Fall wirkungslos. DZ, 26.1.2009.

Bahn frei!. DZ, 19.2.2009.

Fremder Urin in der Hose. DZ, 5.3.2009.

Bis hierher – und nicht weiter. DZ, 5.3.2009.

Die DNAthleten. DZ, 5.3.2009.

Österreichs Spitzensport. DZ, 2.4.2009.

Vitamine für die Karriere. DZ, 29.5.2009.

Wo Angst regiert. DZ, 1.7.2009.

Quält euch. DZ, 11.7.2009.

9,58 Sekunden. DZ, 20.8.2009.

 

 



[1] Die Ergebnisse dieses Aufsatzes leiten sich zum Teil aus meinem Dissertationsprojekt ab, das sich mit dem Dopingbegriff über einen Zeitraum von sechzig Jahren befasst. Das Dissertationsvorhaben ist im Kontext des vom Bundesinstitut für Sportwissenschaft geförderten dreijährigen Projektes „Doping in Deutschland von 1950 bis heute aus historisch-soziologischer Sicht im Kontext ethischer Legitimation“ entstanden, das 2012 fertiggestellt wurde.

[2] Für eine detaillierte Untergliederung in Dekaden vgl. Rose (2013a:28).

 

Rediscovering the cognitive-semiotic and cognitive-pragmatic approaches to metaphor in the work of Johann Heinrich Lambert and Philipp Wegener

Ulrike Schröder

Belo Horizonte (schroederulrike@gmx.com)

Abstract

Since the advent of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) more than thirty years ago, many researchers have pointed to the problems of this approach due to its lack of historiographical contextualization, given that the major hypotheses of conceptual metaphor as well as many examples were already anticipated by philosophers, anthropologists, psychologists and linguists from the 17th century onwards. The article introduces two authors from the 18th and 19th centuries: the philosopher Johann Heinrich Lambert (1764/1965) and the linguist Paul Wegener (1885/1991). Not only did they develop a cognitive theory of metaphors ‘we live by’ but they also included some pragmatic aspects rediscovered in recent works on cognitive metaphor and characterized as issues disregarded by the first generation of CMT. Therefore, remembering the works of Lambert and Wegener may help to build a bridge from their work to current discussions. On the one hand, the approaches of both scholars allude to ways of overcoming the cleavage between the solipsistic individual and society; on the other hand, both works address the dichotomy of universalism and cultural relativity. Most importantly, they concurrently understand metaphor as a cognitive and intersubjective phenomenon negotiated between participants in real communication.

Seit Beginn der Konzeptuellen Metapherntheorie (KMT), die sich im Rahmen der Kognitiven Semantik von Lakoff & Johnson (1980) vor mehr als dreißig Jahren herauszubilden beginnt, haben Forscher wiederholt auf die mangelnde historiographische Einbettung des Ansatzes aufmerksam gemacht, d.h. darauf, dass die Kernthesen sowie viele ihrer Beispiele bereits in philosophischen, anthropologischen, psychologischen und sprachwissenschaftlichen Arbeiten seit dem 17. Jahrhundert antizipiert werden. Der Aufsatz stellt zwei Autoren des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts vor – den Philosophen Johann Heinrich Lambert (1764/1965) und den Sprachwissenschaftler Paul Wegener (1885/1991) –, die nicht nur bereits eine kognitive Theorie der Metaphern, ‘in denen wir leben’ vorlegen, sondern gleichermaßen pragmatische Aspekte einbeziehen, die in jüngeren Untersuchungen als von der ersten Generation der KMT vernachlässigt aufgearbeitet werden. Sich der Vorarbeiten von Lambert und Wegener zu besinnen, so die hier vertretene These, wäre ein hilfreicher Brückenschlag zur aktuellen Diskussion, zumal die Ansätze beider Theoretiker Wege aufzeigen, wie die Kluft zwischen dem Individuellen und Sozialen überwunden werden kann. Darüber hinaus beschäftigen sich ihre Untersuchungen bereits mit der Dichotomie von Universalismus und kultureller Variation und sind in ihrem Verständnis der Metapher als kognitives und intersubjektives Phänomen, das zwischen Teilnehmern in realer Kommunikation ausgehandelt wird, der heutigen Auffassung von Metapher sehr nahe.

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Rediscovering the cognitive-semiotic and cognitive-pragmatic approaches to metaphor in the work of Johann Heinrich Lambert and Philipp Wegener

Ulrike Schröder; Belo Horizonte (schroederulrike@gmx.com)

Abstract

Since the advent of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) more than thirty years ago, many researchers have pointed to the problems of this approach due to its lack of historiographical contextualization, given that the major hypotheses of conceptual metaphor as well as many examples were already anticipated by philosophers, anthropologists, psychologists and linguists from the 17th century onwards. The article introduces two authors from the 18th and 19th centuries: the philosopher Johann Heinrich Lambert (1764/1965) and the linguist Paul Wegener (1885/1991). Not only did they develop a cognitive theory of metaphors ‘we live by’ but they also included some pragmatic aspects rediscovered in recent works on cognitive metaphor and characterized as issues disregarded by the first generation of CMT. Therefore, remembering the works of Lambert and Wegener may help to build a bridge from their work to current discussions. On the one hand, the approaches of both scholars allude to ways of overcoming the cleavage between the solipsistic individual and society; on the other hand, both works address the dichotomy of universalism and cultural relativity. Most importantly, they concurrently understand metaphor as a cognitive and intersubjective phenomenon negotiated between participants in real communication.

Seit Beginn der Konzeptuellen Metapherntheorie (KMT), die sich im Rahmen der Kognitiven Semantik von Lakoff & Johnson (1980) vor mehr als dreißig Jahren herauszubilden beginnt, haben Forscher wiederholt auf die mangelnde historiographische Einbettung des Ansatzes aufmerksam gemacht, d.h. darauf, dass die Kernthesen sowie viele ihrer Beispiele bereits in philosophischen, anthropologischen, psychologischen und sprachwissenschaftlichen Arbeiten seit dem 17. Jahrhundert antizipiert werden. Der Aufsatz stellt zwei Autoren des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts vor – den Philosophen Johann Heinrich Lambert (1764/1965) und den Sprachwissenschaftler Paul Wegener (1885/1991) –, die nicht nur bereits eine kognitive Theorie der Metaphern, ‘in denen wir leben’ vorlegen, sondern gleichermaßen pragmatische Aspekte einbeziehen, die in jüngeren Untersuchungen als von der ersten Generation der KMT vernachlässigt aufgearbeitet werden. Sich der Vorarbeiten von Lambert und Wegener zu besinnen, so die hier vertretene These, wäre ein hilfreicher Brückenschlag zur aktuellen Diskussion, zumal die Ansätze beider Theoretiker Wege aufzeigen, wie die Kluft zwischen dem Individuellen und Sozialen überwunden werden kann. Darüber hinaus beschäftigen sich ihre Untersuchungen bereits mit der Dichotomie von Universalismus und kultureller Variation und sind in ihrem Verständnis der Metapher als kognitives und intersubjektives Phänomen, das zwischen Teilnehmern in realer Kommunikation ausgehandelt wird, der heutigen Auffassung von Metapher sehr nahe.

1. Introduction

Since the arise of Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) more than thirty years ago (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999), many researchers in the field of cognitive metaphor have pointed out the persisting eclecticism of the approach due to its lack of interest in historiographical contextualization (Chamizo Dominguez & Nerlich 2010; Hülzer-Vogt, 1987; Jäkel, 2003; Schmitz, 1985; Schröder, 2004, 2008, 2010a, 2012a). In fact, the majority of the basic hypotheses and even the main part of the examples have already been discussed since the beginning of the seventeenth century, especially in philosophical treatises (Clauberg, Vico, Locke, Leibniz, Lambert, Kant, Nietzsche, Mauthner, Vaihinger, Richards, Blumenberg), but also from anthropological (Herder, Boas, Sapir, Whorf, Gehlen), psychological (Stählin, Bühler) and linguistic (Paul, Wegener, Gerber, Biese, Lady Welby, Black, Weinrich) perspectives. All these contributions already imply a profound awareness of the cognitive-epistemological function of metaphor, its ubiquity in everyday life, as well as its affection both on a conceptual and linguistic level.

Below, we will introduce two researchers from the eighteenth and nineteenth century: the philosopher Johann Heinrich Lambert (1764/1965) and the linguist Philipp Wegener (1885/1991) – who were not only responsible for preliminarily developing a cognitive theory of everyday metaphor but also for integrating pragmatic-semiotic questions, which have been rediscovered in current discussions as facets which had never been considered by the first generation of Cognitive Linguistics (Cameron, 2007; Schröder, 2012a; Steen, 2007; Tendhal & Gibbs, 2008).

            As a guideline to elaborate a discussion about the connections between the CMT and the ideas of the two researchers in question, we will adopt the nine hypotheses as proposed by Jäkel (2003:40-41; 2002:21-22), who aims to condense the core assumptions of cognitive theory of metaphor. According to him, the cognitive theory of metaphor is composed of nine main tenets:

  1. Ubiquity Hypothesis: “Linguistic metaphor is not an exceptional matter of poetic creativity or excessive rhetoric.” (Jäkel, 2002:21)
  2. Domain Hypothesis: “Most metaphorical expressions are not to be treated in isolation, but as linguistic realizations of conceptual metaphors” (Jäkel, 2002:21) which serve as mappings from source to target domains.
  3. Model Hypothesis: “Conceptual metaphors form coherent cognitive models” as “complex gestalt structures of organized knowledge” of complex reality. (Jäkel, 2002:21)
  4. Diachrony Hypothesis: “Cognitive-semantic studies of metaphor show that even in the historical development of languages, most metaphorical meaning extensions are not a matter of isolated expressions, but provide evidence of systematic metaphorical projections between whole conceptual domains.” (Jäkel, 2002:21)
  5. Unidirectionality Hypothesis: Metaphor links an abstract and complex target domain as explanandum with a more concrete source domain as explanans, which is more simply structured and open to sensual experience. This relation is irreversible.
  6. Invariance Hypothesis: “In conceptual metaphors, certain schematic elements get mapped from the source domain onto the target domain without changing their basic structure.” (Jäkel, 2002:22)
  7. Necessity Hypothesis: “In general, metaphors have an explanatory function. Certain issues could hardly be understood or conceptualized at all without recourse to conceptual metaphor.” (Jäkel, 2002,22)
  8. Creativity Hypothesis: The metaphor is open for myriad new ways of thinking by restructuring ingrained patterns of thinking.
  9. Focusing Hypothesis: “Metaphors only supply a partial description or explanation of the target domain in question, highlighting certain aspects while hiding others.” (Jäkel, 2002:22)

2. Johann Heinrich Lambert and his double view on metaphor

            For the philosopher Lambert, who already raised semiotic questions in the eighteenth century und whose interest in epistemological problems made him a significant predecessor of Kant, the metaphor represents the tropus par excellence. He draws his attention to its double function, i.e. for Lambert the metaphor is simultaneously an implement of recognition and communication because it functions as a medium for the marks objects leave on men: it is through metaphor that the abstract turns expressible as well as communicable (Lambert, 1764b/1965:85). Thus, Lambert chooses the way of impression to claim a critical position with respect to the cognitive function of language. Concurrently, he attends to ideas about the communicative and conducting mechanisms of language so that his approach becomes fertile to current discussions.

            The starting point of his semiotics is characterized by the division between the necessary (dem Notwendigen), the arbitrary (dem Willkürlichen) and the hypothetical (dem Hypothetischen) which language encompasses. Ungeheuer (1979:97) conceives this particular terminology as an implicit introduction to the distinction between ‘communicative’ and ‘extracommunicative perspectives’ concerning the phenomenon of language:[1] By the term ‘the necessary’, Lambert refers to the representational relation between sign and concept; by the term ‘the arbitrary’ to the meaning of the signs themselves, that is, to the conventional meaning; and by the term ‘the hypothetical’ to the communicative practice. This implies a focus onto the process itself guided by the hypotheses about the meanings and the sense of the utterance as constructed by the respective interlocutors. Whereas the arbitrary aspect corresponds to an extracommunicative treatment of the linguistic means for being dedicated to the analysis of language as a system, the hypothetic aspect adverts to the management of communication, to the communication acts of language and to the practical problem involved asking for how the reciprocal understanding and the correspondence between the meaning of the word and the sense of talking would be achieved[2] (Ungeheuer, 1979:98).

For Lambert (1764a/1965:483), the basis for the comparison created by the metaphor lies in the similarity of the impression provoked in us by the sensations of external objects and the imagination of abstract and invisible objects.[3] As Ungeheuer (1980:92) predicts, Lambert also holds that the ubiquity of metaphor alludes to its indispensable function in the linguistic proceeding of communication in general. Once a metaphorical expression has been accepted by the interlocutors, there will be initiated a process of habitualization (Hülzer-Vogt, 1987:26), in which the different instances of the linguistic level are related to a cognitive principle beyond the mere words:

On the contrary, it has already been introduced that we compare the visible with the invisible, the corporal world with the intellectual word, the sensations with the thoughts using the same words and expressions for both. Thus words necessarily receive a double and sometimes also multiple meaning. Having a light in the room and having a light in the thoughts are examples of such ways of talking.[4] (Lambert, 1764a/1965:483)

Such anticipation of the conceptual metaphor understanding is seeing, as well as the image schemas container, path and force (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999) mentioned by Lambert shortly before the cited paragraph, adverts implicitly to the Domain Hypothesis (2). Furthermore, he refers to the semantic principle of polysemy whose basis, according to Lambert, is shaped by a more ‘general’ or more ‘transcendental’ notion. In this context, his comprehension of tertium comparationis is crucial by showing a certain analogy to the ‘Invariance Principle’, by Lakoff’s (1990) definition, and corresponding to the sixth hypothesis, according to Jäkel: Lambert posits a basic schema representing an invariable core content of the word that remains constant in all the divergent occasions in which the word is used. 

If Ungeheuer (1985:474) purports that Lambert refers to the meaning we have to elicit from the way of denomination of the word with regard to the corporal world[5], we can conclude that such a statement is consistent with the idea of the image structure maintained untouched in the metaphorical mapping. However, Lambert is not interested in providing a list of examples of conceptual metaphors and their corresponding metaphorical expressions but in focusing on entire semantic fields in order to reveal the underlying cognitive principle with regard to the fundamental difference between the corporal and intellectual world.

Notably, the approach of Lambert already bears out an awareness of the importance of synesthetic metaphors and the cognitive principle they are governed by. As Baldauf (1997) points out in her revision of the classification of metaphors according to Lakoff and Johnson, she calls such synesthetic metaphors ‘attributional metaphors’ and holds that they merit more attention than they have received so far. Lambert assigns a central epistemological function to them since they permit a comparison between sensations and thoughts. They designate the starting point from where man comes to entire analogical conclusions as reflected in the construction of the air pump in analogy to the water pump. Therewith Lambert already uses an analogy to illustrate his point in a similar way as Gentner and Gentner (1983) do in their famous experiment where subjects were asked to explain the functioning of an electric circuit by means of a light interrupter. In dependence on the analogy the subjects chose – a water flow or a flow of people – the conclusions they arrived at were quite different: A water flow stops as soon as any barrier prevents the ongoing flow, while a flow of people stops as soon as pressure comes into play and, as a consequence, rises congestion causing the disruption. In Cognitive Semantics, there are many references to this example to illustrate that such analogies might be defined as a “comparison based on perceived similarity” (Evans & Green, 2006:98). Kövecses (2005:265) stresses that in the case of analogy, on a generic level, source and target domains have in common the whole structure so that they can be characterized by holding similar structural relations which assigns a crucial point for the creativity of metaphor development. Finally, Kohl (2007:87) concludes that an analogy represents an extended version of metaphor where the source domain turns into a narration with coherent sequences of meaning.

Hence analogies and metaphors serve as orientations in everyday life, a conclusion which turns out to be of fundamental importance for the experientalism (Lakoff & Johnson 1980/2003) or embodied realism (Lakoff & Johnson 1999) more than 200 years later, as Lakoff and Johnson define the ubiquity of metaphor as an intellectual implement:

They [the metaphors, US] also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most mundane details. Our concepts structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003:3)

            At this point, the view of Lambert is in line with the notion of conflation according to Johnson (1999) who dedicates his research to a neuroscientific and developmental anchoring of CMT[6]. Despite lacking the physical evidence we have recently gotten access to, Lambert (1764a/1965, p. 483) already speculates that the metaphorical mapping has its origin in the parallelization of the executions of the body[7] and those of the mind,[8] the concrete knowledge being applied to the understanding of cognitive processes. Therefore we conceive our memory as a container since we also keep real objects in boxes. The nexus between box and memory yields a force of imagination[9] (Lambert, 1764b/1965:144).

            Ultimately, the Diachrony Hypothesis (4), the Unidirectionality Hypothesis (5) and the Creativity Hypothesis (8) come to the fore in Lamberts postulation of a three-step-meaning-formation, a theoretical construct, which Ungeheuer (1980) calls semantic tectonics of vocabulary:[10] According to such tectonics one may observe the historical development of language from a more basic level to a more abstract one: (a) at the first level, we find root words like the class of sensorially perceivable objects; (b) the second level implies the metaphorical use of the words of the first level and (c) the third level comprises meta-metaphors presuming those of the second level.

This interest in meaning changes and transformations bears a certain anticipation of the ‘radial networks’ theory as formulated by Lakoff (1987). As a consequence, for Lambert the main reason for the ongoing growth of language is not at all the increase of the number of words but the extension of the original meaning. First of all, metaphor serves as the elimination of a deficit[11] (Bertau, 1996:217) by compensating an initial situation in which a multiplicity of notions confronts a small number of words. It is this economic principle of the language that leads to the described development by the means of gradual metaphorization. Nevertheless, at the same time, danger arises with respect to misunderstandings in communication (Hülzer-Vogt, 1987:46), and arguments about words become more probable in the transition from the first to the third word class (Ungeheuer, 1980:92).

Thus, in addition to the anticipation of the Ubiquity Hypothesis (1) and the Domain Hypothesis (2), Lambert alludes to an important topic around the Focusing Hypothesis (9) which brings him to the field of communication less focused by the CMT. He broaches the issue of communicative problems which emerge as a consequence of metaphorical extensions of meanings when the speaker stresses a specific aspect of meaning in a specific instance of interaction but another one in the following. Furthermore, Lambert brings to the fore the possibility that each individual applies his proclaimed comparability to different aspects, that is, realizing a diverging selection as opposed to the interpretation constructed by the hearer. 

In compliance with Lambert, each one can choose a totally individual way of thinking to arrive at new metaphors[12] (Lambert, 1764b/1965:183). Hülzer-Vogt describes this situation analyzed by Lambert as a kind of paradox:

The need of an idealization of meaning stability in order to be able to trust, under these circumstances, in the success of communication stands against the need of meaning plurality of the words in order to be able to encompass and mediate new language insights[13] (Hülzer-Vogt, 1987:30, emphasis by the author)

Accordingly, the speaker tends to unconsciously establish idealizations and attributes these to the hearer, too: on the one hand, the significability of the attributions of the meaning Lambert (1764b/1965:182-183) calls ‘hermeneutic approval’[14], on the other hand, the identity of the meaning Lambert (1764b/1965:203) refers to by the principle ‘of the hypothetical of language’.[15] Notably the same idea resides in the ‘Principle of Relevance’ as conceived by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) who claim that human cognition tends to be relevant. Tendhal and Gibbs (2008) show how the two perspectives – the CMT and the cognitive-pragmatic approach of Sperber and Wilson – might be seen as complementary and not as excluding each other. In the view of Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995) metaphor only represents one aspect of the so-called ‘loose talk’ which they see as everyday talk practice characterized by vagueness. Thereby it is the responsibility of the hearer to construct a contextual meaning when applying interpretative strategies based on the Principle of Relevance to the given utterance. The authors (Sperber & Wilson, 2002:319) give an example:

Peter: Can we trust John to do as we tell him and defend the interests of the Linguistics department in the University Council?

Mary: John is a soldier.

Here, we can view a variety of alternative understandings regarding the term soldier: (a) John is aware of his duties, (b) John stands by to follow orders, (c) John never questions authorities, (d) John identifies himself with the goals of the group, (e) John is a patriot and one can count on him, (f) John has the income of a soldier and (g) John is member of the army. However, based on the known schema as presented by Peter (trust, defend, interests) Mary might understand directly what Peter wants to say. Such metaphors represent a ubiquitous phenomenon in everyday talk. As opposed to other theories in the fields of pragmatics, Sperber and Wilson do not distinguish between different ways of understanding in the case of metaphor compared to further linguistic means as each mere meaning in a phrase is always underdetermined. In this sense, the theory of Sperber and Wilson can in fact be seen as compatible and complementary to the CMT for its dedication to the inferential process as an aspect which is left out by Lakoff and Johnson. Anyhow, there are also divergences between the two approaches related to basic definitions as Sperber and Wilson (2008:84) themselves underscore: Whereas cognitive linguistics conceive metaphor as a language phenomenon constitutive for human cognition, Sperber and Wilson aim to adopt the communicative perspective of the participants involved in human interaction conceptualizing metaphors as emerging in the process of verbal communication. At this point, we agree with Tendhal and Gibbs (2008), for whom Sperber and Wilson introduce this fundamental aspect to the discussion, although the integrability of the two theories may be questioned because the perspective of Sperber and Wilson remains a rationalist and egological one, modeled by an instrumental, deductive view aimed as maximal relevance. In addition to that, Sperber and Wilson part from a position opposed to CMT concerning the foundation and development of language itself for choosing as a starting point of their account the conjunction of the ‘Theory of Implicature’ according to Grice and the ‘Modular Theory of Mind’ as proposed by Fodor, following the Principle of Modularity Cognitive Linguistics strives to leave behind. 

Although Lambert – as opposed to the characterization of metaphor as ‘loose talk’ in terms of Sperber and Wilson – still maintains the special status of metaphor, paying more attention to novel metaphors than to conventionalized ones, the two principles formulated by him show how the pragmatic-functionalistic and cognitive-epistemological perspectives might be complementary. At the same time, Lambert anticipates basic premises of modern theories of communication: (a) the Principle of Cooperation with its Maxims of Conversation as proposed by Grice (1975)[16] and (b) the ‘General Thesis of the Reciprocity of Perspectives’ with its idealizations of the ‘exchangeability of the viewpoints’ and the ‘congruity of the relevance systems’ as inaugurated by the philosopher and sociologist Alfred Schütz (1971:12-14), whose phenomenological foundation was the crucial impetus for the Ethnomethodology and, thereupon, the Conversation Analysis.

As Lambert puts it, especially the postulate of the reciprocity of the perspectives only might be converted conditionally once communication always remains fallible. This is a logical consequence of his basic hypothesis derived from his tectonics of language that metaphor acts like a fundamental principle in language growth. 

