Schematizing the Maternal Body: The Cognitive-Linguistic Challenge to Poststructuralist Valorizations of Metonymy

Wendy Faith, Saskatchewan (faith.van@sasktel.net)

Abstract

This paper uses cognitive linguistics to re-evaluate — for feminist theory — one of the main organizing principles of poststructuralism: the binary opposition between metonymy and metaphor. In so doing, it counters the poststructuralist assumption that metonymic readings are fundamentally liberatory while metaphoric ones are essentially oppressive. Relying chiefly on the experientialism of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, 1987, 1999), it maintains that both metonymy and metaphor are flexible constituents of an (Lakoff 1987: xiv) “ecological structure” of mind; accordingly, they appear in various combinations to support any number of rhetorical perspectives. Specifically, it explores the potential value of Lakoffian image-schemas to popular discussions of the maternal body — an apt site from which to consider the limits of poststructuralism and the possibilities for feminism of more holistic analyses.

1. Introduction

For poststructuralist philosophers, language is not a means of representing empirical reality; rather, it is a system of linguistic binaries in which one signified is privileged while the other is devalued, as in transcendence/immanence, culture/nature, masculine/feminine and, most important to this discussion, metaphor/metonymy. While language is admittedly not transparent, this binary system is limited by its rejection of organicism, or gestalt thought. Because the text composes “the real” only through its hierarchical oppositions, oppressive designations need not be socially qualified but only logically subverted; thus, many poststructuralists valorize feminine difference and metonymic deferral in place of masculine autonomy and metaphoric coherence.

The poststructuralist derogation of “masculine” metaphor, which is aligned with autonomy, in favor of “feminine” metonymy, which is aligned with relativity, has provisionally disrupted the gendered
hierarchies of Western humanism. For example, rather than metaphorically equating the Woman-Mother with a passive vessel, poststructuralist feminists (see Haraway 1985, 1996; Irigaray 1985; Kristeva 1981) have metonymically dispersed female identity, treating it in terms of multiple relations and roles. But despite its disruptive capacity, poststructuralism still works within a masculinist tradition of philosophical dualism; consequently, it tends to reproduce the same binaries that it aims to critique, as I elaborate in section 2. Moreover, its focus on binary logic ignores the experientially-based motives of language use. It is my contention, then, that poststructuralism risks redirecting, rather than reinforcing, feminist rhetorical strategies.

As a means of broadening the theoretical scope of poststructuralist dualism, this paper uses the more holistic cognitive linguistics of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980, 1987, 1999) to analyze popular representations of the maternal body, which is a key site of contestation within feminist studies. In particular, it examines how Pro-Life and Pro-Choice groups — based in America, where the issue of abortion is most hotly debated — use “embodied image-schemas” to set the stage for either fetal personification and maternal objectification or fetal disenfranchisement and maternal autonomy. (The majority of textual samples, having been drawn from the Internet, are internationally accessible.) The pre-partum body poses an obvious challenge to the Cartesian separation between immanence (nature/body/femininity/metonymy) and transcendence (culture/mind/masculinity/metaphor), for one can locate neither a wholly discrete fetus residing within a concrete “vessel” nor a merely abstract fetus contained within the concept “mother.” In other words, because the maternal body is a “fuzzy boundary,” it problematizes the dualism of Western language philosophy.

If the cognitive imposition of spatial categories onto the maternal body contributes to its representations, as this paper speculates, then the poststructuralist metaphor/metonymy binary may require amendment. Moreover, if oppositional (Pro-Life and Pro-Choice) camps are able to select and employ rhetorical figures on the same spatial bases, then language need not be seen as oppressively metaphoric, or phallocentric, but rather as flexibly persuasive. In total, by speculating on the role that Lakoff and Johnson’s schemas play in popular discourse, it seeks to demonstrate that feminist rhetorical strategies may require forms of critique that surpass the limits of poststructuralist theory.
2. The Metaphor/Metonymy Binary: Theoretical Bases

From Lacanian psychoanalysis through Derridean deconstruction and beyond, poststructuralist language philosophers have criticized the universalizing propensity of metaphor, which is seen as oppressive, and valorized the contextualizing capacity of metonymy, which is seen as liberatory. This philosophical shift from metaphoric totalization to metonymic relativity stems from Freudian psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s appropriation of linguist Roman Jakobson’s paper “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances.” Originally delivered as a lecture in 1930, this work draws on Ferdinand de Saussure’s paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes in posing metaphor and metonymy as binary opposites that correspond to two types of cognitive impairment: the contiguity disorder and the similarity disorder. The first, an extreme case of metaphor, involves the incapacity of patients with certain kinds of brain injuries to contextualize subject matter. In this event, word order becomes confused as conjunctions, prepositions, articles, and other grammatical ties are dropped in favour of linguistic constructions that confer identity. According to Jakobson (1987 [1930]: 107), the contiguity disorder gives “rise to infantile one-sentence utterances and one-word sentences. Only a few longer, stereotyped, ready-made sentences manage to survive.” The second, an extreme case of metonymy, concerns the inability of patients with alternate sorts of brain lesions to conceive of a given topic apart from context. For example, such persons can produce the sentence “it rains” only if they observe the rain first-hand. In other instances of the similarity disorder,

metonymies [function] as projections from the line of a habitual context into the line of substitution and selection: a sign (fork) which usually occurs together with another sign (knife) may be used instead of this sign. Phrases like “knife and fork,” “table lamp,” “to smoke a pipe,” induced the metonymies fork, table, smoke; the relation between the use of an object (toast) and the means of its production underlies the metonymy eat for toaster. (Jakobson, 1987 [1930]:105)