3. Philipp Wegener and his pioneering cognitive pragmatics

Influenced by the spirit of historical linguistics of the century,[17] the scientific outsider Philipp Wegener (1885/1991) describes the metaphor as a phenomenon profoundly entrenched in everyday talk. Metaphor has a decisive force in the development of language where, at the same time, its selective character is revealed (Wegener 1885/199:160). By choosing this starting-point, Wegener anticipates especially the first, fourth and ninth hypotheses as described by Jäkel. However, unlike the CMT, Wegener opts for a pragmatic point of view founding a theory of communication directed towards interaction: “Wegener was among the first to realize that speaking and understanding are preconditioned by and embedded in practical action and also dependent on the cooperation among the speakers.” (Knobloch, 1991:XVI). Hence the overarching benefit of his theory is the bridge he builds between pragmatic and cognitive aspects of language. That is why his approach should be remembered in current discussions which cope with this key question of how to overcome the seemingly artificial separation of cognitive and functional perspective.

Starting from a communicative point of view, Wegener arrives at theoretical questions related to cognition. The pivotal point of his account is the presumption that the principal goal of talk being the persuasion of the interlocutor as a kind of ‘influentiation’[18] to trigger a certain action, a certain volition or a certain state of consciousness. That implies a view where verbal signs do not have primarily an epistemological but an imperative function.

In accordance with such a functional-interactive view, Wegener starts his account with a differentiation of contextual factors playing a crucial role in the construction of meaning in the course of communication. He terms such contextual elements ‘exposition’ of the utterance. It comprises (a) the linguistic explication of the predicate for which reason Wegener also understands this element as ‘exposition’ in a more restrictive sense, (b) the ‘situation of imagination’[19], to which belong the personal and temporal conditions, (c) the ‘situation of remembrance’[20], that refers to the events and sequences happened immediately before, (d) the ‘situation of awareness’,[21] with which Wegener identifies meaning systems related to a specific domain and, finally, (e) the ‘cultural situation’[22] to which belong the geographical and historical embedding of an utterance.

Wegener is particularly concerned to bear out that the communication process cannot be seen as a manifestation of a verbal representation recomposed by the hearer, but instead has to be understood as a process of meaning construction where the speaker merely allocates an organized system of indications to the hearer, a system serving as basis for the act of (re)construction by the hearer. In that, it is possible to bring out a parallel to the ‘contextualization cues’ of the interactional-sociolinguistic theory of Gumperz (1982), as well as to the Theory of Implicature, as proposed by Grice (1975) as essential parts of the meaning are inferred by what was not explicitly said but understood implicitly. It is exactly this kind of context in which Wegener observers the emergence of cognitive metaphor: Through the prism of Wegener’s theory the co-text is responsible for the choice of a certain domain of our background knowledge which is activated when we hear, e.g., the word lion, i.e. it is the textual field that determines whether the speaker refers to the muscular force of the lion or to its posture. This implies that always only certain parts of a group of imagination are activated, namely those which serve as exposition of the predicate (Wegener, 1885/1991:49-50).

When Wegener confines his attention to an analysis of the variety of the meanings of the verbs give and have in dependence on the immediate co-text, it allows us to draw an analogy to a pragmatic-semantic version of the notion of valency as well as to the theory of Construction Grammar (Goldberg, 1992). According to Wegener, the difference between ‘having money’ and ‘having an idea’ demonstrate the metaphorical extension of the original meaning. Such verbs create expectations with respect to complements which corresponds to the idea of the activation of slots. Only the annulment of those slots affects the decision on our comprehension of the possible meaning of the verb.

Concomitantly, we can observe traces of the Frame Semantics (Fillmore, 1982/2006), the embodied realism (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999) as well as the notions of ‘schema’ (Bartlett, 1932; Lakoff, 1987; Johnson, 1987), ‘script’ (Schank & Abelson, 1977) and ‘scenario’ (Sanford & Garrod, 1981): for Wegener is convinced that it is only from our experience that emerges the expectation of a development of the event and by this emerges the schema regarding the way how we think we have to interconnect action sequences[23] (Wegener, 1885/1991:131).

Wegener already gives the answer of Cognitive Semantics together with its hypotheses of Necessity (7) and Ubiquity (1) when he launches the question of how to understand the emergence of something new by the activation of schemas and experience patterns via analogical projection and comparison: And before language had faded words for the logical subject language had been incapable to denominate the situation as by alluding the situation of imagination[24] (Wegener, 1885/1991:54).

Notice again that the terms ‘metaphor’, ‘comparison’ and ‘analogy’ are frequently used as synonyms although they are conceived through the prism of cognition: Following the terminology introduced by Aristotle, since Kant (1790/1990, 1781/1986) the expressions symbol and analogy have been used to refer to the basic mechanism of reality construction according to the new cognitive-epistemological paradigm. Yet Kant argues that it is by analogy that we conceive the state either as a body with a soul when we refer to the internal laws of a people, or as a machine when we refer to a single dominating volition (Kant 1790/1990: § 59). It is this idealistic branch of philosophy where the majority of the reflections about metaphor since the eighteenth century have their origin, such as the treatise of Biese (1893) or the account of Paul (1880/1995), and finally are influenced by Paul, only turning his solipsistic and psychological approach into an intersubjective one: the ideas of Wegener himself. From this the question arises whether (or not?) Wegener was directly influenced from Lambert. However, considering the abundance of contributions to the cognitive metaphor before the advent of Wegener, direct influence may be less supposable because as a secondary school teacher Wegener was a scientific outsider, even though he was marked by the philosophical discussions of his era like the research of Paul (1880/1995), who was the most important representative of the German School of ‘Young Grammarians’ (Junggrammatiker).[25]

With regard to Wegener’s focus on analogy, it is worth mentioning that we can observe a recurrence of interest in the cognitive metaphor as analogy in authentic language use and its affinity for certain communicative genres in recent work in the more cognitive-discursive oriented field of research:

Cameron (2008a) singles out how analogical process unfolds its own dynamics during the flow of conversation as a mechanism of ‘vehicle development’. She states that such analogical reasoning is typical for the interactions between teachers and students, and she gives an example where a teacher wants to explain to his students the phenomenon of volcanic eruption using an analogy of butter melting in the microwave. Schröder (2012a:295) throws some light on typical analogies used in current books about the end of the social welfare system in Germany. Here, for instance, the ‘House of Society’ is one omnipresent analogy to refer to those who have to leave the house or move to the basement. Beckmann (2001:121-124) shows how want ads in search for a relationship are often guided by a central analogy. People frequently introduce themselves as animals or desired objects such as cars. In the field of Discourse Analysis, Musolff (2004) and Zinken (2007) even put the analogy into the centre of their attention when analyzing political discourse.[26]

The examples Wegener gives stem from everyday talk and comprise verbs with prepositional prefixes and verbal complements as reflected in the expressions to reject an offer,[27] I refuse something,[28] I admit[29] or I describe the house orally[30] (Wegener, 1885/1991:136), verb-noun combinations as semantically weak verbs (Funktionsverbgefüge) like to let the point out[31] (Wegener, 1885/1991:136) and local descriptions like in the way of injustice[32] or on the path of sin[33] (Wegener, 1885/1991:142). For Wegener, as well as for Cognitive Semantics, such expressions reveal:

that there are fixed special patterns in our interior forming the basis for our understanding of special utterances and that we also carry patterns of our movement to our soul that serve as completing and understanding movement messages.[34] (Wegener, 1885/1991:165)

In line with the German linguistics at the end of the nineteenth century, directed to studies about regularities in the history and development of language (Paul, 1880/1995), for Wegener, the crucial mechanism of the changes of word meanings resides in the analogical formation. Thus, he introduces a gradual model to explain the process of the fading of metaphor through constant use. Like Lakoff and Johnson, Wegener also has no interest in bearing out isolated, singular expressions but in groups: “The metaphor is based on the connection of groups of imagination in accordance with partial sameness”[35] (Wegener, 1885/1991:52). Nevertheless, metaphorical expressions like the Krieg entbrennt (war begins to burn)[36] or der Krieg bricht aus (the war breaks out),[37] in correspondence with the terminology of Lakoff and Johnson reflecting the conceptual metaphor conflict is fire, in the view of Wegener, due to its conventionalization, the original sense is not any longer transparent to the users. As Wegener puts it, one only feels the sense stipulated by the situation, the ideas additionally related to the word entbrennen’ (begin to burn) are totally forgotten in the present connection[38] (Wegener, 1885/1991:52). Similarly to Sperber and Wilson as well as to the CMT itself, Wegener forecloses a criticism directed to intentionalist theories which we can find in the field of pragmatics (Grice 1975; Searle 1979/1993). For instance, Grice distinguishes between Sentence-Meaning, Word-Meaning and Utterer’s Meaning so that the metaphor is seen as a violation of the Conversational Maxims. Similarly, in Searle’s theory of reinterpretation (1979/1993), the comprehension of the metaphor passes through a two-step-procedure where the hearer (1) comes naturally to a literal interpretation but then (2) notices an anomaly and as a consequence, he tries to employ a metaphorical interpretation. This theory supposes that the literal comprehension is the unmarked case, that is, by resorting to Grice, Searle also distinguishes between two senses he denotes ‘meaning’ and ‘use’. Here the metaphor belongs to the appellative field of the speaker’s intention. In both approaches the metaphorical utterance remains an indirect communicative strategy based on monological-rational calculus. Both Grice and Searle see speech acts rather as individual than social actions since the difference between the two meanings gives support to the postulation of a difference between competence and performance, as well as between semantics and pragmatics.

Opposed to this view, psycholinguistic experiments have shown that theories assuming a two-step-process of reinterpretation cannot be hold. In contrast, the hearer does not understand the metaphor passing through two processes of interpretation but understands it as he understands every other lexical unit. The experiments of Hoffman and Kemper (1987) and Gibbs (1994), e.g. measure the reaction time for the processing of literal and metaphorical utterances and come to the conclusion that the subjects do not need more time to understand a metaphorical expression than a literal one. However, we should add that this observation apparently is only valid for conventional metaphors which Searle does not even define as metaphors. In fact, the subjects need more time to interpret innovative, novel metaphors (Giora, 2003:108).

For Wegener, the fading process of metaphor passes through three steps (Wegener, 1885/1991:52): (a) the adding of an exposition of an imagetic idea to the new metaphorical expression as in the example The war breaks out like a fire, (b) the comparison is compressed for being known: The war breaks out, (c) the association only with the group of war and no longer with the group of fire when hearing the utterance. Here, Wegener already treats the metaphor in a similar way to Steen in his cognitive-textual conceptualization of metaphor: whereas Lakoff and Johnson (1999:126) oppose the idea of metaphor involving similarity, Steen (2007:61-66) highlights that this kind of rejection is based on the assumption that such similarities were preexisting and substantial instead of structural. If we substitute such a concept of similarity by a constructionist one, Steen argues that in this case, the difference is only reflected in the surface of language or at the level of psychological processing but not at the level of conceptual structure. For Wegener the difference between comparison and metaphor also seems to be a question of processing and at the same time of habitualization and conventionalization so that he draws his attention to the moment of use. 

Observe that at this point of his argumentation it once again becomes evident that Wegener in fact thinks about two levels – a cognitive and a linguistic one – even though he does not explicitly broach the issue of this implication. It is obvious because the expressions he treats are different; moreover he explicitly talks about ‘groups’ when he refers to the cognitive level of source domains, which leads to a clear presumption of ‘metaphorical expression’ and ‘conceptual metaphor’.

Hülzer-Vogt (1987:60-106) constricts her attention to the fading process of metaphor in the approach of Wegener, as well as to the emphasis Wegener gives to the hearer: When the metaphor is still active, it develops its force by the exposition which instructs the hearer how to construct the imagetic of the metaphor in the course of the whole communicative situation. At this point of the theory, Wegener approaches the communicative context and stresses ‘suggestion’ and ‘sympathy’ as relevant elements for acting onto the behavior of the hearer by governing the process of signification because in the end, for Wegener, it is the imperative aspect which is predominant in any interaction by communication.

To conclude, when we look at the topics which seem to dominate current discussions in the field of cognitive metaphor theory, the study of Wegener has been shown as worth remembering, especially with regard to the integration of the situation and the context of communication. Such questions are elaborated in current approaches striving for, on the one hand, overcoming the static and artificiality of the idealized conceptual metaphor by substituting it by a more dynamic, discourse-oriented and communicative concept (Cameron, 2007, 2008b; Gibbs, 1999; Linz, 2002, 2004) and, on the other hand, realizing empirical studies in the field of cultural relativity (Fernandez, 1991; Kövecses, 2005; Schröder, 2009, 2010b, 2012b; Zinken, 2004;). By highlighting the fundamental importance of the hearer, Wegener accomplishes the extension of the monological basis of metaphor by defining it as starting from its communicative function and analyzing it as an implement used by a speaker to induce certain actions, emotions or thoughts from the hearer. Primarily, the metaphor conduces to the guidance of the cognitions of the hearer. 

4. Concluding remarks

If we take a look back to the nine hypotheses which, according to Jäkel, sum up the tenets of the CMT, in the case of Lambert and Wegener, we can conclude the following result:

 

Predessor

 

1.

UBI

2.

DOM

3.

MOD

4.

DIA

5.

UNI

6.

INV

7.
NEC

8.

CRE

9.

FOC

Lambert

(1764)

X

X

[X][39]

[X]

X

[X]

X

X

X

Wegener

(1885)

X

[X]

 

X

X

[X]

X

X

X

 

TABLE 1: Anticipation of the nine hypotheses of cognitive metaphor theory in the approaches of Lambert and Wegener

 

The fact that we opted for the presentation of these two approaches within a major panorama of researchers, who have already dedicated their studies to cognitive and everyday metaphor, is due to the merit of these two authors with respect to current questions entering the scenario of cognitive metaphor theory. The contributions of Lambert and Wegener have not only shown par excellence that both perspectives – a cognitive and functional, an epistemological and pragmatic, a extracommunicative and communicative one – have to be seen as complementary, but also that one perspective cannot be imagined without the other one. The Focusing Hypothesis (‘highlighting and hiding’),[40] also alluded to by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) but less explored, was revealed to be a key-element in both theories discussed above which binds together the two perspectives in question. While Lambert introduces the pragmatic view by his ‘Principle of Hermeneutic Approval’, Wegener brings his action-based pragmatic perspective into play by his concepts of ‘exposition’, ‘sympathy’ and ‘suggestion’. Thus, the communicative process is left intact for the hearer receiving an active role in the construction of meaning in correspondence to his own hypotheses about the world, the course of the current communication, and dependence on the activity in which she is inserted. In this way, the two authors go beyond the mere cognitive function of metaphor and modify it by carrying metaphor into the field of dynamic interaction.

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[1] Ungeheuer assumes that every human being experiences communication twice: a) as a communicator during the execution of communicative acts employed to achieve reciprocal understanding and b) as a (self)reflexive observer who tries to categorize and analyse the means of communication from an external point of view. The distinction between communicative and extracommunicative perspectives can be traced back, on the one hand, to the phenomenological philosophy, precisely, to the distinction between ‘ready-to-hand’ (Zuhandenes) and ‘present-at-hand’ (Vorhandenes), according to Heidegger (1927/1957) as well as to the polarity between ‘functioning’ (fungierend) and ‘thematizing’ (thematisierend), according to Husserl (1901/1921:261-265). On the other hand, Ungeheuer refers to the linguistic-psychological approach of Karl Bühler (1934/1982:58) who distinguishes between the study of speech action and speech acts as subject-related phenomena and the study of language work and language structure as phenomena independent of a subject by having intersubjective fixation. Cf. to the historical contextualization of the problem Kolb (2010).

[2] Während das Willkürliche mit einem extrakommunikativen Umgang mit den Sprachmitteln in der Systemanalyse korrespondiert, verweist das Hypothetische auf die kommunikative Handhabung “[…] auf die sprachlichen Kommunikationsakte und auf das darin enthaltene praktische Problem, wie gegenseitiges Verständnis und Übereinstimmung in Wortbedeutung und Redesinn zu erreichen sei.”

[3] Den Grund für die Vergleichung, die von der Metapher vollzogen wird, sieht Lambert (1764a/1965:483) in der “Aehnlichkeit des Eindruckes, den die Empfindungen äußerlicher Dinge und die Vorstellung abstracter und unsichtbarer Dinge in uns machen.”

[4] “Hingegen ist es schon längst eingeführt, daß wir das sichtbare mit dem unsichtbaren, die Körperwelt mit der Intellectualwelt, die Empfindungen mit den Gedanken vergleichen, und vor beyde einerley Wörter und Ausdrücke gebrauchen. Die Worte erhalten dadurch nothwendig eine doppelte und zuweilen auch vielfache Bedeutung. Ein Licht im Zimmer haben, und Licht in den Gedanken haben, sind solche Redensarten.”

[5] “die aus der Bezeichnungsweise des Wortes bezüglich der Körperwelt zu eruieren ist”

[6] Starting from a developmental perspective, Johnson refers to a first phase of acquisition of metaphorical reasoning during which a child establishes relations between co-active domains while experiencing the two fields as belonging to each other. When the mother responds to a nonverbal request of her daughter who points to a toy: “Ah, I can see what you want”, this sentence can be interpreted literally – the mother sees the desired object itself – or metaphorically as an utterance about the state of mind of the daughter: she understands what the daughter wants. The domains see and understand are simultaneously activated so that the primary scene comprises two sub-scenes: on the one hand, the physical act of perception, on the other hand, the change of consciousness. This experience marks the crucial step to the second phase of learning where the original use of the word is uncoupled from its original use obtaining now a merely metaphorical sense.

[7] “[die] Verrichtungen des Leibes”

[8] “[des] Verstandes”

[9] “[eine] Einbildungskraft”

[10] “[die] semantische Tektonik des Wortschatzes”

[11] “[der] Behebung eines Mangels”

[12]Lambert ist überzeugt, dass “jeder sich durch ganz individuale Reihen von Gedanken, den Weg zu neuen Metaphern bähnen kann.”

[13] “Der Notwendigkeit einer Bedeutungsvielfalt der Wörter, um neue Erkenntnisse in der Sprache erfassen und daraufhin vermitteln zu können, steht die Notwendigkeit einer Idealisierung der Bedeutungsstabilität von Wörtern gegenüber, um unter dieser Bedingung auf eine gelingende Verständigung vertrauen zu können.”

[14] ‘hermeneutische Billigkeit’

[15] das Prinzip ‘des Hypothetischen in der Sprache’

[16] Here we only refer to the Principle of Cooperation with its Conversational Maxims as a contribution and valuable introduction to a new focus directed to the coordination of activities between speaker and hearer, this aspect being absent in former pragmatic approaches. The starting-point for Grice are speakers and hearers acting in a rational matter by following principles assuring the success of communication. At the same time, this hypothesis marks a weak point in the theory because the influence of the conventions, the a priori of rationality and the generality of the socialization of the interlocutors receive an exaggerated importance. In Grice’s theory it is only in exceptional cases that the interlocutor relies on the communicative context, namely when he is not able to interpret an utterance according to its ‘normal’ meaning. As a consequence, the metaphor receives marginal space once it is seen as a mere implicature. By this view, Grice corroborates the separation between semantics and pragmatics as we will see in the following.

[17] Wegener adopted insights of the psychology of language fostered by Steinthal, under whom he studied, Lazarus, as well as Paul (cf. Nerlich & Clarke, 1996:177).

[18] Influentiation refers to the German term beeinflussen, whose meaning corresponds to ‘exerting influence about somebody’.

[19] ‘[die] Situation der Anschauung’

[20] ‘[die] Situation der Erinnerung’

[21] ‘[die] Situation des Bewusstseins’

[22] ‘[die] Cultursituation’

[23] Wegener ist davon überzeugt, dass erst aus unserer “Erfahrung die Erwartung einer bestimmten Weiterentwicklung des Geschehens resultiert und daraus das Schema, wie wir Handlungsfolgen glauben verknüpfen zu müssen.”

[24] “Und bevor die Sprache für das logische Subject abgeblasste Worte hatte, war sie unfähig, die Situation anders als durch Hinweis auf die Situation der Anschauung zu bezeichnen.”

[25] Paul himself integrated the ideas of Wegener in his second edition of his work Principles of the History of Language (Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte, 1880/1995), especially the difference between ‘usual meaning’ (in the sense of conventionalized meaning) and ‘occasional meaning’ (in the sense of the meaning emerging from the context of use). It was through Karl Bühler that Wegener was not forgotten. In his famous opus Theory of Language (Sprachtheorie, 1934/1982), Bühler adopts some concepts from Wegener. Thus through Bühler the ideas of Wegener left their mark on British contextualism and functionalism (Malinoswski ð Gardner ð Firth ð Halliday).

[26] To a certain extent, such analogies that are understood by Kohl as extended metaphors frequent in specific discourse genres like political discourse, have a function similar to what Steen (2011) describes when he refers to ‘deliberate metaphors’ that confine the attention of the interlocutor to their own metaphoricity.

[27] “ich weise ein Anerbieten zurück”; the literal translation maintaining the metaphor would be: point back.

[28] “ich lehne etwas ab”, the literal translation maintaining the metaphor would be: put out.

[29] “ich räume ein”, the literal translation maintaining the metaphor would be: put in.

[30] “ich beschreibe das Haus mündlich”

[31]“den Punkt beiseite lassen”

[32] “auf dem Wege des Frevels”

[33] “auf den Bahnen der Sünde”

[34] Solche Ausdrücke betrachtet Wegener wie die Kognitive Semantik als Indiz dafür, “[…] dass feste Raummuster in unserem Inneren vorhanden sind, nach denen wir räumliche Mitteilung verstehen und dass wir ebenso Muster unserer Bewegung im Raume in unserer Seele tragen, aus denen wir Bewegungsmitteilungen ergänzen und so verstehen.”

[35] “Die Metapher beruht auf der Verbindung von Vorstellungsgruppen nach partieller Gleichheit.”

[36] in German, the word entbrennen is composed by the prefix ent- and the verb brennen, which means burn.

[37] The word ausbrechen originally also refers to fire.

[38] Wie Wegener formuliert, bedeutet dies, es werde “nur der von der Situation geforderte Sinn empfunden, die Vorstellungen, welche mit dem Worte entbrennen sonst verbunden werden, sind in dieser Verbindung total vergessen.”

[39] The brackets stand for ‘implicitly represented’.

[40] The metaphor highlights certain elements of its object and hides other ones.

 

The place of metaphor in a devolved cognitive linguistics

Ariadna Strugielska

Torun/Polen (ariadna.strugielska@umk.pl)

Abstract

The article tackles the problem of the role of metaphor, both linguistic and conceptual, in a devolving paradigm of cognitive linguistics. It is argued that while the notion of metaphor proposed by standard Conceptual Metaphor Theory is hard to defend in the web of functionally-oriented alternatives, the exact status of two-domain mappings in a revised cognitive enterprise remains elusive. It is thus further maintained that in order to resolve the quandary precise phenomenological and methodologies declarations should be made so that specific dimensions of devolution could be juxtaposed. The split definitions of metaphor hence obtained could serve as converging/diverging evidence of its status within a functional cognitive linguistics. The overall message is therefore optimistic since a devolution in cognitive linguistics means exciting avenues of research which will need to be pursued in order to re-define the old, monolithic terms against the new, multifactorial background.

Dieser Artikel behandelt die Rolle sprachlicher und konzeptueller Metaphern innerhalb eines Paradigmenwechsels der kognitiven Linguistik. Da eine Rechtfertigung des Metaphernbegriffs nach der konzeptuellen Metapherntheorie im Rahmen funktionalistischer Ansätze nur schwer möglich ist, bleibt der genaue Status der Projektion von Quell- auf Zielbereich nur schwer fassbar. Zur Lösung dieser Problematik müssen die phänomenologischen und methodischen Vorgehensweisen eine Gegenüberstellung der spezifischen Dimensionen des Paradigmenwechsels möglich machen. So erhaltene Definitionsversuche könnten dazu beitragen den Metaphernbegriff innerhalb einer funktionsorientierten, kognitiven Linguistik zu stützen oder ggf. zu widerlegen. Dieser Paradigmenwechsel in der kognitiven Linguistik bedeutet den Abschied von alten, starren Begrifflichkeiten und eröffnet somit spannende Perspektiven für die zukünftige Forschung im Hinblick auf einen zeitgemäßen und vielschichtigen Hintergrund.

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The place of metaphor in a devolved cognitive linguistics

Ariadna Strugielska, Torun/Polen (ariadna.strugielska@umk.pl)

Abstract

The article tackles the problem of the role of metaphor, both linguistic and conceptual, in a devolving paradigm of cognitive linguistics. It is argued that while the notion of metaphor proposed by standard Conceptual Metaphor Theory is hard to defend in the web of functionally-oriented alternatives, the exact status of two-domain mappings in a revised cognitive enterprise remains elusive. It is thus further maintained that in order to resolve the quandary precise phenomenological and methodologies declarations should be made so that specific dimensions of devolution could be juxtaposed. The split definitions of metaphor hence obtained could serve as converging/diverging evidence of its status within a functional cognitive linguistics. The overall message is therefore optimistic since a devolution in cognitive linguistics means exciting avenues of research which will need to be pursued in order to re-define the old, monolithic terms against the new, multifactorial background.

Dieser Artikel behandelt die Rolle sprachlicher und konzeptueller Metaphern innerhalb eines Paradigmenwechsels der kognitiven Linguistik. Da eine Rechtfertigung des Metaphernbegriffs nach der konzeptuellen Metapherntheorie im Rahmen funktionalistischer Ansätze nur schwer möglich ist, bleibt der genaue Status der Projektion von Quell- auf Zielbereich nur schwer fassbar. Zur Lösung dieser Problematik müssen die phänomenologischen und methodischen Vorgehensweisen eine Gegenüberstellung der spezifischen Dimensionen des Paradigmenwechsels möglich machen. So erhaltene Definitionsversuche könnten dazu beitragen den Metaphernbegriff innerhalb einer funktionsorientierten, kognitiven Linguistik zu stützen oder ggf. zu widerlegen. Dieser Paradigmenwechsel in der kognitiven Linguistik bedeutet den Abschied von alten, starren Begrifflichkeiten und eröffnet somit spannende Perspektiven für die zukünftige Forschung im Hinblick auf einen zeitgemäßen und vielschichtigen Hintergrund.

1. Introduction

Recent years have seen two concurrent trends within the second generation cognitive linguistics (henceforth also CL). On the one hand, there has been a tendency towards a dialogical interaction among the many conceptual approaches within, as well as outside, the paradigm, which has resulted in the emergence of both converging and diverging evidence for the claims which many cognitive linguists seem to have taken for granted in that a number of notions have been deductively assumed rather than inductively derived. Two interrelated declarations in particular – the conceptualist commitment and the usage-based orientation, which were proclaimed at the onset of the cognitive enterprise (see, for instance, Langacker 1987: 46) – have undergone a thorough re-appraisal from an integrated perspective and the role of local, multifactorial contexts has been emphasized. As a result of this re-evaluation, the second development within cognitive linguistics, i.e., an assertion that the paradigm needs internal diversification, has become prominent and thus, formal and functional schools of cognitive linguistics have been recognized (cf. Evans and Green 2006).

An important corollary of these refinements is the fact that the heuristic apparatus which conformed to the sweepings statements of the early cognitive linguistics could not be maintained if local contexts were systematically considered in theory construction and description. Thus, we can, on the one hand, observe a shift towards redefining and/or splitting the monolithic meta-constructs of formal linguistics in order to make them fit functional methodologies (see, for instance, Ariel 2002). On the other hand, though, many cognitive linguists, among them Croft and Cruse (2004), Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen (2005) and Glynn (2011), have articulated a need for a thoroughly revised metalanguage, which would be emergent, data-driven and contextually-bound.

In accordance with the two tendencies outlined above, Section 2 describes the functional shift within cognitive linguistics – a propensity to replace the idealized statements of the early formulations of the paradigm with more precise phenomenological and methodological declarations. This proclivity, which I choose to call a devolution, is discussed through its two interrelated manifestations: integration and optimization. Consequently, the cognitive pledge and the usage-based orientation of the paradigm are seen as complex notions, whose particular dimensions can be traced within particular methodologies of cognitive linguistics.

One of these approaches, which is metaphor-oriented research, is discussed in Section 3. Both linguistic and psycholinguistic studies into the nature of metaphoricity are evaluated and it is concluded that the role of metaphor in a devolved cognitive linguistics remains undecided since, although a number of functional dimensions, or relevant contexts, can be discerned among the methodologies discussed, they do not seem to be defined in a compatible manner.

2. Devolution in cognitive linguistics

The need for a devolution, or decentralization, in cognitive linguistics has been expressed by a number of researchers (see, for instance, Evans and Green 2006; Langacker 2008; Geeraerts 2010 or Glynn 2011). A major reason for this concern has been a discrepancy between the observed diversity within the paradigm and its “great tolerance…towards internal variety and towards external interaction with major linguistic disciplines and subdisciplines” (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Peña Cervel 2005: 1). Indeed, this detachment has prompted the question of the extent to which the many ramifications within CL abide by its two central claims: the conceptual pledge and the usage-based commitment.

A bottom-up perspective upon both conceptualization and usage has shown that these need to be approached as complex categories and hence, each methodology within CL can be evaluated on the integration-isolation continuum (cf. Geeraerts 2003). To be more specific, isolating are those paradigms which tend to constrain the number of possible contexts influencing linguistic theorizing, while integrating approaches allow the researcher to “describe the entirety of language from discourse through lexis and culture to syntax and cognition” (Glynn 2004: 198). Similarly, depending on the scope each perspective is granted, a particular dimension can be understood in a narrow or broad sense, i.e., it can be evaluated along the maximum-minimum parameter (cf. Langacker 2008: 164).

Devolution-as-integration has resulted in either introducing previously neglected perspectives into linguistic theories (cf. Evans and Green  2006; Geeraerts 2006) or in actually accommodating merely declared, or assumed, contexts into proposed models (see Sandra and Rice 1995 for a discussion), while devolution-as-optimization has led to the emergence of extended definitions of numerous  meta-concepts.

One of the most important of these descriptions is a comprehensive definition of cognition, based on the extended embodiment postulate (cf. Zlatev 1997), which has led to further refinements, including a broader catalog of basic concepts (see Hampe and Gibbs 2005 for a discussion) and their linguistic manifestations (see, for instance, Tyler and Evans 2001; Navarro 2006). Simultaneously, much attention has been paid to the fact that the semantic values of isolated words do not correspond to their contextual realizations. Instead, it appears to be the complex unit which facilitates the understanding of its components (cf. Hampe 2005)

An important corollary of adopting a whole-to-parts, distributed semantics in cognitive linguistics is the need to abandon one of its key meta-concepts, which is the profile determinant, i.e., “[a] component structure that ‘bequeaths’ its profile to the composite structure” (Langacker 2008: 192). A gradual relegation of the profile determinant from the heuristic apparatus of a devolved CL can be observed at many levels. In lexical semantics, for instance, Evans (2006) argues for the unique role of nouns in the process of conceptual integration, but he simultaneously admits that “the nature of the information accessed must be ‘calibrated’ with respect to the contribution of the other lexical concepts in the composite lexical conceptual structure” (2006: 526). Likewise, in construction grammar, Boas (2008: 128) postulates the redundancy of abstract constructions “à la Goldberg”, which constitute one group of profile determinants in CL, in the production of novel utterances. Instead, he claims that existing conventionalized knowledge and contextual background information need to be retrieved. Ultimately, then, it could be concluded that devolution at the level of meta-concepts is signaled by a shift from the construct of a profile determinant to that of a profile itself, i.e., a syntagmatic context where certain structures can be regarded as more salient than others. This tendency is illustrated by a number of constructs alternative to the profile determinant, including lexical profiles (Evans 2006), co-occurrence patterns (Svanlund 2007), behavioral profiles (Gries and Divjak’s 2009), constructional profiles (Janda and Solovyev 2009) or multidimensional patterns of usage (Glynn 2011).

            Expanding the context(s) within which a linguistic analysis is to be situated has resulted in the emergence of a functional cognitive linguistics, characterized by its particular phenomenological declarations and methodological routes. This much needed pluralism inside the paradigm has, concurrently, constituted a challenge for cognitive linguists since a number of “well-established” concepts must now be tested against the new perspectives. One of them is metaphor.

3. Devolution in the cognitive theory of metaphor

Conceptual Metaphor Theory, proposed by Lakoff and Johnson in 1980, is one of the most vehemently discussed methodologies within cognitive linguistics – on the one hand, CMT is credited with highlighting the importance of metaphor as a cognitive process; on the other hand, though, the standard version of the theory is criticized since its central tenets fail to conform to the conceptual and usage-based commitments of cognitive linguistics, if these are defined through the prism of integration and maximalism (cf. Section 2). A number of concerns expressed by the critics of CMT are discussed in detail by, for instance, Haser (2005), Evans and Green (2006: 779-780), Nerlich (2007) or Kertész and Csilla (2009), and thus, only selected arguments, relevant for the present exposition, i.e., concerning the isolating nature of the standard metaphor model and highlighting its aspects which should be, or have been, subjected to devolution, are outlined below.

            The first manifestation of the lack of integration in CMT is its ahistorical character. As Steen (2000: 261) observes, CMT creates an impression that “in the beginning was Aristotle. Then there were the Dark Ages, which lasted until 1980. And then there was Lakoff. And there was a Johnson too”. However, if  CMT is assessed in the context of metaphor tradition, it is a  far lees revolutionary enterprise than maintained by some of its proponents (for a detailed discussion, see Cameron 2003 and Geeraerts 2010, among others).

Importantly, re-discovering the historical perspective has led to the revival of the elements of the heuristic apparatus which have been disregarded by standard CMT. For instance, Deignan (2005: 41) re-introduces the concept of dead metaphors onto the research scene and argues that a number of Lakoff and Johnson’s conventional, i.e., active, links between source and target concepts are in fact highly conventionalized mappings. Similar observations have been made by Evans and Zinken (2005), who emphasize that CMT fails to account for the role of conventionalization in the process of  conceptual integration – an argument which also echoes in Hanks’ (2006) notion of gradable metaphoricity.

As indicated in Section 2, human cognition can be defined in a more or less comprehensive manner, and Conceptual Metaphor Theory seems to have adopted a rather limited view upon conceptualization, i.e., such that reflects the competence of an idealized native speaker (Givón 2005). This definition has been criticized as static, i.e., impervious to the impact of broadly understood contexts, including the ontogenetic constraint (cf. Cameron 2003: 21), the culture-induced variation (cf. Goatly 2007: 256–280) or the linguistic/discourse factor (cf. Deignan 2005, 2006; Hanks 2006 and Glynn 2011).

These criticisms have resulted in the emergence of usage-based approaches to metaphoricity, which have begun to question the relation between linguistic metaphors and conceptual mappings and challenge the fixed asymmetry between source and target concepts. In fact, research has shown that target categories may well be conceptually independent of the mental scaffolding provided by two-domain mappings and related to numerous other concepts instead (cf. Ritchie 2003; Haser 2005). Moreover, it has been argued that  these networks of categories are related via a variety of attributes, among which the functional aspect is particularly prominent.

Focusing on the functional features of categories, i.e., those which are relevant from the human perspective (cf. Ungerer and Schmid 1996), has had important implications for the mechanics of categorization upon which metaphors are built. To begin with, let us recall that, in CMT, the topological/geometrical aspects of the source domain are either transferred from the vehicle concept upon the unstructured topic category, which is known as the strong version of the Invariance Hypothesis (Murphy 1996), or the elements of the abstract concept are highlighted by means of source-to-target correspondences. Simultaneously, it should be noted that the exact nature of aspects, including such notions as their centrality in the context of a particular category (Jäkel 2002) or level of generality (Cameron 2003: 252), has not been the focus of investigation in CMT. Consequently, standard Conceptual Metaphor Theory has proposed that categories be linked via topological, e.g., CONTAINER, and functional e.g., HARM, attributes (Kövecses 2000: 47), both of which have, rather arbitrarily, been taken as constituting the main meaning focus of the source concept (cf. Kövecses 2000: 112).

A lack of criteria by which to distinguish between functional and topological aspects means that CMT has indeed provided no consistent basis which could serve as a demarcation line between abstract and concrete categories. In other words, since functional aspects can be attributed to either source or target concepts, the nature of correspondences between and among domains may be more complex than proposed by CMT. Along these lines, Szwedek (2011) argues for four types of relations between source and target concepts, all of which are subsumed under the mechanism of metaphor. On the other hand, Strugielska (2012) claims that Szwedek’s (2011) data can be interpreted as non-metaphorical if the semantic contributions of their syntagmatic contexts are taken into account. As a result, metaphoricity may well be a far less ubiquitous phenomenon than envisaged by researchers working within a standard CMT framework.

To conclude the current section, an important corollary of a devolution with the cognitive theory of metaphor is a heteroglossia, which results in a non-rigorous and thus, perhaps, non-scholarly, character of metaphor-related methodologies. Therefore, there is an urgent need to make precise declarations as to which aspects of the functional commitment of CL are being addressed by means of a particular methodology. Consequently, in the following section, specific approaches to the study of metaphorical language and thought, which define themselves as alternatives to standard CMT, are presented. First, linguistic analyses are described and then the findings of psychological studies are discussed, both of which are evaluated with reference to the role of metaphor in explaining the meaning of abstract concepts.

3.1. Metaphor: the linguistic approach

The bulk of the criticism directed at CMT seems to have been motivated by the incongruity between its theoretical declarations, often functional in orientation, and their implementation at the level of data analysis. According to Evans and Green (2006: 779–782), this dissonance between what is declared and that which is performed has led to the detachment, simplification and vagueness of the theory.  In an attempt to overcome the idealization commitment of CMT, alternatives have developed in two directions. The first one aimed at modifying CMT in order to make the paradigm conform to the functional commitment of the cognitive linguistics of the 21st century, while the other sought to develop new theoretical models in order to capture the complexities of language in use. Both developments are present in the linguistically-oriented studies of metaphoricity.

The former trend, which Deignan (2006: 121) calls a (metaphor) theory-driven approach, assumes the cognitive validity of two-domain mappings and concentrates on providing more empirical and methodological rigor to the enterprise. Steen’s attempts (2002, et al. 2010) to build a principled model of linguistic metaphor identification or Stefanowitsch’s  (2006) endeavor to distinguish between metaphorical patterns and other types of metaphorical language are definitely worth mentioning in this context. The other tendency, which is an advancement towards establishing a usage-based description of abstract concepts, has been pursued by, for instance, Hampe (2005) and Janda and Solovyev (2009). However, as already stipulated in Section 2, the functional commitment is not uniformly implemented by the various functional methodologies within CL and thus, the specific elements of a usage-based, cognitive approach should be carefully traced in each and grouped with a view to building sets of converging evidence.

Table 1 offers an overview of selected, though representative, studies within linguistically-driven research into metaphoricity. The analyses are discussed with reference to four shared aspects of the functional commitment. First, two dominant contexts, i.e., cognitive and usage-based, have been distinguished and next, each has been evaluated with reference to its scope. In other words, elements of devolution as both integration and optimization have been highlighted (cf. Section 2). Importantly, the four criteria discussed do not correspond to the full functional pledge declared by a particular researcher. For instance, Evans and Zinken’s (2005) usage-based postulates include, among others, supporting evidence from evolutionary studies,  Haser’s (2005) arguments are related to psychological and philosophical research and Szwedek’s (2011) approach draws from neuroembryological examinations. Still, though potentially influential in skewing the results, factors acknowledged only randomly are not considered in the current survey due to difficulties engendered by a lack of tertium comparationis. Instead, views upon category structure as well as sources and types of data analyzed are systematically juxtaposed in Table 1.

With reference to categorization, the dominant tendency in CMT has been to derive the meaning of the target concept from the central aspect(s) of the source. Simultaneously, the status of the donor category as the unique profile determinant has led to positing radical and often cognitively implausible solutions, such as the activation of etymological connections between senses – an ability which Barcelona (2001) attributes to untrained speakers of a language, and which is forcefully criticized by McGlone (2007). Moreover, placing too much emphasis on the topological attributes of the source domain has resulted in a limited view upon category structure, whereby either monosemy or unmotivated polysemy have been advocated (see Strugielska 2012 for details).

Alternative approaches, presented in Table 1, have tried either to provide a highly abstract, superordinate interpretation of the source domain, which has led to positing generic level metaphors, e.g., THE SUN IS A PERSON and A NEED IS A THING Steen (2002: 30–31), EMOTIONS ARE FORCES (Kövecses 2008: 395), A THOUGHT IS AN OBJECT (Szwedek 2011: 345), or to concentrate on the actual collocation patterns of the linguistic units derived from the source domain, which resulted in either invalidating two-domain mappings altogether (see, for instance, Haser 2005; Givón 2005) or in reformulating them as more precise, i.e., data-driven, analogies, whereby specific delineations have been proposed for both source categories (cf. Jäkel 2002; Ritchie 2003; Semino et al. 2004) and target domains (cf. Glynn 2002). Placing “alleged metaphors…within the full polysemous structure of the expressions involved” (Geeraerts 2010: 209) has also triggered the question of the actual status of figurative senses within the network. If “words like have and in are polysemous, capable of referring to physical objects and locations as well as psychological states and attributes, …characterizing I’m in trouble as metaphorical is not only odd, but paradoxical” (McGlone 2007: 123). Consequently, metaphoricity has been seen as a gradable relation whereby, for instance, deep colour, though originally derived from the ‘measurement’ sense by a process of metaphorical extension, is now not dependent on it because the mapping is concrete-concrete” (Deignan 2005: 41).

The urge for a systematic distinction between conventional and novel linguistic examples provided in support of conceptual metaphors, i.e., the polysemy cline within metaphor studies, is reflected in column three of Table 1. In fact, in the 18 case studies analyzed, I have distinguished declared conventionality and novelty, motivated conventionality and novelty, and cases where no distinction between the two is maintained by the researcher.

Declared conventionality means that an analyst merely assumes that the data discussed are “highly conventional or conventionalized (i.e. well established and deeply entrenched) in the usage of a linguistic community” (Kövecses 2002: 30), and thus fails to provide elaboration of the proposed criteria. For instance, while Kövecses (2002: 110) argues that the meaning focus of the source domain is “conventionally fixed and agreed-on within a speech community; it is typical of most cases of the source; and it is characteristic of the source only”, no evidence, other than definitions generated by the linguist himself, is provided to support the claims. An analogical approach is assumed with reference to novel examples and, as a result, declared conventionality/novelty cannot be verified. On the other hand, as Stefanowitsch (2006: 68) observes,

the relative frequency of source and target domain items in a given metaphorical pattern may be used to determine the degree to which the pattern in question is transparently motivated by a metaphorical mapping, and the relative frequency of source and target domain items in a coherent set of metaphorical patterns underlying them can be regarded as productive, i.e., as a candidate for a truly conceptual metaphor.

Consequently, in the case studies outlined in Table 1, motivated conventional/novel linguistic expressions are distinguished if the examples investigated have been classified on the basis of, at least, the criteria of frequency, productivity and semantic stability (cf. Clark 1996: 71) and have been defined in a way which enables repeat analyses (see examples 4, 14, 15, 17 and 18). Finally, I have discerned analyses of linguistic metaphors where, according to the authors, “it is irrelevant whether a conceptual mapping is systematic across linguistic expressions or not” (Steen 2002: 21) and hence, conventional and novel examples are viewed as qualitatively identical linguistic manifestations of metaphoricity.

Summing up, a comparison of tendencies in columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 shows that preserving a motivated distinction between conventionality and novelty diminishes the likelihood of “discovering” metaphorical mappings among the mechanisms facilitating conceptual integration. To be more specific, in Table 1, declared conventionality/novelty strongly coincides with the presence of conceptual metaphors (examples 1 and 2), while analyses where no systematic distinction has been made between conventional and novel examples support the mechanism of conceptual metaphor in 7 cases (examples 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13), reject it in 2 contexts (examples 5 and 6) and render ambivalent results in two situations (examples 10 and 16). Finally, an optimized definition of conventionality consistently co-occurs with instances where family resemblances are proposed as a central underlying mechanism,[1] while conceptual metaphors are evoked only in the case of novel expressions (examples 4, 14, 15, 17 and 18). In view of the above, rather complex, networks of interdependencies, the role of metaphors in explaining abstract concepts situated within their conventional contexts remains undecided.

Another important perspective influencing relative salience of conceptual metaphors is the source of linguistic examples (cf. column 4 of Table 1). Instances derived via introspection constitute invented texts which, according to Deignan (2005: 120), “may differ from naturally-occurring texts in that they provide a good deal less context, and in designing them, researchers seem to concentrate on informational content, neglecting interpersonal and modal issues”. Consequently, linguistic examples obtained via a deductive methodology are atypical in that they are relatively impoverished in comparison with natural language settings, where a variety of conceptual mechanisms are likely to be discovered. Thus, data from deduction, i.e., introspection, limited induction, i.e., a non-representative sample of corpus examples, and induction, i.e., a large sample of corpus-derived instances, will vary with reference to the number of conceptual mechanisms potentially included within their contexts.

            Column five of Table 1 reflects the above considerations and demonstrates that the scope of examples discussed under the rubric of linguistic metaphors ranges from lexemes through abstract patterns and constructions to collostructions.[2] This ordering, I claim, reflects important integrating tendencies within metaphor research due to not only quantitative differences, i.e., the number of linguistic items (and their underlying concepts) incorporated into the study, but also because of qualitative discrepancies, i.e., the amount of (linguistic and conceptual) detail admitted by a particular perspective.

To begin with, while the majority of studies within the framework of CMT concentrate on lexical categories, seeing open-class items as the sole loci of linguistic metaphors means that many cognitively salient structures are left unnoticed, among them function words and basic-level constructions (cf. Talmy 2003). In other words, as Glynn (2002: 1) rightly observes, there are “details of conceptual structure that are not visible in lexical analysis” and, therefore, incorporating grammar into the study of metaphorical language may reveal rich networks of associations unavailable from a lexical  perspective. Moreover, Deignan (2006) claims that grammatical patterns found in naturally-occurring data cannot be predicted from the theoretical model of CMT since they are not derived from the source categories proposed. Instead, both source and target concepts are responsible for the linguistic (and cognitive) properties of the emergent metaphorical relation.