Metonymy, as a form of aphasia, is thus associated both with the idea of reference (the rain as an index) and the notion of displacement (eat for toaster) in direct opposition to metaphoric abstraction and totalization.

Through Lacanian theory (Lacan 1998 [1949]: 179), the metonymic displacement of nouns in the speech acts of brain-injured patients gained the status of the infinite deferral of the real in the

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1 Saussure’s paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes refer in turn to association and proximity.
universal formation of subjectivity. Using Jakobson’s concept of metonymic deferral, Lacan postulated that a fundamental division in individual consciousness occurs when the subject first encounters his self-image in a mirror and perceives it, rather than his actual body, as the object of desire. This stage marks the beginning of the infant’s emergence from the Imaginary realm, wherein consciousness is inseparable from the maternal body (Freud’s edenic oceanic self) and his entry into the Phallic or Symbolic Order, wherein ego boundaries and linguistic competence are cultivated Oedipally in the name of the Father. Following the loss of symbiotic unity with the corporeal mother, the child’s identity is constituted by the desire for its irretrievable mother (a kind of paradise lost), which is forever postponed by the metonymic displacement (mirror-like reflections) of the Phallic domain. Lacan’s liberal application of Jakobsonian theory is evident here. Whereas Jakobson (110) notes that “in normal verbal behavior both processes are continually operative” and treats the extremes of metonymy in terms of a cognitive disturbance, marked by either mute gestures toward the real or temporary displacements of identity, Lacan (1966: 126) poses the similarity disorder alone as the essential means through which the “unity of signification” and the self “prove . . . never to be resolved into a pure indication of the real.” Subjectivity is thus formed through a never-ending series of metonymic deferrals (misidentification) as opposed to metaphoric coherence (identification).

This psycholinguistic paradigm has been a long-standing source of debate for feminist scholars. Luce Irigaray (1993 [1985]: 110), for instance, alleges that Lacan — despite his theoretical reliance on metonymy — blatantly privileges the metaphoric “quasi-solid” presence of phallic sexual identity over the metonymic “fluid” diffusion of female sexual experience. Jane Gallop (1985: 126), in contrast, contends that he ingenuously “finds prejudice operating in favor of [masculine] metaphor, and at the expense of [feminine] metonymy.” I believe that both readings expose a major drawback for feminist analyses of the poststructuralist model of cognition. As Gallop asserts, Lacan indeed emphasizes the role of metonymic reasoning in the development of subjectivity, arguing, in Kaja Silverman’s words (1983: 163), “that meaning emerges only through the temporal or diachronic unfolding of a signifying chain. Since it does not pre-exist the syntagmatic alignment of signifiers, the signified is that syntagmatic alignment.” However, as Luce Irigaray rightly suspects, this exclusive reliance on Saussure’s syntagmatic axis — more specifically, Jakobson’s similarity disorder — works to support rather than displace the idealized, metaphoric status of the Phallus. It is able to do so, as both scholars demonstrate in their own interpretations of Lacan, because the
metaphor/metonymy opposition evokes a culturally persistent myth about sexual division that overrides the poststructuralist ideal of, what Paul de Man (1979: 14) calls, the “purely relational metonymic contact.”

In its various forms, this myth equates the female with servile immanence and the male with masterly transcendence, foregrounding either her dependence on his inventiveness or her usefulness to his enterprise. It is suggested by Lacan’s assertion (1997 [1955]: 259) that metonymy, although it is the historically depreciated half of the linguistic couple, “is there from the beginning, and is what makes metaphor possible.” It is emphasized by Man’s claim (1979: 15) that “the assertion of the mastery of metaphor over metonymy owes its persuasive power to the use of metonymic structures.” It is revealed by Irigaray’s complaint (1993 [1985]: 109) that “a woman serves (only) as a projective map for the purpose of guaranteeing the totality of the system . . . as a geometric prop for evaluating the “all” of the extension of each of its ‘concepts’” — that is, as the metonymic frame of support by which a man metaphorically elevates himself. And it is fully dramatized by Gallop’s insightful elaboration (1985: 129) of the Lacanian paradigm:

Metonymy is servitude; the subject bows under the oppressive weight [of the anticipation of the real]. . . . Metaphor is a liberation from that weight. . . . Masculine metaphor may be frank (franc, franchi), may be free of the obstacles shackling femininity, but it is dependent on feminine metonymy to “[re]produce itself”.