To account for the effects of linguistic and conceptual integration, one solution is to, rather arbitrarily, eliminate a number of symbolic units, e.g., prepositions, grounding elements and verbal inflections, from the span of a linguistic metaphor so that an idealized schema can be produced, i.e., a metaphorical proposition (cf. Steen 2002) or a metaphorical pattern (cf. Stefanowitsch 2006). The other approach is to incorporate constructions and collostructions attracted by a particular lemma into the analysis. Simultaneously, though, it needs to be observed that although approaches 7, 14, 15 and 18 in Table 1 can all be called integrating in that more than just lexical units or abstract patterns are considered, they are holistic to various extents. For instance, both Glynn (2002) and Janda and Solovyev (2009) concentrate on the distribution of prepositional constructions in the contexts of emotion nouns, while Deignan (2005, 2006) and Strugielska (2012) focus on a variety of elements within a syntagmatic string of a (potentially) metaphorical linguistic expression.

To account for such subtle differences, which are, nevertheless, bound to affect the results of the study, two classes of constructions and two sets of collostructions have been distinguished in Table 1.[3] All in all, then, if the scope of a linguistic example were to be taken as a vital indicator of the functional pledge of a particular approach, i.e., if we concentrated on the degree of integration and optimization of syntagmatic and paradigmatic contexts, the 18 perspectives presented in Table 1 clearly vary with reference to their respective cognitive and usage-based commitments.

Table 1. Metaphor: the linguistic perspective – selected case studies

Author

Relations among categories

Entrenchment of  examples

Source of examples

Scope of examples

1. Kövecses (2002)

metaphorical mappings

 

declared conventional  and novel

deduction

lexical units

2. Kövecses (2008)

generic metaphorical mappings

declared conventional and novel

deduction

lexical units

3. Szwedek (2011)

 

generic metaphorical mappings

no distinction

 

deduction and limited induction

lexical units

4. Evans and Zinken (2005)

family resemblances and metaphorical mappings

motivated conventional and novel

deduction

lexical units

5. Haser (2005)

family resemblances

declared conventional  and novel/no distinction

 

deduction

lexical units

6. Givón (2005)

family resemblances

no distinction

 

deduction and limited induction

lexical units

7. Glynn (2002)

specific

metaphorical mappings

no distinction

deduction

constructions 1

8. Ritchie (2003)

specific

metaphorical mappings

declared conventional  and novel/no distinction

deduction

lexical units

9. Semino et al. (2004)

specific

metaphorical mappings

no distinction

induction

lexical units

10. Hanks (2006)

family resemblances and

metaphorical mappings

no distinction

induction

lexical units

11. Steen (2002)

generic metaphorical mappings

no distinction

limited induction

(lexical units in) abstract patterns

12. Jäkel  (2002)

specific

metaphorical mappings

no distinction

limited induction

lexical units

13. Stefanowitsch (2006)

metaphorical mappings

no distinction

induction

(lexical units in) abstract patterns

14. Deignan (2005, 2006)

family resemblances and metaphorical mappings 

motivated conventional and novel

induction

collostructions 1

15. Janda and Solovyev (2009)

family resemblances

motivated conventional (and novel)

induction

constructions 2

16. Hampe (2005)

family resemblances

and metaphorical mappings 

no distinction

induction

lexical units

17. Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen (2005) 

family resemblances

motivated conventional (and novel)

limited induction

lexical units

18. Strugielska (2012)

family resemblances and metaphorical mappings

motivated conventional

and novel

induction

collostructions 2

 

In view of the fact that, as illustrated in Table 1, the functional commitment within the linguistic perspectives on metaphor needs to be approached as a complex category, we are indeed confronted with a network of functional perspectives, each of which could be characterized by means of specific phenomenological and methodological preferences. Importantly, although sometimes the discrepancies among the approaches displayed in Table 1 may seem negligible, e.g., the distinction between declared and motivated conventionality, such “nuances” in fact constitute the core of devolution (cf. Section 2). Consequently, detailed declarations should be encouraged within a functional cognitive linguistics if truly converging evidence is to be assembled.

This problem can be neatly illustrated with reference to Table 1. For instance, if there is one difference between two perspectives, as in the case of examples 11 and 13, which can be distinguished with reference to the number of examples studied, should the approaches be viewed as supporting each other’s claims? Likewise, if the differences between examples 15 and 17 lie in both quantitative and qualitative disparities between the linguistic units analyzed, should Janda and Solovyev’s and Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen’s findings be interpreted as incompatible? Clearly, there is no simple answer to this question but, in view of the fact that in a devolved methodology any fluctuation of a variable should be reflected at the level of a theoretical model, it seems that a family resemblance view upon the approaches assembled in Table 1 is a viable option.

            In the clusters of perspectives thus discriminated, the mechanism of conceptual metaphor is unequally prominent. While approaches based on generalization and idealization (see, for instance, approaches 1–3) provide evidence in favor of metaphorical mappings, those built on integration and detail stress the marginal role of conceptual metaphors in the interpretation of abstract concepts, particularly in conventional contexts (see, for instance, approaches 4, 14 and 15). Possibly, then, as Steen (2011) suggests, we are dealing with qualitatively distinct phenomena, i.e., a variety of metaphors. Thus, there is a metaphor understood as an active link between concrete and abstract meanings (see, for instance, approaches 1–3), basic and non-basic interpretations (approach 11), non-resonating meanings (approaches 10 and 14), or conventional and novel senses (approach 4). But there is also a metaphor viewed as a latent disparity within the meaning potentials of categories which can only be resolved, i.e., interpreted either literally or metaphorically, in a context. In other words, according to, for instance, Glynn (2002), Givón (2005), Janda and Solovyev (2009) or Strugielska (2012), a metaphor needs to be defined as a contrast within an exemplar, i.e., a clash between or among the meaning potentials of linguistic units in a particular syntagmatic string, possibly related to the varying degrees of attenuation of their semantic/conceptual representations.

In Section 3.1, evidence for metaphors has been sought in constructed linguistic examples, dictionaries or the corpora. Conceptual projection has been perceived between more or less extended cognitive models underlying a variety of linguistic units. Nevertheless, any functionally plausible definition of metaphoricity which could be proposed on the basis of Table 1 needs support from other perspectives within the cognitive sciences, among which there is the psychological approach to metaphor.

3.2. Metaphor: the psycholinguistic approach

The linguistic perspectives on metaphoricity discussed in Section 3.1 lend plausibility to the conclusion that metaphor, linguistic and, possibly, conceptual, is most likely to occur if the functional commitment is either merely declared, e.g., Kövecses (2002), or minimally pursued, e.g., Stefanowitsch (2006). In other words, if each of the contexts through which usage can be defined is optimized, metaphor can indeed be only sporadically observed among specimens of conventional language.

Naturally, this supposition stands in stark contrast to the central tenet of CMT, which is the tenability of two-domain mappings in the processing of conventional linguistic examples involving abstract categories.[4] Thus, in order to either validate the postulates of the more formal strand within metaphor studies or to corroborate the suggestions of those working within the more devolved framework, selected psychological accounts of metaphorical language will now be evaluated with reference to the dimensions of the functional commitment distinguished in Table 1. In this way, it will be possible to identify which parameter of the functional orientation is being addressed in a particular psychological approach. Consequently, any evidence for metaphor to be inferred from Table 2, whether converging or diverging, should be taken as a substantiation for a metaphor, i.e., its particular definition which is dependent on a specific set of constraints. Consequently, an absolute confirmation or rejection of metaphoricity is unlikely to be revealed.

The bulk of psycholinguistic research seems to have concentrated on trying to validate CMT from the comprehension perspective and thorough overviews of this strand of investigation have been provided by Steen (2007) and Gibbs and Colston (2012). In the same vein, Table 2 includes an overview of 10 analyses, in which the key question is whether people actually use metaphorical mappings in order to interpret metaphorical linguistic expressions. The answer to this question, as demonstrated in Table 2, can be positive (example 1), uncertain (example 2) or negative (examples 3–10) for conventional language and positive (example 1, 3–7 and 9–10), uncertain (example 10) or negative (example 8) for novel expressions. In other words, “while the evidence that conventional expressions are understood via conceptual metaphors is scant and problematic, there is some evidence that people can spontaneously construct conceptual mappings to understand novel metaphoric expressions” (McGlone 2007: 120).

The above conclusion needs to be understood against the criteria of the functional commitment developed in Section 3.1. In other words, it should be established which of the possible definitions of metaphor from Table 1 are testable by means of the psycholinguistic, comprehension-based research from Table 2. Clearly, the majority of the analyses assembled below are concerned with a metaphor defined as a contrast between senses of lexical units whose conventionally is assumed, i.e., declared, and whose occurrence is attested within a set of deductively assembled data (see examples 1–8). As demonstrated in column two of Table 2, the results do not corroborate the psychological reality of such mappings.

Moreover, there are two samples of experimental research which are more functional in orientation than the others (examples 9 and 10). To be more specific, McRae et al.’s (1998) constraint satisfaction approach is integrating since it accounts for the various influences provided by syntactic and lexical cues, which results in a number of possible interpretations competing for activation, while Cameron’s (2003, 2008) studies focus on two key parameters of a usage-based orientation.[5] Firstly, the degree of conventionality of linguistic metaphors is carefully established on the basis of the analyst’s intuition and verified against the judgements of other raters as well as language corpora and dictionaries. Secondly, linguistic examples are not constructed but recorded and thus, they constitute samples of real language reflecting the many mechanisms contributing to a successful interpretations of (potential) conventionalized and novel, or deliberate, linguistic metaphors. Among these, conceptual metaphors, i.e., pre-existing mappings in the minds of language users, constitute only one possible constraint through which metaphor shifting, i.e., the changes and adaptations to a linguistic metaphor observable in discourse, can be explained. As Cameron (2008: 61) argues, there are at least three types of metaphor shifting, i.e., vehicle re-deployment, vehicle development and vehicle literalization, which account for the host of referential ties to be discovered in the web of discourse.

The notion of metaphor shifting and the resulting multitude of links between the source concept and other domains highlight the validity of family resemblances as an alternative to two-domain mappings. In fact a number of similarity relations have been proposed in experimental approaches to metaphor, all of which have stressed the cognitive superiority of emergent, or interactional, features over pre-existing attributes, echoing in the notion of the main meaning focus proposed by Kövecses (2000). In other words, whether defined narrowly, e.g., as an abstract relational schema which may, over time, be lexicalized as an additional sense of the vehicle term (cf. Gentner and Bowdle 2001), or broadly e.g., as “potentially endless links” (Cameron 2003: 191), inter-domain connections revealed through psychological studies stress the cognitive independence of abstract concepts from the categories proposed in CMT.

All in all, then, it can be concluded that the comprehension-based, experimental perspective on metaphoricity presented in Table 2 is only partly compatible with the results displayed in Table 1. First of all, while both methodologies stress the non-relevance of metaphor for understanding conventional language, the linguistic perspective is less definite on this issue than the psychological one. Moreover, while both approaches suggest a low explanatory potential of two-domain mappings in the case of integrated analyses, i.e., such that involve a number of optimized contexts, the psycholinguistic orientation is, on the whole, far less devolved than the linguistic one – there are only two (partly) functional studies among the 10 assembled in Table 2, while there are as many as 14 among the 18 approaches discussed in Table 1. Thus, for metaphor to be more reliably verified from a psycholinguistic angle, experiments which would more accurately replicate the richness of natural contexts, characteristic of language use, are definitely needed.[6]

Table 2. Metaphor: the psycholinguistic perspective – selected case studies

Author

Relations among categories

Entrenchment of  examples

Source of examples

Scope of examples

1. Gibbs (1992)

metaphorical mappings

declared conventional and novel

deduction

lexical units

2. Gibbs et al. (1997)

(possible) metaphorical mappings

declared conventional

deduction

lexical units

3. Giora (1997)

family resemblances and metaphorical mappings

declared conventional and novel

deduction

lexical units

4. Gentner and Bowdle (2001)

family resemblances and metaphorical mappings

declared conventional and novel

deduction

lexical units

5. Glucksberg (2001)

family resemblances and metaphorical mappings

declared conventional and novel

deduction

lexical units

6. McGlone (2007)

family resemblances and metaphorical mappings

declared conventional and novel

deduction

lexical units

7. Tendahl (2009)

family resemblances and metaphorical mappings

declared conventional and novel

deduction

lexical units

8. Murphy (1996)

family resemblances

declared conventional and novel

deduction

lexical units

9.  McRae et al. (1998)

family resemblances and metaphorical mappings

declared conventional and novel

deduction

collostructions

10. Cameron (2003, 2008)

family resemblances (and metaphorical mappings)

motivated conventional and novel

induction

lexical units

 

All in all, the psycholinguistic perspective upon metaphor, represented by the 10 studies in Table 2, seems to question the role of conceptual metaphor in processing metaphorical language, particularly in the case of conventional expressions. Moreover, the juxtaposition of the functional criteria in Tables 1 and 2 reveals that the three parameters chosen for verification have not provided a unanimous answer concerning the status of metaphor in a devolved cognitive paradigm. One of the reasons are, undoubtedly, the disparities in the ways each factor has been interpreted in individual approaches, which has rendered the results incompatible in some or most respects. Another explanation, however, might be the fact that further dimensions of the functional pledge need to be incorporated into the analysis in order to strengthen its explanatory potential.

4. Conclusions

Cognitive linguistics is in a state of transition which, expectantly, is going to result in the emergence of a new model through which the various interacting influences shaping the experience of language use could be represented. These constraints, as argued throughout Section 3, require meticulous definitions since even a minute disparity in determining initial conditions will affect the results and may ultimately lead to the development of a multiplicity of claims, whose validity will be difficult to sustain.

            The many characterizations of metaphor which, as demonstrated in Tables 1 and 2, can be supported through linguistic and psycholinguistic perspectives, illustrate this conundrum really well – while there are a number of functionally-driven approaches to metaphoricity, their respective claims are, on the whole, incompatible since they have been built on inconsistently interpreted constraints. In other words, even though the influences considered by one analyst seem attuned with those assumed by another researcher, the results obtained by each are likely to be incongruous since one or more important factors have been developed  to reach varying degrees of optimization. Thus, although in the present article selected linguistic and experimental approaches to metaphor have been juxtaposed with reference to the same number of contexts, each seems to constitute a separate perspective. Simultaneously, let us recall that the constraints discussed here are potential dimensions of the functional commitment. However, since each has been interpreted in more or less disparate ways, perfect convergence among the approaches studied may be impossible to attain, which impedes the possible emergence of a universal, functional definition of metaphoricity. Instead, all the perspectives should be linked via family resemblances, representing the degrees to which particular influences have been developed. Ultimately, then, the approaches could be modeled as a complex dynamical system, advocated by, for instance, Cameron (2003) and Gibbs and Colston (2012). Still, the key question concerns the place of metaphor in this network of interdependencies. Definitely, its position cannot be uniformly established. However, the dominant tendency, accentuated throughout this article, is for a metaphor built upon the notion of profile determinance to be of little explanatory value in a devolved model. In other words, construals of metaphoricity which grant special prominence to one linguistic (and conceptual) structure and maintain its superiority over competing explanations are first to demise in a devolved methodology. Nevertheless, if any of the more functional, or usage-based, options are to seriously challenge the formal, or competence-based, approach to metaphoricity posited by CMT, precise definitions supported by compatible converging evidence are urgently needed. This requirement, it seems, opens new opportunities for research into the nature of a metaphor in a language and a thought.

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[1] For a definition of family resemblances see, for instance, Ungerer and Schmid (1996: 24-27).

[2] In the present paper, a collostruction  is understood as an element of a word’s  linguistic context which is taken to be related to its cognitive model or a scenario (cf. Hampe 2005). In other words, collostructions encompass both lexical and grammatical units.

[3]In the same vein, distinctions more refined than those in Table 1 could probably be offered for the category of lexical units. For one thing, open-class items could be distinguished with reference to how many of them are considered in a study. For instance, while most analyses concentrate solely on the lexical words related to potential source and target items, there are also those which incorporate the meaning potentials of other/all lexical assemblies within an utterance (see examples 6, 16 and 17 in Table 1).

[4]The term “figurative language” is deliberately avoided here in view of the fact that the construct is in itself ambiguous (see Ariel 2002 for a discussion) and thus, it needs to be either carefully re-defined or relegated from the heuristic apparatus of a functional methodology.

[5]In fact, Cameron (2003, 2008) addresses a number of usage-driven parameters which have not been considered for the current exposition, among which the constraint constituted by ontogenetic development seems particularly interesting.

[6]Martin’s (2006) study into the relationship between results from comprehension-based psycholinguistic research and a corpus-based analysis is an attempt to address this problem.

 

Do near-synonyms occur with the same metaphors: A comparison of anger terms in American English

Kaisa Turkkila

(kaisa.turkkila@gmail.com)

Abstract

When studying metaphorical target domains by means of corpus linguistics, a problem that needs to be addressed is how to retrieve metaphorical expressions associated with that domain from a corpus. One suggested answer is metaphorical pattern analysis, which claims that we can map out all the metaphors for a target domain by choosing one word to represent the domain and by analyzing its occurrences in the corpus. The method makes the assumption, among others, that near-synonyms occur with the same metaphorical mappings. This paper tests the assumption by examining an earlier metaphorical pattern analysis of near-synonyms and by analyzing the metaphors in which anger, rage, fury, and wrath occur in the Corpus of Contemporary American English. The results show that, broadly speaking, near-synonyms do occur with the same metaphorical mappings, but not necessarily to the extent that we could always map out entire target domains with a single search word.

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Do near-synonyms occur with the same metaphors:
A comparison of anger terms in American English

Kaisa Turkkila (kaisa.turkkila@gmail.com)

Abstract

When studying metaphorical target domains by means of corpus linguistics, a problem that needs to be addressed is how to retrieve metaphorical expressions associated with that domain from a corpus. One suggested answer is metaphorical pattern analysis, which claims that we can map out all the metaphors for a target domain by choosing one word to represent the domain and by analyzing its occurrences in the corpus. The method makes the assumption, among others, that near-synonyms occur with the same metaphorical mappings. This paper tests the assumption by examining an earlier metaphorical pattern analysis of near-synonyms and by analyzing the metaphors in which anger, rage, fury, and wrath occur in the Corpus of Contemporary American English. The results show that, broadly speaking, near-synonyms do occur with the same metaphorical mappings, but not necessarily to the extent that we could always map out entire target domains with a single search word.

1.Introduction

Metaphor has been a popular research topic in linguistics especially since the publication of Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980). For decades, linguists have studied the nature of metaphor and its significance in our language use, but only recently have they started to pay closer attention to the methods in which metaphor is studied. Some have developed procedures for identifying metaphorically used words (Pragglejaz Group 2007, Steen et al. 2010), others have come up with methods for extracting metaphors from a corpus (Partington 1997, Stefanowitsch 2006b).

One such method is metaphorical pattern analysis (MPA), which suggests that it is possible to map out all the metaphors for a target domain by choosing just one word to represent that domain and studying the metaphorical expressions in which the word occurs (Stefanowitsch 2006b: 64). An important assumption behind this method is that near-synonyms occur broadly with the same metaphorical mappings (Stefanowitsch 2006b: 101–102). It should therefore not matter whether we use the word anger or rage to study the target domain of anger; both words should produce more or less the same results. This assumption is given some support in Stefanowitsch (2006b: 96–99), where little differences are found in the metaphors in which the words happiness and joy occur. Although Stefanowitsch (2006b: 101–102) takes the results of this comparison as proof that near-synonyms produce similar results, I would like to submit the hypothesis to further tests.

In this paper, I will therefore examine a previous study that has applied MPA on a pair of near-synonyms (Ogarkova 2007) as well as analyze a set of near-synonyms—anger, rage, fury, and wrath—in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) (Davies 2008–). I will also discuss how the anger metaphors identified in this study compare with metaphors identified in earlier literature.

2.Background

Much of the linguistic work done within conceptual metaphor theory has been based on intuition rather than empirical studies (Stefanowitsch 2006a: 4, Rojo and Orts 2010: 3301), but corpus linguistics has meant a change. Large electronic corpora are usually accessed by means of words or word forms, but because metaphorical mappings are not necessarily associated with particular words, retrieving them from a corpus can be difficult (Stefanowitsch 2006a: 1–2). Stefanowitsch (2006a: 1–2) lists and evaluates three separate strategies that have been used for extracting metaphors from a non-annotated corpus (Rojo and Orts 2010: 3301).

The first strategy is to search for metaphors manually, but this limits the size of the corpora and therefore renders the representativity of the results questionable. The second strategy relies on source-domain vocabulary, which is a convenient choice because metaphorical expressions contain source-domain words by definition. We can therefore choose a source domain, list lexical items relevant to it, search for them in a corpus, and identify the metaphorical occurrences among the hits. These occurrences can then be analyzed in more detail, uncovering information about the mappings in which the source domain participates.

The source-domain oriented approach or course doesn’t work if we want to investigate mappings associated with a particular target domain (Stefanowitsch 2006a: 3). The third strategy therefore relies on target-domain vocabulary. Stefanowitsch exemplifies this third strategy with the approach in Partington (1997: 111–112), where a list of keywords is first extracted from a corpus specialized in the target domain. Potentially metaphorical words are then identified in the list, and these as well as related words are finally searched for in a more general corpus. This approach has two weaknesses: first, it is only applicable for target domains where specialized corpora exist, and second, it can only identify source domains whose vocabulary is frequent enough to appear on the keyword list (Stefanowitsch 2006a: 3).

To overcome these limitations, Stefanowitsch (2006a: 3–4) suggests another approach, MPA. Similar approaches have been used by other scholars, for example in Tissari (2003) and Martin (2006), but Stefanowitsch (2006b: 64–65) seems to be the first one to argue that the approach exhaustively identifies the metaphors associated with a target domain.

MPA is built on the observation that there are two kinds of metaphorical expressions: ones that include target-domain words and ones that do not. Examples (1) and (2), from COCA, illustrate these types:

  1. Tonya’s confession [...] sparked an anger in Jacob.
  2. Bryan sat fuming in his room.

Example (1) is what Stefanowitsch calls a metaphorical pattern: it contains both target-domain vocabulary (anger) and source-domain vocabulary (spark). Example (2) is not a metaphorical pattern, because it only contains source-domain vocabulary (fuming) and no target-domain vocabulary.

Stefanowitsch (2006b: 64) suggests that we can use metaphorical patterns to investigate mappings in the following way:

We choose a lexical item referring to the target domain under investigation and extract (a sample of) its occurrences in the corpus. In this sample, we then identify all metaphorical expressions of which the search word is a part, and these expressions can then be grouped into coherent groups representing general mappings.

This procedure is what Stefanowitsch calls metaphorical pattern analysis.

3.Ogarkova’s comparison of jealousy and envy

Some studies have already applied MPA on near-synonyms, but the comparison of happiness and joy in Stefanowitsch (2006b: 96–99) seems to have been the only one to directly address the question whether near-synonyms occur with the same mappings. Rojo and Orts (2010) compare the near-synonyms crisis and recession in a collection of news texts, but because their sample sizes are very small (167 occurrences of crisis and 193 of recession) and because their corpus of financial articles from The Economist is not representative of general English, I will not analyze their results here. I will, however, concentrate on Ogarkova’s 2007 study, which applies MPA on all the occurrences of jealousy and envy in the British National Corpus.