Here, the seemingly novel idea that metonymy is characteristically feminine in fact parallels the clichéd notion that the female body is bound to reproduction. While feminine metonymy is — as Simone de Beauvoir notes in The Second Sex (1989 [1949]: 182; 144; 186) — “the very substance of man’s poetic work,” which humbly assists his creative genius, the female body is the figurative “sod” of man’s earthly toil, which “passively receives [his] seeds within its furrows.” To the extent that the Woman-Mother is presumably fated to reproduce masculine forms of identity without ever “existing in and for herself,” the enigma of her tangibility is easily wedded to the elusiveness of metonymic deferral. She “is necessary in so far as she remains an Idea into which man projects his own transcendence; but . . . she is inauspicious as an objective reality.” Not unlike the Freudian family romance, which renders the mother psychologically trivial by sentimentalizing her “instinctual,” nurturant connection to the (ideally male) child, these psycho-narratives make “feminine metonymy” rhetorically benign by valorizing its primary supportive relation to “masculine metaphor.”
Indeed, I am convinced that despite its effective collapse of the humanistic subject/object model of reality, poststructuralism has failed to challenge the occidental division between “feminine” nature (body) and “masculine” culture (mind). In his treatise on metaphor entitled “White Mythology” (1979), for instance, Jacques Derrida evokes the conspicuously gendered, Judeo-Christian myth of man’s fall from grace, which separates the origin of flesh from the flight to reason. Drawing on the Nietzschean claim (Derrida 1979: 15) that truths are “worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses,” Derrida maintains (1979: 8-9) that metaphors are the abstraction and effacement of carnal, “primitive meaning.” Such abstraction, like the orthodox doctrine of *via negativa,* functions by way of “negative form[s]” that “cancel definiteness and determinancy,” as exemplified by such terms as *ab-solute* and *in-tangible.* It is also reminiscent of the teleological myth of Eden, in which Man receives “the fruit of knowledge” through an act of sensual transgression that moves him “progressively” further from his original state of innocence. For the Jew or Christian, reconciliation with the Father is delayed by a divine sequence of historical events; for Derrida, reconnection with primal sensuality (female *jouissance?*) is deferred by a metaphysical series of linguistic erasures. While Derrida does not explicitly link the feminine with carnal origins, his eschatological narrative cannot help but suggest the connection. For within Western religious orthodoxy, it is Eve’s sinful appetite that separates man from Eden, forever figuring woman (Beauvoir 1989 [1949]: 179) “[as] the material representation of alterity.” As long as religion sustains the antiquated doctrine that (Lucas 1983: 8) “the senses submit to reason [as] woman to man”, metaphysics evokes the stereotype that rudimentary utterances and lofty abstractions are fundamentally “feminine” and “masculine” in turn.

If, as Derrida himself admits (Derrida 1970 [1966]: 253), the hierarchic culture/nature split, and by inference the ranked man/woman binary, is “congenital to philosophy,” then feminist scholars clearly require alternatives to such narrow analyses. Indeed, it strikes me as socially imperative that we resist strengthening the patriarchal myth (Beauvoir 1989 [1949]: 186) that woman “is inauspicious as an objective reality” with the Derridean manifesto (1989: 841) that “there is no outside-the-text.” At the same time, we cannot afford to dismiss out of hand the poststructuralist tenet that language shapes our understanding of just such “objective reality” or “truth.”

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2 *Via-negativa* – literally, “the way of the negative” – is a means of approaching the Absolute through psychological disillusionment. After all preconceptions about “reality” are stripped away, one faces God in the form of *Mystereum Tremendum.* Ultimate absence and ultimate presence are thus revealed to be one and the same.
poststructuralism is indeed aligned with most feminisms to the extent that it challenges the classical metaphysical doctrine of essentialism (Lakoff 1987: 161), which assumes that reality comprises discrete entities that can be categorized objectively according to their inherently fixed properties (e.g., by virtue of her natural immanence, woman must yield to the civilizing power of man.). Derrida (1970 [1966]: 249) argues, for instance, that the “transcendental signified” or metaphorization of “truth” results not from the work of absolutes but rather from the play of différance — that is, difference and the deferral of presence. Similarly, Lacan (1998 [1949]) contends that the preeminence of the Phallic signified is guaranteed not by self-contained plenitude but rather by the deferential movement of jouissance-laden signification. However, in the final analysis, poststructuralism is not compliant with these same feminisms insofar as its valorization of the metonymic displacement of identity relies on the same binary division, and plays on the same misogynistic entailments, as the Western philosophical tradition that it aims to critique. What is needed, I think, are theories that continue to challenge the essentialist assault on the female body without nostalgically relegating immanence to non-metaphoric (“feminine”) states of intellectual naïveté (Derrida), pre-Oedipal bliss (Lacan/Freud), or reproductive servitude (Gallop).