Ogarkova treats jealousy and envy as distinct emotions and therefore as distinct conceptual domains, and if we accept this view, her results are not relevant for the purposes of this paper. However, as Ogarkova acknowledges (2007: 100), the words jealousy and envy are often used interchangeably. The dictionary definitions in Macmillan (2012) are certainly very similar:

jealousy

an unhappy feeling because someone has something that you would like or can do something that you would like to do

  1. a feeling of being unhappy and upset because you think someone who you love is attracted to someone else

envy

the unhappy feeling that you have when you want very much to do something that someone else does or to have something that they have

Apart from wording, the main sense descriptions of jealousy and envy are almost identical. The only notable difference is that jealousy has a subordinate sense that is specifically related to love relationships, and this sense seems to be what motivates the treatment of jealousy and envy as separate emotions (Ogarkova 2007: 99–101). The similarity of Macmillan’s sense descriptions, however, suggests that jealousy and envy can just as well be taken to represent a single domain. Whether we treat jealousy and envy as two distinct domains seems to depend on how specific our categorization of domains is. Even if there are two domains, jealousy and envy, it could be argued that only those instances of jealousy that fit the subordinate sense description represent the domain of jealousy and the rest the domain of envy.

Ogarkova’s results show that there are altogether seven mappings that occur exclusively with either jealousy or envy (2007: 101–116). I gathered the mappings that Ogarkova has found with both jealousy and envy into a single table so that it would be easy to compare the coverage achieved with each word. Table 1 summarizes her results. The absolute numbers of hits are normalized to a sample of 1000 occurrences.

Table 1 Mappings associated with jealousy and envy in Ogarkova (2007)

Mapping:
JEALOUSY/ENVY IS

Jealousy
n/1000

Envy
n/1000

Total

POSSESSION

68

177

245

A DISEASE/PAIN

100

27

127

AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE/ENEMY

71

40

111

MIXED/PURE SUBSTANCE

44

38

82

SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER

43

26

69

A HUMAN BEING/(SLEEPING) ORGANISM

32

30

62

LOCATION

43

15

58

AN ANIMAL/INSECT

38

15

53

(HOT) LIQUID (IN A CONTAINER UNDER PRESSURE)

43

7

50

BEING ENVIOUS IS ACTING WITH AN OBJECT

0

45

45

MOVING OBJECT

28

15

43

SHARP OBJECT/WEAPON

36

4

40

FIRE

34

4

38

(DESTRUCTIVE) PHYSICAL FORCE

31

5

36

INSANITY/FOOLISHNESS/MADNESS

31

1

32

BECOMING GREEN IN COMPLEXION

3

22

25

MOVED OBJECT

4

18

22

PHYSICAL OBJECT

12

10

22

(UN)MASKED OBJECT

10

11

21

CAUSER/PATH

13

8

21

UNPLEASANT TASTE /GORGE

18

3

21

THE INTENSITY IS PHYSICAL SIZE OR QUANTITY

12

7

19

OBJECT IN SOME LOCATION

9

5

14

AN OBSTACLE (TO VISION)/BARRIER

9

3

12

GROUND/FOUNDATION

4

8

12

SUPERNATURAL BEING

4

8

12

PLANT

6

5

11

WEATHER PHENOMENON

7

4

11

HIGH/LOW (INTENSITY)

10

0

10

ACTING ON AN EMOTION IS ACTING IN A LOCATION

9

0

9

LIGHT

4

5

9

MECHANISM

4

5

9

WRONGDOING

7

1

8

ANTIDOTE/POISON

0

5

5

FUEL

0

4

4

SPY

4

0

4

TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT

4

0

4

Total

795

581

1376

Table 1 shows the 37 mappings in Ogarkova’s sample that occurred at least four times with either search word when the number of hits was normalized to a sample of 1000 occurrences. Out of those mappings, jealousy instantiated 34 (91.89 percent) and envy 33 (89.19 percent). This means that there are three mappings that did not occur with jealousy (being envious is acting with an object, envy is antidote/poison, and envy is fuel) and four mappings that did not occur with envy ((the intensity of) jealousy is high/low, acting on an emotion is acting in a location, jealousy is a spy, and jealousy is TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT).

The main focus in Ogarkova’s comparison is on mappings that are statistically more significantly associated with either jealousy or envy. According to Ogarkova (2007: 117–122), there are five metaphors that are more significantly associated with jealousy (jealousy is a disease/pain/physical annoyance, jealousy is insanity/foolishness, jealousy is fire, jealousy is a weapon/sharp object, and jealousy is (hot) liquid (in a container under pressure)) and three metaphors that are more significantly associated with envy (envy is a possessed object, acting on envy is acting with an object, and being envious is becoming green in color). In a similar comparison, Stefanowitsch (2006b: 48) finds that 4 percent of metaphorical patterns distinguish between happiness and joy, which is interpreted as a positive result that suggests that focusing on one word only does not affect the results too much. In Ogarkova (2007: 117), the corresponding amount is 14 percent (8 out of 56 mappings), which seems much higher.

4.A comparison of anger, rage, fury, and wrath in COCA

4.1Materials and methods

I tested the hypothesis that near-synonyms occur with the same mappings by applying MPA on a set of near-synonyms from COCA. The analysis was divided into two major phases. The first phase consisted of a rather straightforward application of the procedure outlined above:

  1. I chose four lexical items that refer to the target domain of anger: anger, rage, fury, and wrath. This set of words is identified in Stefanowitsch (2006b: 71) as containing possible candidates to represent the domain of anger.
  2. I took a random sample of 500 occurrences of each noun from COCA.
  3. Among these occurrences, I identified the metaphorical expressions in which anger was the target domain. The identification relied on the metaphor identification procedure (MIP) (Pragglejaz Group 2007) and on its extension MIPVU (Steen et al. 2010), where a word is considered to be used metaphorically if its contextual meaning contrasts with a more basic meaning but can be understood in terms of it.
  4. I categorized the metaphorical expressions according to their source domains. When possible, I used the same categories that are used in the analysis of anger in Stefanowitsch (2006b)—many of which are taken from Kövecses’s (1998: 128–129) summary of earlier studies.

The second phase of the analysis focused on mappings that were not found with all search words. To find out whether this was due to sample size or whether it reflected real differences between the words, I did the following for each search word:

  1. I drew all the occurrences of the word from COCA and stored them in a text file.
  2. I listed the mappings with which the search word did not occur but that did come up with other search words.
  3. I compiled a list of search strings that instantiated the missing mappings in the other samples and in Stefanowitsch (2006b). For example, for the mapping anger is a disease, the list would consist of the following strings: fester, froth, relapse, impotent, livid, sick, symptom, purge, and infect. The search strings did not have to occur as full words—infect, for example, would find words such as infectious and infected.
  4. Out of all the occurrences of the search word, I selected those that included the search strings listed in step (g).
  5. For the selected occurrences, I applied steps (c) and (d).

4.2Results and discussion

Table 2 summarizes the metaphors found with anger, rage, fury, and wrath; it lists the mappings that occurred at least three times in the total set of 2000 samples in the order of their overall frequency and conflates less frequent ones under the other category[1]. Columns AngerWrath show how many times a particular search word instantiated a particular category. The numbers of occurrences that were found with additional queries in the second phase of the analysis and not in the actual 500-word samples are shown in brackets and are not included in the total count.

Table 2 A summary of the mappings associated with anger, rage, fury, and wrath

Mapping: ANGER IS

Anger

Rage

Fury

Wrath

Total*

A possession

128

82

102

322

634

A place

31

59

55

4

149

A moving object

52

23

13

32

120

An object

39

21

15

25

100

Fire

19

15

21

5

60

An object in a location

26

13

12

1

52

An opponent in a struggle

15

11

15

4

45

A substance in a container (under pressure)

9

20

13

1

43

An explosion

7

8

4

1

20

Light

12

2

4

1

19

High/low

10

(18)

6

1

17

Physical annoyance (i.e. pain)

1

9

1

4

15

A sound

(16)

3

10

1

14

A liquid

3

6

4

1

14

A (dear) person

5

1

(2)

7

13

Darkness

3

3

5

2

13

A disease

(32)

6

6

(0)

12

Fluid in a container

3

2

3

4

12

Aggressive animal behavior

3

2

4

2

11

A natural force

6

2

3

(1)

11

A mixed or pure substance

6

4

(9)

1

11

A burden

6

(10)

1

4

11

Hot fluid in a container

3

5

1

1

10

Heat

5

1

2

1

9

A captive animal

1

2

3

3

9

An organism

4

2

3

(0)

9

A sleeping organism

3

(4)

2

4

9

Cold

1

1

5

1

8

A container

1

(12)

3

4

8

Blind

1

5

(15)

(1)

6

A superior/an inferior

2

2

2

(0)

6

Food

1

2

2

(1)

5

Physical strength

3

1

(5)

(1)

4

A plant

3

(14)

(4)

(0)

3

Insanity

(9)

2

1

(0)

3

A weather phenomenon

(3)

(0)

3

(1)

3

A mask

(16)

2

1

(0)

3

Other

5

6

4

1

16

Total*

417

323

329

438

1507

*Bracketed amounts are not included in the total count.

Most of the mappings in Table 2 are familiar from earlier literature such as Lakoff and Kövecses’s (1987: 195–219) analysis of anger in American English and in Stefanowitsch’s (2006b: 71–78) metaphorical pattern analysis of anger in the British National Corpus. As in Stefanowitsch’s analysis, the most frequent mappings identified here represent event structure metaphors. In Stefanowitsch’s sample, the location system (anger is a location/place) accounts for 10.2 percent of metaphorical patterns and the object system (anger is a possession, anger is a moving/moved object, anger is an object, anger is an object in a location) for 56.15 percent. Here, the total percentages are quite similar, 9.89 for the location system and 60.12 for the object system, but there is some variation between the search words. The location is system is hardly at all instantiated by wrath—it accounts for 0.91 percent of the metaphorical patterns identified with the word—whereas the object system accounts for a total of 86.76 percent. The corresponding percentages with the rest of the search words are 7.43 and 58.75 with anger, 18.27 and 43.03 with rage, and 16.72 and 43.16 with fury.

The largest group after event structure metaphors is also the same as in Stefanowitsch (2006b: 75–77). Mappings related to the general domains of liquid and heat (anger is fire, anger is a substance in a container (under pressure), anger is an explosion, anger is a liquid, anger is fluid in a container, anger is a natural force, anger is hot fluid in a container, and anger is heat) account for 11.88 percent, which is not very far from the 13.3 percent reported in Stefanowitsch (2006b: 77). This group of mappings corresponds with Lakoff and Kövecses’s metaphor anger is heat and its more specific variants anger is the heat of a fluid in a container and anger is fire, which they suggest are the most central metaphors for anger in American English (1987: 197)—a claim that these results seem to support. Again, wrath instantiates these mappings much less frequently than the other search words: the group accounts for only 3.20 percent of the metaphorical patterns in its sample, when the corresponding percentages are 13.19 with anger, 18.27 with rage, and 15.50 with fury.

Similar variation is also apparent in the next most frequent mapping, anger is an opponent in a struggle. It accounts for 2.99 percent of the metaphorical mappings in the total sample but only 0.91 percent in the sample for wrath. Another group of metaphors, anger is aggressive animal behavior, anger is a captive animal, anger is a sleeping organism, which Lakoff and Kövecses (1987: 206–207) see as instances of a more general metaphor anger is a dangerous animal, does not display similar variation. The group accounts for 1.92 percent of metaphorical patterns identified in the total sample and 2.05 percent in the sample for wrath. These observations show that not all mappings display the same variation, but even when a mapping can be identified with wrath, it often instantiates it less frequently than the other search words.

Next, I wish to draw attention to some differences between the results of this analysis and the metaphors identified in earlier studies. The metaphor anger is a superior (His actions were completely governed by anger) is suggested in Kövecses (1998: 129) and also identified in Stefanowitsch (2006b: 74) (anger rule the day). This data set includes several patterns where the person experiencing anger has the superior position (banish rage from awareness, in command of anger, keep anger in its place, ungovernable anger, ungoverned fury) and only one pattern where anger is the superior (fury banish emotion). In the light of this data, the label anger is superior/inferior seems more appropriate for the mapping.

Table 2 includes 5 mappings that seem to be absent from the earlier literature on anger metaphors:

anger is a sound
fury pulse on X's tone, the echo of fury, quiet fury/rage, silent fury/rage, whirring fury, wrath echo

anger is a (dear) person
accommodate X’s wrath, a stranger to X’s anger, attract anger, court X’s anger, foster rage, get in touch with anger, invite X’s wrath/the wrath of X, long-cherished anger, meet ((with) the wrath of) X

anger is food
feed on rage, fresh fury, fury ripen, raw rage

anger is blind
blind anger/rage

Anger is a mask
don a mask of fury, face be contorted in a mask of rage, rage mask X

The SOUND metaphor has come up in investigations on other emotion concepts, at least in Stefanowitsch’s metaphorical pattern analysis of sadness (2006b: 88), but it does not seem to have been identified as a metaphor for anger. The person/people metaphor is not usually listed among emotion metaphors at all, but Esenova (2009) does suggest a more specific version anger is a child. One pattern in the (dear) person category (foster rage) is compatible with the child metaphor, but most patterns imply a more general or completely different relationship. food is another source domain that usually does not come up in analyses of emotion concepts, and even here some of its instances could perhaps be categorized under anger is plant. The last two mappings anger is blind and anger is a mask are specific and not very productive: both of them are instantiated by a single lexical unit (the former by blind and the latter by mask). The instances under anger is blind might also be motivated by the metonymy interference with accurate perception for anger (Lakoff & Kövecses 1987: 196–197).

Do the near-synonyms anger, rage, fury, and wrath occur with the same metaphorical mappings? Table 2 shows that more or less the same metaphorical mappings can be identified with anger, rage, and fury—provided that the sample size is large enough. The only exception is the mapping anger is a weather phenomenon, which I was unable to find with the search word rage. This should not be a major problem for MPA, because the mapping status of anger is a weather phenomenon can be questioned for at least two reasons: first, even when the additional searches are included, the mapping is very infrequent, and second, the metaphorical patterns could also be accounted for by the more general mapping anger is a natural force. In fact, Stefanowitsch (2006b: 74) does not list weather phenomenon as a mapping for anger (he does so for other emotion concepts) but subsumes the example climate of anger under the natural force mapping. If we treated the weather phenomenon and natural force mappings as one category, we could say that anger, rage, and fury are associated with all the same metaphorical mappings that exceed the threshold level of three occurrences in the total sample.

The discussion above has already shown that wrath stands out in the extent to which is participates in many mappings, but it also stands out in terms of coverage. Even after additional searches, there are six mappings that were not found with wrath: anger is a disease, anger is an organism, anger is a superior/an inferior, anger is a plant, anger is insanity, and anger is a mask.

The overall results show that all the metaphorical mappings for anger in COCA can more or less be mapped out with the search word anger, rage, or fury, but not with wrath. I do not know the exact reason why wrath stands out, but I can say the following. First, wrath is by far the least frequent of these words in COCA. Its relative frequency per million words is 3.59, which does not differ that much from the frequency of fury (7.74), but which is considerably lower than that of rage (16.61) and anger (35.08). Second, the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) (Davies 2010–) shows that the relative frequency of wrath per million words in that corpus has decreased from the 1810s to the 2000s much more than that of the other words. The decrease in the relative frequency of wrath is as much as 93.66 percent, whereas rage has decreased 73.98 percent, fury 69.27 percent, and anger 21.20 percent. This change is also reflected in the fact that both dictionaries used in this analysis for metaphor identification, Macmillan (2012) and Longman (2012), tag wrath as formal.

5.Conclusions

This paper set out to investigate whether near-synonyms occur with the same metaphorical mappings and whether we can make generalizations about a whole conceptual domain from the metaphors with which a single representative word occurs. The discussion of Ogarkova’s (2007) results shows that the answer may not be as straightforward as assumed in Stefanowitsch (2006b)—her comparison of jealousy and envy in BNC shows that the corpus contains 4 metaphorical mappings that are specific to jealousy and 3 metaphorical mappings that are specific to envy. In this study, the variation is not as great: depending on how fine-grained our categorization of metaphorical mappings is, anger, rage, and fury produce either an identical list of metaphorical mappings or an identical list with the exception of one mapping that does not occur with rage. Wrath, on the other hand, clearly stands out; there are as many as 6 mappings with which wrath does not occur.

There are two possible conclusions that can be made from this result: either wrath is not a near-synonym of anger, rage, and fury, or near-synonyms do not always appear with the same metaphorical mappings. Even if the latter conclusion is true, the consequences for MPA are not necessarily severe. The method calls for a representative word, and there are at least two reasons why wrath is not as representative as anger and rage, or even fury.

First, Stefanowitsch (2006b: 71) takes the frequency of a word as a sign of its representativeness. The total occurrences of anger, rage, fury, and wrath in COCA amount to 5752, and wrath accounts for only 6 percent of these, whereas fury accounts for 18 percent, rage for 20 percent, and anger for 55 percent. In terms of frequency, wrath is clearly the least representative word and anger the most representative one.

Second, we might assume that the more general a word’s meaning is, the more representative it is of its domain. Figure 1 below shows that wrath is the most specific of these words, both in terms of its logical denotation (‘a feeling of very strong anger that usually does not last very long’) and the register in which it is used (formal). In this respect, too, anger is the most representative word; it is superordinate to all the three other words.

In fact, near-synonyms occurring with the same metaphorical patterns would only be a problem for MPA when less representative words occur with mappings with which more representative words do not occur. This is clearly not the case with anger, rage, fury, and wrath in COCA, but at least according to the results in Ogarkova (2007), it seems to be the case with jealousy and envy in BNC. If we take jealousy and envy to represent the same domain, it seems that a single representative word might not be enough to map out the all the mappings that structure a target domain. MPA might therefore benefit from further explorations into the metaphors in which near-synonyms occur, and as suggested in Ogarkova (2007: 109), including other word forms than nouns might also add to the mappings that can be uncovered.

Figure 1: Lexical relations between anger, rage, fury, and wrath derived from Macmillan (2012)

Bibliography

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Metaphorical mappings associated with anger found in the first phase of the analysis

Mapping: ANGER IS

Examples

n

A POSSESSION

X’s anger, have/own/get rid of anger, share X’s anger/feelings of anger, the anger of X

128

A MOVING OBJECT

anger at/from/toward X, deflect anger onto Y, divert anger away from X, take anger aimed at X and turn anger on Y, target for/of anger, turn anger toward X

52

AN OBJECT

anger about/against/among/over X, anger between X and Y, anger displace emotion, anger passed between X and Y, anger surface, anger washed away, beneath X’s anger, cover up/hide/lay down anger, emotion displace anger, fling all X’s anger into Y, hidden anger, let anger go, let go of anger, place to put anger

39

A PLACE

be seated in anger, beyond anger, drive X to anger, (expression waver) between anger and emotion, get past the anger, in anger, move X to anger, out of anger, step out of anger

31

AN OBJECT IN A LOCATION

(an) anger within/in/inside X, anger be from within, anger come into X’s eyes, anger in X’s eyes/heart/voice/face, anger spread, have anger inside, keep anger out of X’s voice

26

FIRE

anger burn inside X, anger flare (through X), anger fueled by X, consumed with anger, eyes blaze with anger, face aflame/flare with anger, fuel/ignite/spark/stoke anger, fuming/glaring with anger, glare at X with anger, tamp down the smoldering anger

19

AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE

anger and emotion war in Y, anger get the best of/stun/take hold of X, anger take over, appease/give way to anger, control/overcome/secure control of anger, emotion overtake anger, suppressed anger, suppression of anger

15

LIGHT

a flash of anger, anger fade (to emotion), anger flash (behind X’s glasses/in X’s eyes), anger shimmer in X’s eyes, eyes/mind flash with anger

12

HIGH/LOW

anger drift higher and higher, anger fall to dust, anger rise, level of anger

10

A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE)

anger erupt, burst of anger, eyes hold anger, filled/full up with anger, release anger, releasing anger, swelling anger

9

AN EXPLOSION

X’s anger fuse shorten, anger explode through X, defuse/trigger anger, explode releasing anger, explode with anger

7

A BURDEN

anger be lifted, anger to carry around, carry anger, drop the anger, dump X’s anger on Y’s shoulders, shake off anger

6

A MIXED OR PURE SUBSTANCE

anger dissolve, mixture of anger and emotion, pure anger, stir X to anger

6

A NATURAL FORCE

X’s anger rush through Y, (a) rush/wave of anger, anger sweep X

6

A (DEAR) PERSON

a stranger to X’s anger, attract/court X’s anger, get in touch with anger, long-cherished anger

5

HEAT

anger be hot, broil with anger, eyes hot with anger, hot red anger, the heat of anger

5

AN ORGANISM

anger breed/grow, growing anger

4

A LIQUID

channel anger into X, words be saturated with anger

3

A PLANT

anger bloom in X’s heart, anger have roots in X, stunted anger

3

A SLEEPING ORGANISM

arouse/awaken/rouse anger

3

AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOR

anger swallow X whole, anger tamer, wild anger

3

DARKNESS

blue eyes turn navy with anger, dark anger

3

FLUID IN A CONTAINER

a bubble of anger well up in X’s stomach, anger well (up) in X

3

HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER

anger boil out of X, anger simmer under the surface, stoke anger to full boil

3

PHYSICAL STRENGTH

the force/power of anger

3

A SUPERIOR/AN INFERIOR

in command of anger, keep anger in its place

2

A CAPTIVE ANIMAL

handle anger

1

A CONTAINER

deep anger

1

BLIND

blind anger

1

COLD

snowcold anger

1

FOOD

seasoned with anger

1

PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE (I.E. PAIN)

a prickle of anger tweak the back of X’s neck

1

A DISEASE

n/a

0

A MASK

n/a

0

A SOUND

n/a

0

A WEATHER PHENOMENON

n/a

0

INSANITY

n/a

0

OTHER

a knot of anger, anger resolve itself into a tight knot, anger run deep, use anger to immunize X against Y

5

Total

 

417

Appendix 2: More metaphorical mappings associated with anger found in the second phase of the analysis

Mapping: ANGER IS

Examples

n

A DISEASE

anger (and emotion) fester, anger be (an) infectious (disease), (long-)festering/frothing/impotent anger, feverish with anger, get infected with the virus of anger, livid with anger, purge anger, red froth [at the corner of X’s mouth] from the anger at Y, sick with anger, symptom/symptomatic of anger

32

A MASK

X adopt a mask of anger, X be masked by anger, a mask of anger harden on X’s face, a red mask of anger, anger be a mask for emotion, anger mask emotion, feeling be masked by anger, mask emotion with anger, mock anger be a mask for real anger, put on a mask of anger to hide emotion

16

A SOUND

quiet/silent anger

16

A WEATHER PHENOMENON

anger relent, try see past X’s ager [but] the fog was total

3

INSANITY

anger spiral into violent madness, delirious from anger, half-mad/insane/mad with anger, insane anger, mad anger, mad beyond simple anger, maddened by anger

9

Appendix 3: Metaphorical mappings associated with rage found in the first phase of the analysis

Mapping: ANGER IS

Examples

n

A POSSESSION

X’s rage, have/share rage, rage be shared, sharing of rage, steal X’s rage, the rage of X, trade out emotion for rage

82

A PLACE

(be) in (a) rage, climb out of rage, fly into a rage, go from rage, (go) into (a) rage, out of rage, send X into rage

59

A MOVING OBJECT

hold back rage, rage at/toward X, rage rumble/sweep through X, rage wants a target, send rage inward, target of rage, turn rage on X

23

AN OBJECT

bring rage, concealed rage beneath the irony, find X’s rage, rage about/against/among/on/over X, underneath rage

21

A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE)

X be filled with/full of rage, a volcano of rage, contain rage, eyes/sound (be) filled with/full of rage, heart be bursting with rage, rage bottle inside X, rage build in/inside X/X’s eyes, rage burst from emotion, rage fill X/the emptiness, rage find outlet, rage swell inside X, release of rage, stamp down a swell of rage

20

FIRE

a flare of rage, blazing fury of rage, consumed by/with rage, emotion flare into rage, fuel/spark rage, full of rage, hurt-fueled rage, on fire with rage, rage flare, red rage

15

AN OBJECT IN A LOCATION

cut the rage out of X, have rage inside, rage in X’s eyes/heart, rage inside (X), rage on X’s face, rage slide over X’s brain, rage sweep across X’s face, rage within X, rage work in X, room be heavy with rage

13

AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE

control/fight/struggle with rage, have control over rage, overcome by rage, rage and its divisions, rage take X (over), repress/suppress rage, suppressed rage

11

PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE (I.E. PAIN)

a fit/spasm of rage

9

AN EXPLOSION

defuse/trigger/let off (X’s) rage, explode with rage, explosion of rage, explosive rage, rage rip through X, snuff the rage fuse

8

A DISEASE

festering/frothing/impotent rage, livid with rage, symptom of rage

6

A LIQUID

a source/torrent/well of rage, rage flow through X’s body, rage flush from every pore, the rage bubbled up from his gut and flowed out his shoulders down his arms into his fists in a red wave

6

BLIND

blind rage

5

HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER

boiling rage, emotion boil over into rage, rage boil over, rage boil up in X, rage seethe

5

A MIXED OR PURE SUBSTANCE

distillation of rage, pure rage, stir X into rage

4

A SOUND

quiet/silent rage, silent rage

3

DARKNESS

black/dark rage

3

A CAPTIVE ANIMAL

feed rage, rage be unleashed

2

A MASK

face be contorted in a mask of rage, rage mask X

2

A NATURAL FORCE

rage engulf X, surge of rage wash over X

2

A SUPERIOR/AN INFERIOR

banish rage from awareness, ungovernable rage

2

AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOR

rage gnaw away, wild rage

2

AN ORGANISM

growing rage, rage live inside X

2

FLUID IN A CONTAINER

a rage well up inside X, rage churn in X’s stomach

2

FOOD

feed on rage, raw rage

2

INSANITY

insane/psychotic rage

2

LIGHT

blinded with rage, rage flash in X’s eyes

2

A (DEAR) PERSON

foster rage

1

COLD

cold rage

1

HEAT

white-hot rage cool

1

PHYSICAL STRENGTH

the strength of rage

1

A BURDEN

n/a

0

A CONTAINER

n/a

0

A PLANT

n/a

0

A SLEEPING ORGANISM

n/a

0

A WEATHER PHENOMENON

n/a

0

HIGH/LOW

n/a

0

OTHER

[rage be] a bitter bile in X's mouth, be worn by rage, eyes be twisted in a rage, rage for X, stiff with rage

6

Total

 

323

Appendix 4: More metaphorical mappings associated with rage found in the second phase of the analysis

Mapping: ANGER IS

Examples

n

A BURDEN

(X) carry (a) rage (inside), burden/weight of rage, carry a burden of rage, (expression) bear rage, rage be lifted

10

A CONTAINER

(a) deep rage, deepening rage, full rage, rage be three centuries deep

12

A PLANT

quick-blossoming rage, root/roots/seeds of (X’s) rage, (seeds of) rage take root

14

A SLEEPING ORGANISM

(X) arouse rage (in Y), keep rage awake, rouse X into a rage

4

A WEATHER PHENOMENON

n/a

0

HIGH/LOW

X be in a high rage, X let rage rise, X’s rage rise, as high as the rage, erupt into a high rage, height/level of (X’s) rage, rage rise (up) (in/inside X), raise X’s rage to a fighting level, rising rage

18

Appendix 5: Metaphorical mappings associated with fury found in the first phase of the analysis

Mapping: ANGER IS

Examples

n

A POSSESSION

X’s fury, have fury, the fury of X

102

A PLACE

beyond fury, emotion take a leap to fury, fly into a fury, in (a) fury, send X into a fury, swing between fury and emotion

55

FIRE

X’s heart burn with fury, a fury burn in X, blaze of fury (ignite X’s face), burning (with) fury, eyes blaze/burn with fury, flames/flare of fury, fury flare, glare at X in fury, ignite/spark/stoke fury, red-looking fury, white fury

21

AN OBJECT

a fury locked away in X’s mind, bring fury, fury about/against/on/over X, fury behind the murk, fury saved up, hide fury, immense fury

15

AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE

be in a battle with fury, control fury, emotion give way to fury, fury give way to emotion, fury grip/shake/take/tear at X, give way to fury, seized by fury, the attack of fury, unappeased fury, uncontrollable fury

15

A MOVING OBJECT

fury at X, fury pass through X, turn fury against X

13

A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE)

X be filled with fury, burst of fury, contain fury, emotion swell into fury, eyes fill with a fury, full of fury, fury erupt, release fury, volcanic fury

13

AN OBJECT IN A LOCATION

X force a calm facade to slam down over X’s fury, fury in/inside/within X, fury in (X’s) glare/smile/voice/eyes, fury sprawl across X’s features, fury with an overlay of emotion, the fury in the soul of X

12

A SOUND

fury pulse on X’s tone, quiet/silent fury, the echo of fury, whirring fury

10

A DISEASE

fury fester into rage, fury relapse, impotent fury, sick with fury

6

HIGH/LOW

fury rise/reach peak, level of fury, stoke fury to a new level

6

COLD

cold fury, eyes icy with fury

5

DARKNESS

black/dark fury, eyes dark with fury, face cloud in fury, face turn black with fury

5

A LIQUID

fury course through X, plunge (X) into fury, send fury coursing through X

4

AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOR

fury eat at X, fury roar, wild fury

4

AN EXPLOSION

explosive fury, fury explode (through X), set off a fury

4

LIGHT

eyes flash/glow/shine with fury, fury fade away

4

A CAPTIVE ANIMAL

unleash fury on X, unleashed fury

3

A CONTAINER

bottomless fury, full fury

3

A NATURAL FORCE

a live hurricane of fury, engulfed in fury, tide of fury

3

A WEATHER PHENOMENON

a fog of fury and emotion, fury relent

3

AN ORGANISM

fury grow, growing fury

3

FLUID IN A CONTAINER

fury pour out of X, fury slosh into X’s marriage

3

A SLEEPING ORGANISM

arouse fury, rouse X to fury

2

A SUPERIOR/AN INFERIOR

fury banish emotion, ungoverned fury

2

FOOD

fresh fury, fury ripen

2

HEAT

cool the heat of X’s fury, hot fury

2

A BURDEN

expression bear fury

1

A MASK

don a mask of fury

1

HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER

fury seethe

1

INSANITY

mad fury

1

PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE (I.E. PAIN)

a fit of fury

1

A (DEAR) PERSON

n/a

0

A MIXED OR PURE SUBSTANCE

n/a

0

A PLANT

n/a

0

BLIND

n/a

0

PHYSICAL STRENGTH

n/a

0

OTHER

blond fury, carry a charge of fury and emotion, open fury on X, redolent with fury

4

Total

 

329

Appendix 6: More metaphorical mappings associated with fury found in the second phase of the analysis

Mapping: ANGER IS

Examples

n

A (DEAR) PERSON X

be met by fury, fury attract X

2

A MIXED OR PURE SUBSTANCE

fury be pure, mixture of fury and emotion, pure fury

9

A PLANT

fury be rooted in emotion, fury begin to blossom, root X’s fury in emotion, seeds of fury

4

BLIND

blind fury

15

PHYSICAL STRENGTH

force of (X’s) fury, fury maintain its force, powerful fury, strength of fury

5

Appendix 7: Metaphorical mappings associated with wrath found in the first phase of the analysis

Mapping: ANGER IS

Examples

n

A POSSESSION

X’s wrath, have wrath in store for X, return wrath to X, the wrath of X

322

A MOVING OBJECT

call down on X the wrath of Y, call down the wrath of X on Y, draw X’s wrath upon Y, duck/waylay X’s wrath, target for/of wrath, turn away wrath, turn wrath on/onto X, wrath at/toward X, wrath come upon/down on X, wrath descend on Y, wrath from X, wrath shift away from X and onto Y

32

AN OBJECT

bring X the wrath of Y, bring X’s wrath down on/upon Y, bring (down) the wrath of X (on/upon Y), bring down wrath, reveal wrath, the transfer of divine wrath to the Son, wrath against/upon X

25

A (DEAR) PERSON

accommodate/invite X’s wrath/the wrath of X, meet (with) the wrath of X, meet wrath

7

FIRE

fan/kindle wrath, fire-spitting wrath, ignite wrath (to another level)

5

A BURDEN

a ton of wrath, bear X’s wrath, the weight of wrath

4

A CONTAINER

the full wrath of X

4

A PLACE

in wrath, work X into a wrath

4

A SLEEPING ORGANISM

arouse/awaken wrath

4

AN OPPONENT IN A STRUGGLE

appease wrath, mobilize the wrath of X, wrath overcome emotion, wrath seize control of X’s body

4

FLUID IN A CONTAINER

pour out X’s wrath on Y’s head, pour out (the vials of the) wrath, pour wrath on X

4

PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE (I.E. PAIN)

a spasm/sting of wrath, a strain of wrath in X’s voice

4

A CAPTIVE ANIMAL

unleash the wrath of X, unleash wrath on X

3

AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOR

fall prey to X’s wrath, snarling wrath

2

DARKNESS

face darken/grow dark with wrath

2

A LIQUID

absorb wrath

1

A MIXED OR PURE SUBSTANCE

wrath dissolve into emotion

1

A SOUND

wrath echo

1

A SUBSTANCE IN A CONTAINER (UNDER PRESSURE)

fill X with wrath

1

AN EXPLOSION

detonate with wrath

1

AN OBJECT IN A LOCATION

wrath assume unprecedented proportions

1

COLD

insulate X from wrath

1

HEAT

wrath cool

1

HIGH/LOW

wrath rise higher

1

HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER

X be a boiling cauldron of wrath

1

LIGHT

wrath fade

1

A DISEASE

n/a

0

A MASK

n/a

0

A NATURAL FORCE

n/a

0

A PLANT

n/a

0

A SUPERIOR/AN INFERIOR

n/a

0

A WEATHER PHENOMENON

n/a

0

AN ORGANISM

n/a

0

BLIND

n/a

0

FOOD

n/a

0

INSANITY

n/a

0

PHYSICAL STRENGTH

n/a

0

OTHER

foul wrath

1

Total

 

438

Appendix 8: More metaphorical mappings associated with wrath found in the second phase of the analysis

Mapping: ANGER IS

Examples

n

A DISEASE

n/a

0

A MASK

n/a

0

A NATURAL FORCE

waves rise up against X, the seas, the wrath of rulers

1

A PLANT

n/a

0

A SUPERIOR/AN INFERIOR

n/a

0

A WEATHER PHENOMENON

X’s wrath relent

1

AN ORGANISM

n/a

0

BLIND

blind wrath

1

FOOD

bitter wrath

1

INSANITY

n/a

0

PHYSICAL STRENGTH

the force of wrath

1

 



[1] A more detailed account of the results can be found in appendices 1–8.

 

15 Fragen an Gerard Steen

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15 questions about metaphor research for Gerard Steen

  1. Do you have any favorite metaphor/s? What are they and what makes them your favorite ones?

My absolute favorite is the following part from Bob Dylan’s song ‘You’re a big girl now’ (Blood on the Tracks, 1974):

I'm going out of my mind
With a pain that stops and starts
Like a corkscrew to the heart
Ever since we've been apart.

It is almost too much to think of the familiar physical experience of inserting a corkscrew into a cork and then giving it a number of distinct twists in order to turn it in deeper and deeper, and relate that to the way your mind can insert a bout of pain into your body that you can feel with increasing intensity at distinct, consecutive moments when you’ve lost your lover—this is a wonderful dramatization of the whole notion of embodied cognition which is used for entirely surprising purposes in these lines.

I particularly like the idea that it is a corkscrew to the heart, which makes you wonder what happens when the heart is finally reached. And I also like the unexpected contrast between the regular use of a corkscrew, which is typically for pleasure, and Dylan’s appropriation, which changes it into an instrument of torture—and this is exactly right, for when you are in such pain, it is as if some person outside yourself keeps hurting you with perfect control, even though it is your own memories and associations that are causing this. The image and its effects are brilliant.

  1. Why metaphor research?

Metaphor research offers a small laboratory for a lot of research on language, cognition and communication. Given the ubiquity of metaphor in the structures of language and thought that has been revealed in cognitive linguistics, metaphor raises questions about the relations between these semiotic structures and functions (in language, thought, and communication) on the one hand and the way these can be observed to have effects (or no effects) in the psychological and social dimensions of behavioral processes. (I see culture and history as arenas of variation and change between such psycho-social events of discourse.) In that way, metaphor raises questions about the relation between the humanities and the social sciences that have to do with the validity and eventually applicability of what humanities scholars have to offer: is what they see in their eventually semiotic analyses always operational in regular behavior?

This has been at the center of my interests since I was trained as an empirical student of literature in the 1980s. This was a new movement that arose as a result of a typically German discussion about theories and methods between the humanities and the social sciences, going back to the notorious Positivismusstreit between Popper and Adorno. Literature is just one domain of discourse in which we can make the distinction between structuralist-functionalist approaches to signs and texts on the one hand and how these signs and texts relate to people’s writing and reading processes on the other, and metaphor has always been regarded as central to that literary domain. The general questions about theories (Schmidt) and methods (Groeben) in the empirical study of literature were hence the same as the ones that needed to be asked about metaphor and its use in many other domains than literature, including politics, health communication, education and science. These are the questions I have kept asking about metaphor in all language, cognition, and communication research since and they have become a central issue for present-day cognitive-linguistic and discourse-analytical approaches to metaphor.

These issues have in particular led to the idea that it is possible that there may be a paradox of metaphor. What counts as metaphor in the structures and functions of language (and thought, as defined by cognitive linguists) may not count as metaphor in the behavior of real people. This is a genuine, potentially embarrassing empirical puzzle with important theoretical and methodological ramifications and implications that go beyond the case of metaphor and extend to other figures and general semiotic structures and functions. This explains why metaphor research is so important.

  1. What do you consider to be the most important questions regarding current metaphor research?

To me there is one paramount question that follows from the paradox of metaphor, and I derive all other questions from that.

The central question is: when is metaphor processed metaphorically? In other words, and limiting myself to metaphor in language for now, which linguistic structures that are analyzed as metaphorical by linguists are realized as metaphors, that is, as cross-domain mappings, in language users’ minds?

The question that immediately follows from that is: what does that mean? When neuroscientists see activation in the brain of an area that is related to the source domain of a metaphor, this suggests some position of metaphor in processing. But does it mean that this source domain is used by the language user for constructing the meaning of the metaphorical expression in which it is used? I do not think that this necessarily follows, for I think that it is also possible that polysemous words activate ‘polysemous’ concepts which themselves may be handled by ‘conceptual disambiguation’ strategies simply selecting the already available and conventionalized metaphorical concept—instead of building that metaphorical concept by projection from the original non-metaphorical concept, as was the original cognitive-linguistic proposition. What I think is needed here is a sophisticated and encompassing discourse processing model that can account for the various stages and functions of the distinct cognitive processes involved (see next question).

Other questions following from this would be how metaphor works as metaphor in production, which has been shamefully neglected in experimental research, one or two exceptions apart. And even though much attention has been paid in recent years to metaphor in interaction and to metaphor across discourse events in the new theory of discourse metaphor, here, too, the question whether all aspects of discourse metaphor in fact work as metaphor to the people involved in these events has not been given sufficient attention. And all of this finally leads to the same question of when metaphor works as metaphor in language acquisition and cognitive development.

  1. What trends of potential for development do you currently see in the field of metaphor research?

I think we need to realize that conceptual metaphor theory has built an important part of a theoretical edifice that now needs extension and in part reconstruction. We need to add at least two components, which may be compared with floors rather than wings.

First we need to go into the ground and build a much better basement, which involves the whole area of primary metaphor. I have serious doubts whether primary metaphors are metaphors (see next question) and believe that they may be metonymies, but this is a matter for theoretical and empirical investigation. What is also exciting about this area is that it can now be explored by means of neuroscientific methods examining which concepts and connections are activated at which times of processing in which parts of the brain, although the interpretation of such research is extremely difficult.

Second we need to go one floor up and show how conceptual metaphors participate in discourse metaphors which in turn give rise to metaphorical models that are publicly accessible in various (and changing) ways. I have suggested that discourse metaphors reveal the varying status of their associated underlying metaphorical models, from official and contested to implicit and emergent, and I think that this is a really exciting avenue for further research.

Both of these are trends that are already under way. What I think is most exciting in addition though, and has high potential for the next decade, is the possibility for forging connections with discourse psychology and with computational linguistics. We need discourse psychology (cognitive and social and communication-scientific) to connect our expectations about processing to more encompassing and independent models of language use in discourse events, showing where metaphorical source domains exert which effects. This is becoming particularly important in the area of figurative framing, as I suspect that the potential framing effect of metaphor is overstated, again, on the basis of an over-valuation of the structures and functions that can be observed in texts, as opposed to the way they work in psychological and social processes. I believe that the kind of studies that we have seen so far have been of good but limited value.

And we need computational linguistics to do large scale automated research on metaphor in language (lexicons) and thought (‘ontologies’) between languages. I think that anyone who can collaborate with a computational linguist and knows how to do work on metaphor in WordNet sits on a gold mine. 

Finally, all of this has to do with metaphor in language. The big question about conceptual metaphor, primary metaphor and even discourse metaphor is how these phenomena translate into non-verbal manifestations, and whether linguistic models for metaphor can be usefully transferred to non-linguistic areas such as visuals, multimodal metaphor, and gesture.

  1. How do metaphor and metonymy relate to each other in your opinion?

Metaphor and metonymy are two independent phenomena, as I argued in my 2007 book Finding metaphor in grammar and usage. The one has to do with similarity, the other with contiguity, and these two qualities in principle operate independently from each other. This is also why they can interact, for they are not two mutually excluding categories on one scale, like man-woman or adult-child. This can also be seen in metaphor and metonymy identification—you need to establish whether an expression is metaphorical or not metaphorical independently of whether it is (also) metonymic or not metonymic.

            The big issue about the relation between metaphor and metonymy, in my opinion, is whether primary metaphor is in fact metaphorical or metonymic. I believe that the definition of primary metaphor in Lakoff and Johnson (1999) as the correlation between a sensory-motor experience and a subjective experience suggests that primary metaphor should be reconceptualized as primary metonymy. Joe Grady in his (2005) article in Beate Hampe’s from Perception to Meaning basically acknowledges as much, and talks about primary metaphor in terms of image schemas for sensory-motor experience and response schemas for subjective experience, between which there does not have to be a metaphorical mapping. But if primary metaphor is primary metonymy, this raises fundamentally new questions about its role in the motivation of complex metaphor. This will be another exciting area for the near future.

  1. What kind of metaphor research do you admire – and why?

All metaphor research that is methodologically responsible,  explicit and of high quality. This means that philosophy, theory and research have to be kept functionally apart in publications, and that research has to be geared to making explicit its limitations regarding validity and reliability.

The reason for this admiration is that metaphor research is all about psychological and social processes, and their historical and cultural variation and change, and that this type of research needs to be done by the methodological standards of social science. These are not sufficiently broadly appreciated across the humanities. This does not mean that we all have to turn experimental, but that we should be careful in making the distinctions I have just mentioned. This is still not the standard in all metaphor research (see next question).

  1. What kind of metaphor research do you see critically – and why?

I am critical of metaphor research that talks about structures and functions as if they are processes. For instance, conceptual mappings, whether metaphoric or metonymic, are often talked about as if they are processes, whereas they are often plain structural reconstructions of linguistic or conceptual structures. The relation between structural reconstructions and psychological or social processes is highly problematic and needs careful modeling and testing.

I am also critical of metaphor research that presents speculations about processes as facts obtained from research. Speculations are speculations and need to be formulated as such, preferably in such a way that they can be tested, whether in experimental work or in observational work.

  1. What would you do if you were the executive of a research center for “Metaphor and Society” for five years?

I think the most important thing we need to find out about the way metaphor works in the real world has to do with figurative framing. Which metaphors can exert a framing effect upon which people in which circumstances? How do such figurative framing structures interact with other figures like hyperbole and irony, and how do they interact with encompassing text types like narration, argumentation, and exposition? Which other genre properties play a role in how metaphor can act like a framing device in public and private discourse? How do figurative frames accomplish their effects and how long do such effects last?

In terms of people and their behavior, how can people be taught to resist such framing effects by recognizing them for what they are? How can professionals in government and politics, in organization and management, in science and education, and in health and care be trained to use the framing powers of metaphor more effectively? And how can academics and citizens learn to evaluate metaphorical frames, criticize undesirable implications, and come up with better alternatives?

To me these are the central questions of an applied metaphorology. In fact, in our Metaphor Lab  in Amsterdam we are currently undertaking new research which partly implements this program. One important but very difficult aspect of this research will be to establish how often metaphorical frames are in fact used in important debates, and how it can be established whether they have in fact had an influence on the debate that is actually due to their metaphorical nature and function. This is crucial for determining how important the issue of figurative framing in fact is for societal practices—I believe that there is a good degree of overstatement about the power of metaphor in this area (simply because I believe that a lot of metaphor in text does not work as metaphor in cognition and interaction).

  1. Which field of research – outside your own research area – is particularly exciting for you?

If I define my own research area as discourse analysis, which I take to include genre analysis and discourse processing, then perhaps to me cognitive neuro science is most exciting. It raises questions about the grounding of our cognition that are fundamental and exciting. I also think that the reach of these questions and issues is again overestimated. I fundamentally disagree with the proposition that we are our brain, but it would be nice if we found out how unconscious and conscious processing relate to cognitive freedom and control and to the immediate social constraints on them. This is why cognitive neuro science is particularly exciting for me.

  1. Who or what has influenced you most in regard to researching metaphor?

There is only one answer possible here: the Pragglejaz Group. This was a group of ten metaphor researchers aiming to develop a reliable method for metaphor identification, resulting in a method called MIP, published in Metaphor and Symbol in 2007. We had annual meetings from the summer of 2000 until the summer of 2009, in three-day workshops where we went through the whole process of designing and testing a procedure for finding metaphor in the wild. We came from different angles of the field:  cognitive linguistics, applied linguistics, stylistics, discourse analysis, and psycholinguistics. We all learned how to listen to each other, talk to each other, allow for personal and disciplinary differences but still attempt to achieve the same goal. We had vehement theoretical and methodological debates followed by boisterous drinks and dinners in bars and restaurants. We basically became each other’s academic family.