3. The Cognitive-Linguistic Alternative to Poststructuralist Language Philosophy

In an effort to disrupt the humanistic subject/object model of reality, poststructuralism extends the implications of Jakobson’s metaphoric and metonymic poles of aphasia by privileging the latter over the former. While this inversion may incidentally frustrate hegemonic discourse, I believe that any strategy premised on binary logic — as Michael Gasser perceptively notes (1990: 179) — risks assigning conceptual entities to categories in “all-or-none fashion,” reducing language to a state of “unhuman-like brittleness.” Indeed, as Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 37) similarly maintain, neither metaphors nor metonymies are “arbitrary occurrences, to be treated as isolated instances.” On the contrary, current advances in neuroscience support the view that language ordinarily functions in terms of a cognitive gestalt, which incorporates both metaphorical (totalizing) and metonymic (partitive) thought processes in the interests of either hegemony or contestation. Since the early 1980s, such “connectionism” has posed a major challenge to the rigidity of binary analyses in symbolic, or rule-based, models of language. It is my conviction that this approach offers a similar
protest to the uncompromising division between metaphor and metonymy found in the domain of poststructuralism. It does so, as Gasser explains (1990: 180), by dispensing with “discrete symbols and rules as such; the entities that a connectionist system uses to characterize the world are fluid patterns of activation across portions of a network.”

At first glance, this passage might seem compatible with poststructuralism insofar as it highlights “patterns of activation” and localized “portions of a network” to the apparent exclusion of agency and structure as a whole. But unlike its contemporary counterpart, cognitive linguistics is in fact organicist in outlook. Whereas the former (Derrida 1976: 18) critiques “organic discourse”, which was faulted for assuming a continuity between the signifier and the referent, the latter espouses the notion of gestalt cognition, which can be credited for examining the interdependent, experientially-based factors that motivate linguistic structure.

And whereas deconstructive strategies exploit the polarization of metaphor and metonymy as part of a strategy to subvert the masculine/feminine binary, connectionist systems wholly circumvent dualism through the imbrication of all forms of association and proximity. Although the contrasting terms of metaphor/metonymy and similarity/contiguity can be useful means of characterizing certain aspects of cognition, such binary categories do not supersede (Gasser 1990: 184) “the complex interactions of more primitive elements and processes.” Gasser explains (1990: 179-181) that all knowledge “is embodied in a network of simple processing units” linked by patterns of chemically induced neural firings, as illustrated in Figure 1.
These pathways become either stronger or weaker “in response to regularities in input patterns.” That is, the “unit at the source end of the connection” either activates or inhibits, in varying degrees, “the unit at the destination end of the connection,” indicating a weighted (or graded) response to that input, as diagrammed in Figure 2. By this account, concepts are distributed over numerous processing units, each of which is implicated in the typification of many more concepts.

4. The Cognitive Imbrication of Metonymy and Metaphor

Thus connectionism, unlike poststructuralism, is not premised on Derrida’s need for a “central executive” or transcendental signified that paradoxically allows and limits “freeplay” — that is, for a metaphoric center which is actually (Derrida 1970 [1966]: 249) “a series of [metonymic] substitutions of center for center.”3 Gasser (1990: 181) explains: “[entities] belong to connectionist categories [in] varying degrees, the representations continually evolve as the system learns, and concepts are free to blend in intricate ways.”4 For example (1990: 185),

it is not the case that something either is a LEG or is not a LEG; rather, things are more or less LEGS. There might be a set of units which would tend to be activated strongly when a leg is perceived or imagined, but it would not be possible to draw a clear boundary around this set of units, and each of these units would also participate in the representation of other concepts. Thus when (more-or-less) LEG is active, any number of other concepts will also be partially active.

By categorizing concepts broadly in terms of multiple membership and gradience rather than strictly according to discrete kinds of things, this system surpasses the logical requirement for an overarching presence/absence or center/freeplay binary. While center/peripheral relations and binary oppositions are important aspects of cognition, which may be seen in terms of basic-level

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3 In his foundational paper “Structure, Sign, and Play” (1970 [1966]: 249) Derrida argues that every discourse relies on a central premise or “transcendental signified” that paradoxically appears to stand both outside of the signifying system and at the center of the totality (e.g. God) but is in fact interchangeable and, hence, arbitrary. He maintains that such ongoing pretensions to centrality are conceptualized in terms of binary oppositions, in which one signified maintains a focal, privileged position while its relative term retains a marginal, inferior status. For example, “black” may be defined solely in terms of what “white” is not, or “woman” may be defined strictly in terms of what “man” is not.

4 The notion that “concepts are free to blend in intricate ways” should not suggest that they blend arbitrarily. As Lakoff (1987: 154) notes in Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, “Cognitive models are embodied, either directly or indirectly by way of systematic links to embodied concepts. A concept is embodied when its content or other properties are motivated by bodily or social experience. This does not necessarily mean that the concept is predictable from the experience, but rather that it makes sense that it has the content (or other properties) that it has, given the nature of the corresponding experience. Embodiment thus provides a nonarbitrary link between cognition and experience.”
categories, as Brent Galloway (2000) observes, they are not representative of the system as a whole. Neither are binaries, as generalizations, so exclusively originative as to arise expressly in the cognitive network. Indeed, if the term LEG cannot be firmly located in the mind, then neither can its seeming opposite (ARM or LEGLESS?). Moreover, certain pairs of terms, such as FATHER and MOTHER, may be viewed as absolutely antonymic by some English speakers but only conditionally or marginally oppositional by others.

Thus, while I am convinced of Derrida’s proposition (1970 [1966]: 249) that Western philosophical discourse revolves around binary oppositions, I am nevertheless skeptical of his assertion (250) that “we have no language — no syntax and no lexicon” that functions differently from this modus operandi. Of course, if one positions the polar scheme as the central organizing principle of linguistic performance, then this statement is truistic and unarguable: undoubtedly, we have no syntax and lexicon which is alien to thought itself. But if we conceive of binaries as reductions of complex portions of a vast network of experientially-based processes, rather than pivotal bases in their own right, then Derrida’s point with respect to general language use is rendered moot. For although the binary model represents one legitimate way of categorizing knowledge within the cognitive gestalt, it is not the only means available to the human mind.

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5 Basic-level categories are generalizations that are produced through the sum of (Lakoff 1987: 13) “gestalt perception, image formation, motor movement, knowledge organization, ease of cognitive processing (learning, recognition, memory, etc.), and ease of linguistic expression.” The process of creating basic-level categories is deemed essential to normal cognitive functioning. However, the effects of this process should not be conflated with cognition as a whole. Even though infants are hard-wired with perceptual and generalizing abilities, they may nevertheless produce different basic-level categories. As Lakoff (1987: 50) explains, “the level of categorization is not independent of who is doing the categorizing and on what basis. Though the same principles may determine the basic level, the circumstances under which those principles are employed determine what system of categories results.”

6 Lakoff (1987: 26) notes that “knowledge at the basic level is mainly organized around part-whole divisions” — that is, synecdochic mappings, which are also informed by image-schematic structures.

7 Gasser (1990: 182) elaborates, “As connectionist systems learn about specific patterns, they are also building the knowledge that will allow them to handle similar patterns. That is, they are making generalizations, possibly at many different levels of abstraction. Unlike the rules of traditional models, however, these generalizations do not appear explicitly in the network. Rather, they arise as needed during processing” [my italics].

8 Linguist D. A. Cruse (1986: 197-98) notes: “In spite of the robustness of the ordinary speaker’s intuitions concerning opposites, the overall class is not a well-defined one, and its adequate characterization is far from easy. One can distinguish, however, central, or prototypical, instances, judged by informants to be good examples of the category: good:bad, large:small, true:false, top:bottom, etc.; and more or less peripheral examples, judged as less good, or about whose status as opposites there is not a perfect consensus, such as command:obey, mother:father, town:country, clergy: laity, etc. (Even tea:coffee and gas:electricity are felt by some speakers to have a degree of oppositeness, but only in situations where they represent a two-way choice.)
If the whole of cognition is not structured around logical oppositions, as cognitive linguistics suggests, then Jakobson’s metaphoric and metonymic disturbances should not be seen as the isolable linchpins of functional language usage but rather as the isolated outcomes of aphasia. In confutation of binary analyses in general, Lakoff (1987: 68) draws on the implications of the connectionist system to propose that knowledge is organized not only by metaphoric and metonymic “mappings” but also by “propositional frames” and “image-schematic structure.” The combination of these four “structuring principles,” which he calls idealized cognitive models or ICMs, compose mini-gestalts that produce myriad categorical linguistic effects. Thus, tropical statements accrue from the combination of pre-existent structural models. Although certain processes within these mini-gestalts or ICMs are more-or-less distinguishable from others — that is, they have been treated categorically — ICMs in fact incorporate the complex interaction of frames, images, metonymic mappings, and metaphoric mappings; no structuring principle functions in isolation. By the standards of this organicist view, then, there exists neither (Man 1979: 14) a “purely relational metonymic contact” nor a purely totalizing metaphoric constituent (illusory or otherwise). Rather, metonymic and metaphoric “poles” can be seen as both contributors to and by-products of (Lakoff 1987: xiv) “ecological structure”. To pose instances of figurative language as linguistic bases in the service of either the liberation or totalization of a hypothetical “locus” confuses the identification of the (apparent) parts with the interpretation of the whole.

Because association and relationality are fundamentally imbricated in the gestalt model of cognition, metonymies and metaphors are by the same token readily conjoined in the discursive totalization of identity. Thus, while poststructuralist strategies generally focus only on the role of metaphor in the production of truth-claims, organicist theories such as Lakoffian experientialism also highlight the contribution of metonymy to the development of (potentially oppressive) rhetorical strategies. Indeed, according to Lakoff (1987: 80),

Social stereotypes are cases of metonymy — where a subcategory has a socially recognized status as standing for the category [or ICM] as a whole, usually for the purpose of making quick judgments about people. [For example], the house-wife mother subcategory, though unnamed, exists. . . . In our culture . . . [it] stands for the whole category in defining cultural expectations of mothers.