            The influence of this process on my own work has been tremendous. It helped me in making explicit my own methodological values and developing my own map of the field, which lies at the basis of my 2007 book on Finding Metaphor in Grammar and Usage. It shows how linguistic work, or work in the humanities, can be empirical without conflating that with experimental. I am sure it was also instrumental in landing me a big grant for a large research project with four PhD students on metaphor in discourse. In this project, we developed and refined MIP to a more valid and reliable procedure called MIPVU and we applied it to a sample from the British National Corpus which yielded the world’s first annotated corpus for metaphor. This then led to another project in which we aim to extend the procedure for verbal metaphor identification to a procedure for visual metaphor identification, currently including a new follow up project for the construction of the world’s first visual metaphor database.

Apart from these methodological consequences, it also led to the discovery of the distinction between direct, indirect and implicit metaphor, which in turn led to the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphor use and my proposal for adding communication as a separate dimension to the study of metaphor in language and thought. This is directly connected to my interest in visual metaphor, figurative framing, and to my new ideas about metaphor, embodied cognition and unconscious and conscious processing. These topics I am now collaborating on with young metaphor researchers who are becoming experts in their field.

I would not have been able to develop any of these ideas, had it not been for Pragglejaz, for which I am extremely grateful. That I can pass all these experiences on to the next generation in our Metaphor Lab Summer and Winter Schools on techniques for metaphor identification and analysis makes me very happy.

  1. How would you explain to children what you are currently doing?

That depends on their age. To kids under 12 I’d just say I’m a linguist who is interested in how language works for telling stories or having arguments. But to kids in secondary school I’d say that I am interested in how we talk about difficult or abstract things in terms of comparison with much simpler things that we know more about. Then I’d say that this is interesting because such comparisons are never completely right, and that choosing the right comparison is essential for getting your ideas across in the best way possible.

  1. What would you want young people to know about metaphors and their effects?

I’d like them to be aware of the many metaphorical models that are part of our culture, including society and organizations as a family or a body, electricity as water, time as space, love as madness, illness as war or a plague, and so on. I’d then like them to see that a lot of our ordinary language reflects these models and that they lead to entailments that people can use automatically and unthinkingly but also need to be critical about. And finally I’d encourage them to see if they can be critical and creative in their metaphor use and then ask them to take a step back and consider the value of these cross-domain comparisons.

  1. Which scientific book are you reading at the moment – and why?

For work I am reading Alan Baddeley’s Working memory, thought, and action. It is an overview of research on working memory by one of the key players in this area. I am reading it because I think it is essential for models of metaphor processing in discourse. Working memory is the moment when processing comes to a temporary moment of stasis, if that is the right word, yielding a mental representation of whatever it is that people are cognizing. For metaphorical utterances, I make the link with the moment in discourse psychology when a situation model for an utterance has been constructed by the comprehender. Everything taking place before then is unconscious, while the situation model is what we have in our attention (working memory), which in turn is open for introspection and subsequent conscious processing, if that is useful. My main suggestion here is that a lot of metaphor may not lead to representations of the source domain in working memory, which would explain why a lot of metaphor is not open for introspection and conscious elaboration. However, some metaphor clearly is, and this is where deliberateness, framing, and so on all come in.

For pleasure I am reading Tony Judt’s Postwar: A history of Europe since 1945. It is a brilliant and engaged historical account of everything we need to know as modern citizens and cultured people in contemporary European society. If you want to know where the welfare state came from, how it was deliberately destroyed from the 1980s on, and what happened next, with all the knock on effects on our everyday lives, culture and, yes, science, too—this is the book to read.

  1. Which novel are you reading at the moment – and why? What do you like about this novel?

The novel I recently finished was Salman Rushdie’s Shalimar the clown. I am a fan of Rushdie’s for his use of language, including metaphor, his encompassing almost Shakespearean vision, his combination of the comic with the tragic, his humor, his compassion, and his intelligence. All of these are to be found in Shalimar the clown as well. But The Satanic Verses remains my favorite.

  1. Which question that is not included here do you find important or maybe even most important?

A question about the development of metaphor studies across the world. I have recently traveled to Ukraine, Russia, and China and am amazed by the interest in metaphor studies and the extent of non-western traditions that we do not know anything about in the west. There are immense linguistic, cultural, academic and material barriers to be brought down here, and I believe that academics in the west have a great responsibility in helping to decrease distances and promote interaction, both by going other places themselves and by hosting visiting students and scholars in their own universities. We all stand to gain a lot.


 

Gerard Steen

place of work:

from 1 January, 2015, I will work as Professor of Language and Communication in the Dutch Department at the University of Amsterdam

main areas of work:

metaphor studies, discourse analysis, genre analysis, cognitive linguistics, stylistics and poetics

career:

I got my MA degree in English language and literature in 1982, and another MA degree in poetics in 1985, both from the VU University. Then I worked at Utrecht University in English for two years before I started out on my PhD project on Metaphor in Literary Reception in 1987 in the Department of Poetics, back at VU University. I took my degree in May 1992 and got a position as assistant professor at Tilburg University in the Department of Discourse Studies in January 1993. I came back to the English Department at VU University in 2000 as an assistant professor and after some years got a newly founded personal chair, in Language Use and Cognition, and my own research group. In 2010 I founded the Metaphor Lab, taking that with me to a new department in October 2013, where I held the chair in Language and Communication until 31 December 2014.

memberships and functions (selection):

Most recently I became chair of the board of the National Research School in Linguistics, LOT. At VU University I was chair of the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Arts, and chair of the Science Committee of the Faculty of Arts. In 2013/14 I served as a member of a committee advising the Rector of the University about the possibility of merging the Arts and Philosophy Faculties into one Humanities Faculty, and in 2012/13 as a member of a national Education Assessment Exercise Committee evaluating the Media Studies and Communication and Information Science programs in all Dutch universities. For five years a was a member of the University Council for Quality Control in scientific research at the VU, and at roughly the same time I was a member of the Scientific Advisory Board for CAMeRA, an interfaculty research institute at the VU. Some years before that I was chair for three years of the personnel committee of the faculty, the ‘parliament’ in our organizational structure.

Most important publications (selection):

Steen, G.J. (2013). Deliberate metaphor affords conscious metaphorical cognition. Journal of Cognitive Semiotics 5 (1-2), 179-197.

Steen, G.J. (2011). The contemporary theory of metaphor—now new and improved! Review of Cognitive Linguistics 9(1), 26-64.

Steen, G.J. (2011). Genre between the humanities and the sciences.  In M. Callies, W.R. Keller, & A. Lohöfer (Eds.),a Bi-directionality in the cognitive sciences: Examining the interdisciplinary potential of cognitive approaches in linguistics and literary studies (pp. 21-42). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Steen, G.J., Dorst, A.G., Herrmann, J.B., Kaal, A.A., Krennmayr, T., Pasma, T. (2010). A method for linguistic metaphor identification: From MIP to MIPVU. (Converging Evidence in Language and Communication Research, Vol. 14.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Steen, G.J. (2009). From linguistic form to conceptual structure in five steps: analyzing metaphor in poetry. In G. Brône & J. Vandaele (Eds.), Cognitive poetics: Goals, gains and gaps (pp. 197-226). Berlin/ New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Steen, G.J. (2008). The paradox of metaphor: Why we need a three-dimensional model for metaphor. Metaphor and Symbol, 23(4), 213-241.

Steen, G.J., Cameron, L.J., Cienki, A.J., Crisp, P., Deignan, A., Gibbs, Raymond W. jr, Grady, J., Kövecses, Z., Low, G.D. & Semino, E. (= Pragglejaz Group) (2007). MIP: A method for identifying metaphorically used words in discourse. Metaphor and Symbol, 22(1), 1-39.

Steen, G.J. (2007). Finding metaphor in grammar and usage: A methodological analysis of theory and research. (Converging Evidence in Language and Communication Research, Vol. 10.) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

15 Fragen an Harald Weinrich

Redaktion

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Fragen über Metaphernforschung an Harald Weinrich

Versuch, einige Fragen zur Metaphernforschung zu beantworten

  1. Haben Sie eine oder mehrere Lieblingsmetapher(n)? Wenn ja, welche und warum?

„Wortmünze“ und „Bildfeld“. Mit diesen Metaphern habe ich meine Beschäftigung mit der Metaphorik auf den Weg gebracht (1958).

  1. Welches sind aus Ihrer Sicht die wichtigsten Fragen in Bezug auf die aktuelle Forschung über Metaphern?

Gibt es globale Metaphern? Wenn sich die Welt sprachlich begegnet, multilingual oder in einer lingua franca: welche Rolle spielen dann die Metaphern als „global players“? (Auch diese Frage ist bereits metaphorisch“.)

  1. Welche Trends oder Entwicklungspotenziale sehen Sie derzeit im Gebiet der Metaphernforschung?

Wann, wo und wie können Metaphern Denkmodelle sein?

  1. Wie schätzen Sie das Verhältnis zwischen Metapher und Metonymie ein?

Die Metonymie ist die kleine Schwester der Metapher. Aber manchmal sind die jüngeren Geschwister klüger als die älteren. Jedenfalls wird die Metonymieforschung zu oft vernachlässigt gegenüber der Metaphernforschung.

  1. Welche Form der Metaphernforschung bewundern Sie und warum?

Ich bewundere alle Metaphernforschung, die sich bewusst ist, dass sie selber ohne Metaphern nicht forschen kann.

  1. Welche Form der Metaphernforschung sehen Sie eher kritisch und warum?

Ich bin skeptisch gegenüber jeder Metaphernforschung, die meint, sie könne selber metaphernfrei agieren.

  1. Wenn Sie für fünf Jahre Direktorin/Direktor eines Forschungszentrums „Metapher und Gesellschaft“ wären, was würden Sie tun?

Literaten als Mitarbeiter und Mitarbeiterinnen anwerben.

  1. Welchen Bereich – außerhalb Ihres eigenen Forschungsgebietes – finden Sie besonders spannend?

Die Metaphorik der Philosophen und Naturwissenschaftler.

  1. Wer oder was hat Sie in Bezug auf die Erforschung der Metapher besonders geprägt?

Selber Gedichte schreiben.

  1. Wie würden sie Kindern das erklären, was Sie gerade tun?

Ich würde Kindern gar nicht erklären, was ich mache, sondern ihnen zu erklären versuchen, was sie selber gerne machen und welche Metaphern sie dabei gerne gebrauchen („runterladen“, „sich einen Freund/eine Freundin angeln“ usw.) Auch ein kleiner Wettbewerb für eine Geschichte mit den „tollsten“ Metaphern wäre vielleicht zu „ventillieren“.

  1. Welches Fachbuch lesen Sie gerade und warum?

Hermann Kurzke: Georg Büchner. Geschichte eines Genies. München: C.H.Beck Verlag. Weihnachtsgeschenk.

  1. Welchen Roman lesen Sie gerade und warum? Was gefällt Ihnen an diesem Roman?

Virginia Woolf: To the Lighthouse (1927). Ein großartiger Roman mit ausgefeilter Erzähltechnik. Der „Leuchtturm“ ist eine Metapher, die den ganzen Roman mit Sehnsucht füllt.

  1. Welche hier nicht gestellte Frage ist für Sie wichtig oder vielleicht sogar die wichtigste?

Abgrenzungen der Metaphorik, innere (Vergleich, Bild, Gleichnis) und äußere (Schmuck, Mode, Orden).

Underhill, James W. (2011), Creating Worldviews. Metaphor, Ideology and Language, Edinburgh: University Press, 301S.

Judith Visser

Bochum (Judith.Visser@rub.de)

 

Bei der Besprechung wissenschaftlicher Fachliteratur bietet es sich häufig an, mit der Themenstellung und der Zielsetzung der Analyse zu beginnen, so, wie der Verfasser diese in seinen einleitenden Bemerkungen skizziert. In diesem Fall erscheint es der Rezensentin jedoch sinnvoll, zum Einstieg auf den Buchdeckel Bezug zu nehmen und diesen mit den Ausführungen des Verfassers in der Einleitung zu verknüpfen: Die Abbildung auf der Vorderseite des vorliegenden Buches weckt Erwartungen an die Lektüre, die im Werk selber nicht uneingeschränkt erfüllt werden – dabei sei dahin gestellt, ob dies dem Verfasser anzulasten ist oder nicht – , und auf dem Buchrücken werden – in ihrer Umsetzung diskussionswürdige – Zielsetzungen z.T. konziser formuliert, als dies im einleitenden Kap. der Fall ist. Gleichzeitig gibt ein Blick in die Biographie Underhills eine mögliche Begründung für die Zusammensetzung der Fallstudien, die ein Drittel der Studie ausmachen, eine Begründung, die vom Verfasser selbst nicht oder allenfalls sehr indirekt geliefert wird.

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James W. Underhill (2011), Creating Worldviews. Metaphor, Ideology and Language, Edinburgh: University Press, 301S.

Judith Visser, Bochum (Judith.Visser@rub.de)

 

Bei der Besprechung wissenschaftlicher Fachliteratur bietet es sich häufig an, mit der Themenstellung und der Zielsetzung der Analyse zu beginnen, so, wie der Verfasser diese in seinen einleitenden Bemerkungen skizziert. In diesem Fall erscheint es der Rezensentin jedoch sinnvoll, zum Einstieg auf den Buchdeckel Bezug zu nehmen und diesen mit den Ausführungen des Verfassers in der Einleitung zu verknüpfen: Die Abbildung auf der Vorderseite des vorliegenden Buches weckt Erwartungen an die Lektüre, die im Werk selber nicht uneingeschränkt erfüllt werden – dabei sei dahin gestellt, ob dies dem Verfasser anzulasten ist oder nicht – , und auf dem Buchrücken werden – in ihrer Umsetzung diskussionswürdige – Zielsetzungen z.T. konziser formuliert, als dies im einleitenden Kap. der Fall ist. Gleichzeitig gibt ein Blick in die Biographie Underhills eine mögliche Begründung für die Zusammensetzung der Fallstudien, die ein Drittel der Studie ausmachen, eine Begründung, die vom Verfasser selbst nicht oder allenfalls sehr indirekt geliefert wird.

Die obere Hälfte des Buchdeckels nimmt eine Photographie ein, auf der einer Person, deren Kopf lediglich ausschnitthaft mit Fokus auf dem rechten Ohr abgebildet ist, von einer anderen Person, von der lediglich Nase und Mund zu sehen sind, etwas ins Ohr geflüstert wird. Das Bild suggeriert damit, zumindest bei der Rezensentin, dass es im vorliegenden Werk um das Herausarbeiten von Strategien der ‘Konspiration‘ und ‘Beeinflussung‘ gehen könnte, Erwartungen, die zusätzlich durch den Titel Creating Wordviews geschürt werden.

Der Buchrücken gibt Hinweise auf den Inhalt. Als allgemeines Ziel wird formuliert, dass Leser dazu ermutigt werden sollen, über die Rolle, die Sprache und Metaphern bei der Herausbildung von Denkmustern spielen, nachzudenken. Metaphern gelten also, auch wenn sie im Fokus der vorliegenden Besprechung stehen, ausdrücklich als eine mögliche und keineswegs einzige Form der Einsichtnahme in Weltansichten (cf. S. 13). Angekündigt wird eine kritische Einführung in die Metapherntheorie (im Singular), an die sich eine Untersuchung von worldview (im Folgenden in Anlehnung an die Praxis des Autors übersetzt als “Weltansicht“) anschließen soll, wie Sprache sie uns ‘anbietet‘, sowie worldviews, wie sie unserer ideologischen und persönlichen Interpretation der Welt entspringen. Dieses Ziel wird in der eigentlichen Einleitung wie folgt formuliert: „This book is concerned with the creation of worldviews: that is, with the way we create them, the way we introduce them, maintain them and transform them [kursiv im Orig., J.V.]” (S. 12).

Die Tatsache, dass eine Erkundung neuer  „avenues in metaphor theorie in the work of contemporary French, German and Czech scholars” stattfinden soll, scheint sich aus dem Lebenslauf des Autors abzuleiten, der als Übersetzer für Französisch und Tschechisch ausgebildet ist und im Bereich Übersetzungswissenschaft an der Université Stendhal de Grenoble arbeitet: Andere unmittelbare Begründungen für die Kombination französischer, deutscher und tschechischer Arbeiten ergeben sich zumindest auf den ersten Blick nicht, zumal die Ausrichtung auf Arbeiten aus dem Bereich der kognitiven Linguistik eine Berücksichtigung auch des angloamerikanischen Raums nahelegen würde, die dann auch entgegen der Ankündigung in Teilen erfolgt. Grundsätzlich kann der Einbezug verschiedener europäischer Perspektiven als großes Potential der vorliegenden Studie gewertet werden, weil aus sprachlichen Gründen gerade angloamerikanische Metaphernforscher dazu neigen, z.B. slawische, aber auch andere europäische Forschungstraditionen zu wenig zu berücksichtigen, wie der Autor selbst anmerkt: „an Anglo-centric trend has tended to emerge among the publications of the second generation of cognitive scholars“ (S. 14). Die für die Analyse der Erschaffung von worldviews durchaus sinnvolle Kombination von Metapherntheorie und Diskursanalyse soll anhand dreier Fallstudien erfolgen. Hier deutet der Text auf dem Buchrücken bereits ein gewisses methodisches Vakuum an, das sich in der Untersuchung manifestiert: Es findet sich kein Kapitel, in dem Methoden der Metaphernforschung und der kritischen Diskursanalyse systematisch zueinander in Bezug gesetzt werden würden. Dieses In-Bezug-Setzen erfolgt bei der Diskussion der Fallstudien lediglich sehr indirekt.

Die Fallstudien spiegeln ebenfalls die Biographie des Autors wider: Die Analyse gilt dem tschechischen kommunistischen sowie dem deutschen faschistischen Diskurs („Czech language reshaped by communist discourse“; „the way fascism emerged in German language“); die dritte Fallstudie „turns metaphor theory on its head: instead of looking for metaphors in language, it describes the way language systems (French and English) are understood in terms of metaphorically-framed concepts evolving over time“ (Buchrücken).

Das Werk schließt mit einem – auf dem Buchrücken leicht irreführend als „multilingual“ angekündigten und im Rahmen einer Studie des vorliegenden Typs durchaus überraschenden Glossar. Zum Ende der Inhaltsangabe wird der Anspruch formuliert, es handele sich um ein ideales Buch „for anyone new to the topic, as well as those already interested in metaphor theory and the analysis of worldviews“.

Die auf dem Buchrücken angekündigte „ciritical introduction to metaphor theory“ umfasst Teil 1 des Buches (mit der sehr allgemeinen Überschrift Metaphor versehen) und ist untergliedert in die Unterkapitel 1. Metaphor and World-Conceiving, 2. A Concern for Metaphor, 3. Metaphors We Live By, 4. Other Developments in Metaphor Theory, 5. Further Cognitive Contributions to Metaphor Theory und 6. Diversity on the Periphery. Die Unterkapitel sind weiter gegliedert; so wird das Online-Journal metaphorik.de als Teil des Absatzes „Diversität in der Peripherie“ vorgestellt.

Teil 2 widmet sich den Fallstudien. Wie angekündigt fokussiert die erste Fallstudie die Sprache des tschechoslowakischen Kommunismus, die zweite das ‘Hitlerdeutsche‘, d.h. die Lingua Tertii Imperii Victor Klemperers. Underhill formuliert als Ziel zu belegen, dass die nationalsozialistische Weltansicht unlogisch und irrational ist (S. 15). Die Untersuchung der Language in Metaphors, die gewissermaßen die dritte Fallstudie bildet, obschon hier mehrere Autoren miteinander in Bezug gesetzt werden, beruht im Wesentlichen auf einer Auseinandersetzung mit den Arbeiten von Claude Hagège und David Crystal. Gerade diese dritte ‘Fallstudie‘ zeichnet sich durch einen – im Inhaltsverzeichnis nur durch den Terminus Sprachsinn erkennbaren – sehr starken Bezug zur Sprachphilosophie Humboldts aus, die Gegenstand von Underhills Publikation Humboldt, Worldview and Language (ebenfalls Edinburgh University Press) aus dem Jahre 2009 ist. Humboldt selbst wird vom Autor als „guilty conscience of modern linguistics“ (S. 16) gezeichnet, weil er uns daran erinnere, dass „language is about us. Speaking involves speakers“ (ibid.). Ziel der Diskussion Hagèges und Crystals sei es zu belegen, dass sprachliche Konzepte metaphorisch konstruiert sind. Man darf sich allerdings schon an dieser Stelle, in Anbetracht der Publikationen Lakoffs und Johnsons und zahlreicher Studien zur Metaphorizität des Wissenschaftsdiskurses, die Frage stellen, ob diese Erkenntnis überraschend ist, oder ob hier nicht eher die Frage interessant wäre, durch welche Konzepte sich die metaphorische Konstruktion von Sprache auszeichnet.

Im ersten Unterkapitel der „critical introduction to metaphor theory“, betitelt als Metaphor and World-Conceiving, liefert Underhill nach eigener Aussage grundlegende Taxonomien für seine Analyse: Er differenziert drei verschiedene Dimensionen von worldview, dem zentralen Konzept seiner Untersuchung. Unterschieden werden: 1. die worldview des Sprachsystems, 2. diejenige des cultural mindsets sowie 3. diejenige des Individuums. Die Unterteilung erscheint ihm nötig, um die Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Denken, zwischen Wörtern und Weltansichten zu verstehen. Aus der Tatsache, dass nicht nur die ideologische Weltansicht, sondern auch diejenige des Sprachsystems und des Individuums beleuchtet werden, leitet er die Notwendigkeit ab, für den Begriff worldview eine weitere Taxonomisierung zu unternehmen, die auf einer von ihm vorgenommenen Diskussion des Konzepts in dem bereits genannten Buch zu Humboldt beruht, und zwar in:

  • World-perceiving: Damit nimmt Underhill Bezug auf „the frameworks of understanding which direct and shade our perception of the world“ (S. 7);
  • World-conceiving: Diese Kategorie bezieht sich auf die „conceptual frameworks which enable us to communicate with others and engage in the discussion of ideas, impressions and feelings” (ibid.). Bei den beiden ersten Kategorien scheint es sich um eine weitere Untergliederung der in der vorangehenden Taxonomisierung eingeführten “worldview des Sprachsystems“ zu handeln;
  • Cultural mindset: Diese, bereits in der ersten Taxonomisierung eingeführte Kategorie wird nicht weiter unterteilt. Sie bezieht sich auf „worldviews specific to a political regime or religion“ (ibid.), wobei sicherlich diskussionswürdig wäre, ob Kultur mit „politischer Weltanschauung“ oder „Religion“ gleichgesetzt werden kann, wie dies die Benennung der Kategorie nahezulegen scheint.
  • Personal World: Diese erste Unterkategorie der Dimension „Weltansicht des Individuums“ fokussiert „the fairly stable systems of concepts which organise and structure the worldview we can attribute to individuals and writers“ (ibid.).
  • Perspective: Die zweite verweist analog zum world-conceiving auf die Tatsache, dass das Individuum mit der Welt interagiert und dabei Konzepte schärft, ändert und überdenkt, d.h. dass diese nicht statisch, sondern einem stetigen Wandel unterlaufen sind oder sein können.