9 Other subcategories of mothers (Lakoff 1987: 79-83) include “working mothers”, “unwed mothers”, “birth mothers”, “biological mothers”, “stepmothers”, “surrogate mothers”, “foster mothers”, and “adoptive mothers.”
In other words, identity can be metonymically totalized by reducing a complex whole to one of its choice aspects.\(^\text{10}\) Even though such cases of metonymy do rely on (Man 1979: 15) “a syntagmatic structure based on contingent association,” as Jakobson, Lacan, Man, and poststructuralist theorists have emphasized, they clearly do not avoid (14) “the inference of identity and totality that is constitutive of metaphor.”

5. Image-Schemas/ Rhetorical Schemes in Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Discourse

Social rhetoric — that is, the motivated use of language — is not simply either metaphoric or metonymic, as poststructuralism suggests. Indeed, the Lakoffian image-schema the container and the thing contained, along with other schemas, is used in Pro-Life and Pro-Choice discourses to set the stage for either fetal personification and maternal objectification or fetal disfranchisement and maternal autonomy. In other words, there is always a risk that the “thing contained” (the fetus) will synecdochly come to stand for “the container” (the prepartum body). By examining how each interest group uses experientially-based schemas to support specific social narratives of the maternal body, this analysis supports the “connectionist” view that language is at once cognitively deep-seated and rhetorically malleable.

In *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* (1987: 271), Lakoff emphasizes the kinesthetic bases of image schemas:

> [Kinesthetic experience] is structured in a significant way prior to, and independent of, any concepts. Existing concepts may impose further structuring on what we experience, but basic experiential structures are present regardless of any such imposition of concepts. . . . Take, for example, a CONTAINER schema — a schema consisting of a boundary distinguishing an interior from an exterior. The CONTAINER schema defines the most basic distinction between IN and OUT. We understand our own bodies as containers — perhaps the most basic things we do are ingest and excrete, take air into our lungs and breathe it out.

\(^\text{10}\) Other culturally specific (and subculturally competing) cases of metonymy, which likewise function as (Rosch 1977: 14) “anchoring points of perception” include (Lakoff 1987: 70-91): *ideals* — highly desirable but unattainable categorical instances; *paragons* — positive or negative epitomes; *salient examples* — probability judgements based on well-publicized or familiar instances; *typical examples* — bases for unconscious or automatic inferences in reasoning; *submodels* — reference points (standards) for the purpose of approximating degrees, variations, weights or measurements; and *generators* — morphological categories that produce new morphemes.
Image-schemas stem not only from “preconceptual” (prelinguistic) experiences but also from our capacity to transform such primal sensations into abstract concepts through the use of propositional frames, metaphoric mappings, and metonymic mappings. In other words, we produce image schemas when we superimpose logical constraints and categorical parameters onto the ongoing dynamic of spatial (physiological) relations. Admittedly, when we name our bodily experiences, we do so through discourse. But because experiences interact with and shape discourse, these representations of the body are especially pertinent to the examination of discursive constructions.

The examination, below, focuses on four of Lakoff and Johnson’s image-schematic structures: the container schema; the part-whole schema, the centre-periphery schema; and the link schema.  

5.1 The Container Schema

The container schema is simply (1999: 31-32) “a bounded region in space,” as Lakoff and Johnson note in Philosophy in the Flesh. It is a way of structuring experience according to the visually abstract notions of an inside, a boundary, and an outside. These structural elements may be extended to build more precise imagery as needed; “the boundary can be made larger, smaller, or distorted” without corrupting the schema as a whole.

5.2 The Part-Whole Schema

I discern two kinds of part-whole schemas (Lakoff 1987: 273ff): one constitutes the configuration of elements into a complete topography (e.g., the segmentation of the human form into limbs and facial features); the other involves the arrangement of parts within a whole figure (e.g., the containment of discrete organs and muscles within the human body). The latter, which seems most relevant to my analysis of the maternal paradigm, is thus a combination of the container schema and the part-whole schema. This “part-whole container schema” unites with propositional reasoning to produce classical syllogisms and other spatially-based rhetorical claims.

11 Missing from my analyses are the up-down, front-back, linear order, and source-path-goal schemas.
For instance, it undergirds the Aristotelian metaphor that (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 380) “Categories Are Containers for their members” and that “Predication Is Containment,” leading to the deduction that If Container A is inside Container B, and Entity C is inside Container A, then Entity C is inside Container B, as per Fig 4. The imposition of logical constraints onto spatial relations (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 20) disguises the gradient, fuzzy, and prototypical features of category structure and, in this case, produces hierarchies “with some category-containers inside of other category-containers,” like Russian nesting dolls. For example, the following Pro-life statement (“America” 1996: 41) hierarchicalizes the nuclear family model, which is prefigured as a part-whole container schema, and thus conceals the existence of identity-gradience and social multiformity:

The language of [abortion] “rights” puts the dilemma of an unwanted pregnancy into a legal-adversarial context, pitting mother against child, and even father against mother. But as the common experience of humanity — and, increasingly, the findings of science — demonstrates, what hurts one party in this most intimate of human relationships hurts both parties. The America we seek is an America in which both mother and child are the subjects of our concern and our community’s protection.

Here, the writer uses spatially-based propositional reasoning to identify and rank the members of the paternalistic “community” (according to the roles of father, mother, and child, exclusively), thus naturalizing the patriarchal family unit. He notes that the prospective mother and child are the joint focus of the collective’s “concern” and “protection”; in other words, they are the most vulnerable and, hence, dependent parts of the social whole. By excluding the father from the ranks of the needy, and situating him in a comparably invulnerable and independent position, the writer implies that he is not an immanent member of the community but rather a transcendent synecdoche for the larger, protective body (Figure 5).

In addition, the writer uses the part-whole container schema to configure the maternal/fetal bond as both “the most intimate of all relationships” and, through an implied hierarchical syllogism — *if the patriarchal community contains the mother, and the mother contains the fetus, then the fetus is a*

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12 In *Philosophy in the Flesh*, Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 380) use the following quotation from Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* (24b) to demonstrate the link between classical syllogisms and, what they call, container logic: “That one term should be included in another, as in a whole, is the same as for the other to be predicated of all of the first. Aristotle thus equates predication with 'inclusion' in a category”.

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member of the community — to identify the “mother” and the “child” as distinct parties. Thus, both sexual hierarchy and fetal agency are rationalized, in part, on the basis of the metonymic ideal of paternalism — that is, the seemingly desirable but unattainable categorical instance (order) of paternity — in which masculine authorities protectively embower the “weakest” members of society. And if mother and child are integral parts of the benevolent (paternalistic) community, then any imperfection in the maternal/fetal bond corrupts the (“America” 1996: 40) “civic virtue” of that entire social body. For the part-whole container schema, in conjunction with propositional reasoning, can be extended to produce a further postulate (Lakoff 1987: 273): “if the PARTS are destroyed, then the WHOLE is destroyed” (as per Fig. 6). Thus, the writer deduces that abortion not only hurts both fetus and mother but also (“America” 1996: 41) “encourage[s] widespread male irresponsibility and predatory male sexual behavior,” “poison[s] relationships between women and men,” “contributes to the marginalization of fatherhood,” and signals “the breakdown of American family life,” all of which provide a “prescription for democratic decay.” Likewise, in “The Pro-Life Push,” Cal Thomas (1996: 59) reasons that abortion should not be addressed as a single issue but “as a symptom and cause of a social disorder, a sign of a frayed and decaying cultural context” And in the “Mass at the Trans World Dome,” Pope John Paul II (1999: 3) denounces abortion by declaring “As the family goes, so goes the nation!” Typical of this schema, then, is not only the idea that the parts are contiguous, as Lakoff observes (1987: 273), but also that they are contagious. The writer from “The America We Seek” takes this association for granted when he argues that (“America” 1996: 42) “[t]he abortion license has a perverse Midas quality — it corrupts whatever it touches” As previously discussed, contiguity has, since Jakobsonian theory, been seen as the definitive feature of metonymy. And, in turn, it has been valorized by poststructuralist language philosophers for its apparent capacity to disrupt, through the infinite generation of value-free signs, the metaphoric totalization of identity. But here, the assumption of unbridled contiguity, as contagion, obviously contributes to the production of truth claims.

Moreover, the chivalric imperative of paternalism, coupled with this part-whole container logic, rationalizes the community’s protection of fetal life at the expense of maternal autonomy. For the primordial (innocent) fetus stands for social vulnerability in a way that the adult (worldly) female
cannot. The father is thus justified in defending the weaker fetus against the stronger mother. As the
writer in “The America We Seek” bemoans (41), “The language of [abortion] “rights” . . . pit[s]
mother against child, and even father against mother (my italics).” In other words, Pro-Choice
abortion rhetoric compels the presumably noble paterfamilias to protect the fetus by opposing (or
perhaps “civilizing,” by virtue of Lacan’s Name-of-the-Father and Freud’s Oedipal rubric) the
morally deficient mother — a seemingly regrettable stance within the idyllic paternalistic order, as
the word “even” suggests. (Note that this schema inhibits the conceptualization of a direct,
aversative relationship between the father and the fetus). Here, the familial “nesting doll”
paradigm helps rationalize the inequitable treatment of the mother. The fetus becomes central; the
father becomes the all-encompassing God-like container; and the mother becomes at once the
earthly intermediary (the virgin Mary) and the earthy medium (the sexually reproductive clay or
vessel).

And because the father is conflated, in the final instance, with the wholesome, benevolent (phallic)
community, the mother stands alone for the discontented, self-interested (lacking) member. Thus
(“America” 1996: 41), women who seek abortions indulge in false “autonomy logic” which
“threatens to give us an America in which the only actors of consequence are the [female]
individual and the state; no other community, including the community of husband and wife, or the
community of parents and children, will have effective constitutional standing.”

Marked by the feeble and desperate claim that the nuclear family unit in fact constitutes a
community, this passage admits anxiety over the development of a governing body, as per Fig. 7,
that may contain, constrict, and thereby “castrate” traditional
Euroamerican paternal authority (feminism has, after all, made in-roads).