Der Versuch der Annäherung an die entwickelten Taxonomien im Rahmen der vorliegenden Besprechung macht zwei Dinge deutlich:

Erstens: Der Verfasser legt Wert darauf, bei der Frage nach der Erschaffung von worldviews die Tatsache im Blick zu behalten, dass Weltansichten in gewisser Weise und durchaus im Sinne Sapirs und Whorfs, deren Positionen an späterer Stelle kritisch diskutiert werden, durch das Sprachsystem geprägt werden, dass die Kultur und die religiöse oder politische Ideologie, in der die Sprecher einer (oder mehrerer) Sprache(n) sich bewegen, eine große Rolle spielen, aber dass auch die Perspektive des Individuums nicht ausgeblendet werden darf. Dabei ist gleichzeitig zu bedenken, dass Weltansichten nicht unverrückbar, sondern entwicklungsfähig sind, ein Gedanke, der die Verantwortung des kritisch denkenden Individuums für die Ausbildung eben dieser Weltansichten in den Vordergrund rückt. Es ist deshalb für Underhill wenig sinnvoll, das Individuum als „passive object or ‘victim‘ of ideology“ (S. 6) zu sehen.

Zweitens: Die Taxonomisierungen werden recht knapp eingeführt und im weiteren Verlauf der Studie nicht hinreichend systematisch wieder aufgegriffen, um dem Leser ein klares orientierendes Gerüst vor Augen zu führen. Es darf daher bezweifelt werden, dass das Werk, wie auf dem Buchrücken angekündigt, „for anyone new to the topic“ geeignet ist. Im Gegenteil scheint der Autor nicht nur hier, sondern gerade auch in der dritten Fallstudie von Teil 2 in gewisser Weise davon auszugehen, dass die Leser mit seiner Studie zu Humboldt von 2009 bzw. mit der Humboldtschen Sprachphilosophie mehr oder minder vertraut sind.

In den darauf folgenden Kapiteln von Teil 1 widmet sich Underhill konkret den metapherntheoretischen Grundlagen. Schon in Kap. 2 (A Concern for Metaphor) zeigt sich, dass seine Ausführungen sehr stark sprachphilosophisch geprägt sind. Die Ideen von Lakoff/Johnson werden mit europäischen Werken von Cassirer (The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. I: Language, New Haven, 1968) sowie Matoré (L’espace Humain, Paris, 1962) in Bezug gesetzt. Der Verfasser blickt also nicht nur bei den Fallstudien, sondern auch bei der Darstellung der theoretischen Hintergründe über den kognitionswissenschaftlichen angloamerikanischen Tellerrand hinaus.

Auch in Kap. 3, das im Titel das Werk von Lakoff/Johnson zitiert (Metaphors We Live By), zeigt Underhill Traditionslinien der Metaphernforschung auf, indem er die amerikanischen Autoren ‘in die Fußstapfen Paul Ricœurs‘ treten lässt (S. 25). Die Erkenntnisse Lakoffs und Johnsons fasst er in sieben Punkten zusammen (S. 25ff.) : 1. Metaphors live, 2. Metaphors form systematic constructs, 3. Metaphors highlight and hide, 4. Conceptual metaphors often contradict one another, 5. Me‑taphors are grounded in experience, 6. Metaphors create similarity, 7. Metaphor is the cardinal trope.

Kap. 4 beginnt mit dem noch einmal ausdrücklichen Hinweis, dass ‘die geheime Macht der Metaphern’ („the secret power of metaphor“, S. 30), um die es vor dem Hintergrund der Erschaffung von Weltansichten geht, keine Entdeckung der kognitiven Linguistik ist. Dies untermauert Underhill durch eine Art Forschungsüberblick, den er in die Kategorien philosophical investigations – linguistic approaches – the poetic tradition – the rhetorical tradition unterteilt. Getreu seines biographischen Hintergrunds zeichnet sich dieser Überblick durch eine starke Fokussierung auf Frankreich aus. Nicht nur die über rein linguistische Forschungsarbeiten hinausgehende Darstellung, sondern auch eine explizite Anmerkung des Verfasser heben die Interdisziplinarität des Forschungsgegenstandes Metapher hervor: „From Aristotle to Ricœur, metaphor has tended to attract those who build bridges between academic disciplines“ (S. 43).

Kap. 5 (Further Cognitive contributions to Metaphor Theory) enthält u.a. einen kleinen Einblick in die Biographie Lakoffs. Als weitere ‘kognitive Beiträge‘ bzw. Beitragende behandelt Underhill besonders Ideen und Arbeiten von Philip Eubanks (A War of Words in the Discours of Trade: The Rhetorical Constitution of Metaphor, Carbondale, 2000), Andrew Goatly (Washing the Brain: Metaphor and Hidden Ideology, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 2007) und Mark Turner („Turner’s Contribution”, S. 55ff.). Das Kapitel endet mit dem Hinweis auf eine gewisse „shortsightedness”, die der Verfasser britischen und amerikanischen kognitiven Linguisten vorwirft (S. 61), deren Arbeiten sich ihm zufolge in drei Kategorien einteilen lassen: 1. solche, die die Universalität von metaphorischen Konzepten zu beweisen suchen, 2. solche, in denen die englischsprachigen Forscher mit Hilfe von Muttersprachlern anderer Sprachen – hier scheinen vor allem kleinere, regional sehr begrenzt auftretende und aus europäischer Sicht ‘exotische‘ Sprachen gemeint zu sein, die die Forscher selbst nicht beherrschen – ihre Hypothesen zu belegen versuchen sowie 3. Arbeiten, in denen Sprecher anderer Sprachen die Hypothesen von Lakoff/Johnson untermauern. Inwiefern es sinnvoll ist, diese drei Kategorien voneinander abzugrenzen, die sich letztlich alle dadurch auszeichnen, dass angestrebt wird, Annahmen Lakoffs und Johnsons durch ausgewählte Beispiele aus anderen Sprachen zu belegen, mag diskussionswürdig sein. Es ist jedoch festzuhalten, dass Underhill die Hypothese der Universalität der Konzepte bzw. die bisherigen Versuche, diese zu beweisen, als ‘kurzsichtig‘ empfindet und diese Empfindung zum Anlass nimmt, in Kap. 6 einen Blick auf die ‘Vielfalt in der Peripherie‘ zu werfen (Diversity on the Periphery).

Die ‘Vielfalt in der Peripherie‘ scheint sich für den Verfasser u.a. darin zu begründen, dass jenseits des ‘kognitivistischen Mainstreams‘ sprachvergleichend gearbeitet wird. Konkret diskutiert Underhill Dirven („Metaphor as a basic means of extending the lexicon“, in: Paprotté, Wolf/Dirven, (ed.), The Ubiquity of Metaphor: Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1985, S. 84-119), die mehrsprachigen Studien in metaphorik.de, tschechische und polnische Beiträge, die in Vaňková, Irena (2001, ed.) veröffentlicht sind (Obraz světa v jazyce (The Picture of the World in Language), Prag) sowie die Arbeiten von Eve Sweetser. Im Zusammenhang mit der Diskussion der slawischen Forschungstradition wichtig erscheint der Hinweis, dass „cognitive studies have shown little sensitivity to questions of register, social class, gender and personality“ (S. 79). Bei der Diskussion der Arbeiten von Sweetser, der der Verfasser einen eigenen Absatz widmet (S. 79-81), wäre ein Verweis z.B. auf Andreas Blank (1997, Prinzipien des lexikalischen Bedeutungswandels am Beispiel der romanischen Sprachen, Tübingen) denkbar gewesen. Da auch Underhill letztlich in erster Linie die Arbeiten zu kommentieren und wiederzugeben scheint, die ihm bekannt sind und ihm interessant erscheinen, bleibt es nicht aus, dass auch er die perspektivische Verengung vornimmt, die er den englischsprachigen kognitiven Linguisten vorwirft. Nichtsdestotrotz dürften seine Versuche des ‘Brückenbaus‘ (S. 81) zwischen europäischen und amerikanischen Arbeiten als ein großer Pluspunkt der vorliegenden Studie betrachtet werden. Vor dem Hintergrund des skizzierten Wertes sprachvergleichender Arbeiten und in Anlehnung an Trabant (2007, „L’antinomie linguistique: quelques enjeux politiques“, in: Werner, Michael (ed.), Politiques & Usages de la Langue en Europe, Condé-sur-Noireau, S. 67-79) warnt Underhill vor einer „languageless linguistics“ (S. 83). Der Wert der sprachvergleichenden Herangehensweise könnte als eine Begründung für die mehrere Sprachen umfassenden Fallstudien herangezogen werden, auch wenn der Verfasser am Ende dieses Theoriekapitels die genaue Motivation für den Blick in die ausgewählten Sprachen und Korpora schuldig bleibt.

Teil 1, der die ‘metapherntheoretischen Grundlagen‘ umfasst, kann damit zusammenfassend als breit angelegter, verschiedene Forschungstraditionen berücksichtigender Einblick in Studien zu Metaphern betrachtet werden. Zweifellos belegt Underhill mit seinen Ausführungen breite Kenntnisse aktueller und älterer Werke zur Metaphernforschung und zeigt eine große Expertise in sprachphilosophischen Abhandlungen. Seine Darstellungen haben Potential für den angestrebten ‘Brückenbau‘ zwischen Forschungstraditionen, die Nutzbarkeit seiner Erkenntnisse wird aber dadurch beeinträchtigt, dass er, wie bereits einleitend kritisch angemerkt, keine systematische Verknüpfung von Metapherntheorie und Diskursanalyse vornimmt und mit Ausnahme der eingangs formulierten, in der Abgrenzung recht diffusen Taxonomien auf klare Analyseschemata und Modelle verzichtet, die die Herangehensweise an die Untersuchung der Texte transparenter gemacht hätten.

In Anbetracht dieser Ausgangslage verwundert es daher wenig, dass bei der Darstellung der Fallstudien keine systematische Auswertung von Korpora erfolgt – bzw. selbige für den Leser zumindest nicht ersichtlich wird – und dass nicht konsequent metaphorische Konzepte herausgearbeitet werden, sondern der Verfasser eher inhaltliche Kategorisierungen seiner Ergebnisse vornimmt.

Die Analyse der Language of Czechoslovak Communist Power scheint auf einer Beschäftigung mit den Arbeiten Petr Fidelius‘ zu beruhen (L’esprit post-totalitaire, Paris, 1986; Řeč kommunistické, Prag, 1998; Filosofický slovník (O-Z) (A Philosophical Dictionary), Prag, 1985). Underhill verweist aber auch immer wieder auf die Tageszeitung Rudé Právo, die er als ‘Äquivalent‘ der russischen Pravda bezeichnet (S. 94). Er identifiziert in den ihm vorliegenden Daten vier ‘konzeptuelle Kluster‘, und zwar Historie (History), Lidé (People), Strana (Party), Stát (State), die er im Anschluss diskutiert. Dabei nennt er durchaus aufschlussreiche metaphorische Konzepte, die Verwendung finden (z.B. history is a machine, S. 98; der Mensch wird darin als ‘living energy‘ konzeptualisiert, derer man bedarf, um die ‘Reise zum Sozialismus‘ vollziehen zu können, S. 99). Weges- und Bewegungsmetaphorik spielen eine große Rolle. Auch wenn die Ausführungen aufschlussreich sind und – tendenziell eher wenige – interessante Beispiele diskutiert werden, hätte man sich als Leser eine größere Nähe zu den untersuchten Texten und eine systematischere Auseinandersetzung mit den metaphorischen Konzepten gewünscht. So bleibt zumindest für den mit tschechischer bzw. tschechoslowakischer kommunistischer Rhetorik wenig vertrauten Rezipienten zu unklar, auf welche Weise „dissenters […] are expelled metaphorically from society and from the homeland“ (S. 114). Die Schlussfolgerungen der Analyse (S. 124 ff.) bleiben dementsprechend relativ allgemein. Underhill kommt jedoch zu dem Ergebnis, dass „universal cross-cultural models of ideological manipulation […] reductive and simplistic“ seien (S. 130). Inwiefern dieses Ergebnis in Hinblick auf die konkrete Fallstudie innovativ ist, kann aufgrund eines fehlenden systematischen Überblicks über den Stand der Forschung zur tschechoslowakischen kommunistischen Rhetorik nicht beurteilt werden. Zu unklar bleibt aufgrund der fehlenden methodischen Systematik auch, was genau man sich unter „models of ideological manipulation“ vorzustellen hat – dieser Aspekt erscheint aber sehr zentral, wenn man das Fehlen eben jener Modelle so substantiell in die Argumentation einbezieht.

Die Feststellung, dass die ‘Modelle der ideologischen Manipulation‘ nicht universell seien, kann als Begründung für die zweite Fallstudie, die Untersuchung des Hitlerdeutschen, herangezogen werden, die diese nicht vorliegende Universalität weiter begründen könnte. Zentrale Fragen der zweiten Fallstudie sind: „How would [the Nazi] movement express itself linguistically? How would the metaphors born of that movement contribute to the reshaping of the German that was spoken at work, in the streets and at home?“ (S. 131), Fragen, die vor dem Hintergrund einer abermals in ihrem Umfang nicht klar zu fassenden Materialanalyse vergleichsweise ehrgeizig erscheinen. Wie bereits erwähnt beruht die Darstellung auf den Studien Victor Klemperers. Struktureller Ausgangspunkt der Analyse ist in diesem Fall eine Unterteilung der sprachlichen Belege, die auch hier nur teilweise konkret angeführt werden, in „seven forms of perversion in the metaphors cherished by the Nazis“, und zwar: 1. conceptual clusters, 2. binary definition, 3. essentialisation [Kursiv i. Orig., J.V.] and exclusion, 4. adoption and inversion, 5. instability, 6. contradiction, 7. absurdity (S. 136). In Hinblick auf die verwendete Metaphorik sind viele der von Underhill angestellten Beobachtungen interessant, aber in ihrem Innovationsgrad abermals nicht zu beurteilen. Sie zeigen z.B., dass auch die Nationalsozialisten mit für manipulative Diskurse typischen binären Kategorisierungen arbeiten (S. 144f.). Überhaupt sind viele Beobachtungen durchaus charakteristisch für rechtextremen metaphorischen und nicht-metaphorischen Diskurs, wenn auch auffällt, dass die vom Verfasser als Überschriften gewählten Kategorisierungen der beobachteten manipulativen Strategien – die als solche nicht explizit benannt werden – nicht in im politolinguistischen Forschungsdiskurs etablierten Terminologien wurzeln. Abermals zeigt sich hier, dass Underhill eher eine sprachphilosophische Perspektive einnimmt und viele Forschungen zur politischen Sprache nicht rezipiert hat. Dies muss dem Verfasser nicht zum Vorwurf gemacht werden, aber es hat zur Folge, dass die Verwertbarkeit seiner Ergebnisse konkret für die Auseinandersetzung mit dem rechtsradikalen europäischen oder aber dem kommunistischen Diskurs (cf. hier z.B. die Studien zur sog. langue de bois) eingeschränkt bleibt, wobei zugestanden werden muss, dass der Verfasser diese Verwertbarkeit nicht anzustreben scheint, dass es hier also offenbar nicht grundsätzlich um die konkrete Auseinandersetzung mit metaphorischen Konzepten im politischen Diskurs geht, sondern eher allgemein um die Frage, wie universell manipulatorische Strategien funktionieren und welche Rolle Sprachsysteme bei diesem Funktionieren spielen.

Die dritte ‘Fallstudie‘ untersucht, wie mit Metaphern über Sprache gesprochen wird. Der Autor stützt sich dabei, wie bereits im Zusammenhang mit der Diskussion des Textes auf dem Buchrücken aufgezeigt, besonders auf die Analyse von Arbeiten des französischen Wissenschaftlers Claude Hagège sowie des Briten David Crystal, auch wenn er beim Blick auf das Oberthema Défense de la langue française und die Diskussion von Eigenschaften, die der französischen Sprache traditionell zugesprochen werden („The french language is so beautiful, we hardly dare touch her“, S. 172ff.; „The aesthetics of order“, S. 183ff.), zunächst einen Blick in die Geschichte der französischen Sprachpolitik wirft und auch anderen Linguisten und/oder Sprachliebhabern kurz Aufmerksamkeit schenkt (besonders Henri Meschonnic, De la langue française. Essai sur une clarté obscure, 1997). Unter der Überschrift „New defences“ widmet er sich kurz sprachpflegerischen Institutionen bzw. sprachpflegerische Artikel publizierenden Organen wie der Délégation générale à la langue française et aux langues de France, der Académie Française und dem Figaro, einem Essai von Dominique Noguez („C comme une crise du français?“, in: Cerquiglini, Bernard et al. (ed.), Le Français dans tous ses états, Paris, 2000), einem Artikel von Julia Kristeva („É comme écrire en français“, in: ibid.) sowie einem Werk von Mohamed Benrabah (Langue et pouvoir en Algérie: histoire d’un traumatisme linguistique, Paris, 1999). Die Gründe für die Auswahl der diskutierten Autoren bleiben offen.

Das Werk Hagèges wird unter der metaphorischen Überschrift „Hagège’s Garden“ diskutiert. Der Stil Underhills zeichnet sich, wie auch in diesem gewählten Titel sichtbar, insgesamt durch eine ausgeprägte Verwendung sprachlicher Bilder aus. Insofern ist es überraschend, dass er sich genötigt sieht darzulegen, dass in Metaphern über Sprache gesprochen wird. Hagège wird als ‘Ökolinguist‘ beleuchtet. Das Augenmerk Underhills gilt dabei u.a. der Annahme der Ökolinguistik, dass sprachliche Diversität in Analogie zu biologischer Diversität gesetzt werden kann sowie der damit verbundenen Sorge vor ‘Sprachentod‘, die davon ausgeht, dass Vielfalt ein schützenswertes Gut darstellt.

Auch wenn sich die Situation des Englischen historisch und in der heutigen globalisierten Welt nur bedingt mit derjenigen des Französischen vergleichen lässt, benutzt auch der englische Wissenschaftler David Crystal die Metapher des Sprachentods: „with the death of each language, another source of potentially invaluable information disappears“ (Language Death, Cambridge, S. 55, zitiert nach S. 226). Die Argumentation beider Linguisten wird von Underhill – me‑taphorisch – als „chivalry of the nobles of the Middle Ages“ abqualifiziert, „who were convinced of the importance of their own values, but considered it their duty (in theory at least), to benevolently watch over those less elevated and rush to the rescue of those in distress“ (S. 230), eine Position, die seiner Ansicht nach der Humboldtschen Sprachphilosophie widerspricht, weil er in der Debatte um drohenden Sprachentod die Vorstellung von Sprachsinn vermisst: „The authours who defend other languages do so because they take it as an article of faith that each language must constitute a worldview” (S. 232). Das Problem Underhills, auf dem die Kritik am ökolinguistischen Ansatz allgemein resultiert, die hier lediglich an den Personen Hagèges und Crystals exemplifiziert wird, besteht also darin, dass er glaubt, dieser sprachwissenschaftlichen Richtung vorwerfen zu müssen, sie würde worldview auf die erste Kategorie seiner Taxonomie reduzieren, nämlich die ‘Weltansicht des Sprachsystems‘. Hagège und Crystal wird vorgeworfen, mit Metaphern ‘Geschichten zu erzählen‘: „The logic of many of these analogies proves to be untenable. Languages are not living things […]. They do not have a limited lifespan. They have no biological parents. They do not interact as species or individual links in a food chain” (S. 233). Für Underhill ist dies insofern kritikwürdig, als diese Perspektive die Kreativität des Individuums, die den Ausgangspunkt bildet für die ‘Weltansicht des Individuums‘ (Nr. 3 der Taxonomie), ausblende und damit das Humboldtsche Konzept des Sprachsinns nicht hinreichend berücksichtige, das die Metapher des Todes nicht sinnvoll erscheinen lasse: „Sprachsinn is not ill or in danger. Since the human species is innately creative, it seems unlikely that imagination is in danger of drying up“ (S. 235).

(Nicht nur) diese Kritik bzw. diese letzte ‘Fallstudie‘ wirft aus Sicht der Rezensentin Fragen auf: Kann Underhill der Ökolinguistik vorwerfen, das Konzept der ‘Erschaffung von Weltansichten‘ auf die Systemebene zu beschränken, nur weil Ökolinguisten vor Sprachentod warnen und dieses Verschwinden von Sprachen mit der Gefahr in Verbindung bringen, dass kulturelles (!) Wissen verlorengeht, das sich in Sprachsystemen niederschlägt (cf. die Forschungsrichtung Wörter und Sachen)? Kann der Verfasser Autoren wie Hagège und Crystal vorhalten, über etwas Abstraktes wie Sprache metaphorisch zu sprechen, wenn doch die Ausführungen Underhills selbst – wie jeder wissenschaftliche Diskurs – von Metaphern durchsetzt sind? Heißt es nicht, die heuristische Funktion von Metaphern zu ignorieren, wenn man diese Metaphern wörtlich nimmt und damit die Argumentation des Gegenübers ad absurdum führt?

Die in ihrer Systematik durchaus schwer zu fassenden und sich in der Diskussion verschiedenartigster Autoren und Texte bisweilen etwas verlierenden, alles andere als perspektivisch offenen Ausführungen Underhills scheinen, das legt auch das Schlusskapitel nahe („A final word, S. 236), auf eine wesentliche Aussage reduzierbar zu sein:

Es bestehe kein Anlass davon auszugehen, dass Sprecher in Weltansichten ‘gefangen‘ – Underhill benutzt hier die Metapher des prison – sein müssen: „Wo‑rldviews must resonate within consciousness. They must enable individuals and peoples to give expression to their thoughts and feelings. They must enable us to live together as communities. Ideology is thus constantly modified by individual expression, and therefore subject to innovation” (S. 239). Die Fähigkeit zur Veränderung und Innovation sieht der Verfasser in dem Konzept des Sprachsinns repräsentiert, wie es Humboldt vertritt.

Wie die Sprecher Veränderungen und Innovationen vornehmen, bleibt allerdings weitgehend offen. Insofern geht es in Creating Worldviews weder, wie das Bild auf dem Buchdeckel – vielleicht zu Unrecht – hat erwarten lassen, um Strategien der Manipulation oder Konspiration, noch um die konkrete Frage, welche Möglichkeiten bestehen, das Oktroyieren von Weltansichten zu verhindern.

Das Buch kann damit abschließend und auch unter Berücksichtigung des 75 Einträge umfassenden Glossars (S. 241-2284), das auf die Studie zugeschnitten und nicht rein definitorisch angelegt ist, als Beitrag zur Diskussion der Ideen der Metaphernforschung betrachtet werden, der sich durch einen umfassenden Einbezug europäischer Forschungsarbeiten auszeichnet. Die Analyse politischer Sprache erfolgt mit einem sprachphilosophischen Ansatz, die Kritik der Ökolinguistik durch die Brille der Humboldtschen Sprachphilosophie. Die Frage nach dem Erkenntniswert der Ausführungen dürfte damit von der Perspektive abhängen, mit der man sich dem Thema nähert: In Hinblick auf eine Verwertbarkeit der Ergebnisse in den Disziplinen der kognitiven Linguistik o‑der der Politolinguistik wie auch der kritischen Diskursanalyse fehlt es der Darstellung an methodischer Schärfe.