At the same time, Pro-life literature (Wolfe 1996: 60-61) ironically
chastises “unwed [welfare] mothers” for self-indulgently extorting money
from the state — “give me more money or I’ll get an abortion” —
thereby “incapacitat[ing] the government from changing incentive
structures that have had a profound effect of undermining family
formation and stability.” In this case, the fear of the actual mother who
bypasses husbandly control or influence by appealing to a larger,
reformed body is projected onto the dispossessed woman. Her marginal
(uncontained/unrestrained) social status — that is, her remove from economic dependence on a
male individual — translates ludicrously into the freedom and power to disrupt the whole order of patriarchy and weaken the apparent benefits of paternalism (e.g., “stability” and moral integrity).

In short, the functioning of the most active, potentially rebellious “part” of the system (the mother) is restricted for the benefit of the ideally static “whole” (the father/community). This sacrificial model is built upon the combined effects of primitive imagery, propositional reasoning, and metonymic and metaphoric mappings. Hierarchical logic is superimposed onto the part-whole container schema, with the father standing for the ultimate “protective” body. He thus becomes the representative synecdoche, or “essence” (see Burke 1966: 371), of society.

In contrast, Pro-Choice advocates generally use the part-whole container schema to configure the mother as a whole social agent apart from patriarchal containment and rule (Fig. 8). Consider the following (McKinley 2001: 5):

If a fetus comes to term and is born, it is because the mother chooses to forgo her own rights and her own bodily security in order to allow that future person to gestate inside her body. If the mother chooses to exercise control over her own body and to protect herself from the potential dangers of child-bearing, then she has the full right to terminate the pregnancy. . . You cannot have two entities with equal rights occupying one [physical] body. One will automatically have veto power over the other . . . In the case of a pregnant woman, giving a “right to life” to the potential person in the womb automatically cancels out the mother’s right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.

In this case, the woman retains her civil rights through bodily integrity. Moreover, the state — as an overarching container — is not ideally paternalistic; the fetus alone is subordinate.

5.3 The Center-Periphery Schema

At times, Pro-Life writers combine the part-whole container schema with the center-periphery schema, which is likewise kinesthetically based (Lakoff 1987:274):

We experience our bodies as having centers (the trunk and internal organs) and peripheries (fingers, toes, hair). . . . The centers are viewed as more important than the peripheries in two ways: injuries to the central parts are more serious (i.e., not mendable and often life threatening) than injuries to the peripheral parts. Similarly, the center defines the identity of the individual in a way that the peripheral parts do not.
Insofar as the mother is positioned within the patriarchal social body, she may be valorized as central to its functioning (Fig. 9), just as the heart — however subordinate to the brain — is acknowledged as essential to human survival. This schema (Lakoff 1987: 275), which is marked by the logic that “[t]he periphery depends on the center, but not vice versa,” may thus be used to downplay the power and privilege of the father, rendering him modestly peripheral (“behind every great man is a woman”) without undermining his proud transcendence (“every man is king in his own castle”).

But to contain the reliably “good” supportive mother within the paternalistic community also means, as noted earlier, to enclose the potentially “bad” self-interested maternal agent within that same regime. Resultant fears of the cannibalizing feminist whore and the parasitic “welfare mom” — hallmarks of a degenerate, pestilential social core — are assuaged by Pro-Life advocates such as philosopher Anne M. Maloney (1996: 32; 40), who argues that all women are biologically and psychologically “predisposed to care,” for “As . . . preservers of life at its most vulnerable, women have historically been the ones to remind the world of the value of life and the cruel futility of all forms of violence.” Likewise, Feminists for Life (“Susan B. Anthony” 2000: 1; 6) reassuringly declares that “feminism has never been about destroying the fabric of human relationships” and that “women’s rights . . . do not come at the expense of others, especially [their] own children.” Straight out of the annals of nineteenth-century American feminism, such rhetoric extols the (feminine) virtues of passivity and selflessness. The mother may be the locus of life but, unlike the Derridean transcendental signified, she is central to, rather than the center of, an apparent totality. In contrast to the ideals of Father/Culture/God, her value lies not in the illusion of self-containment but rather in her commitment to relatedness. This neo-Victorian paradigm, undergirded by the container and center-periphery schemas, figures the Woman-mother as a lumpen main who is naturally bound to feed “her” distinctive (and sometimes distinguished) tributary branches (Fig. 10).

In this case, Woman is dehumanized not because Maloney and Feminists for Life have privileged the metaphoric (Irigaray 1993: 110) “quasi-solid” presence of phallic identity over the metonymic “fluid” diffusion of female experience, as Irigaray accuses Lacan.
On the contrary, it is the very presumption of a fluid, female essence, marked by mammillarity and amniotic flow, and compliance to any and every social channel, that transfigures women into bountiful earth-mothers, ever-present nurturers, the muses of men, and Angels in the House. Here, the mother, who is central to patriarchal relations, is a synecdoche for the female sex. The centrality of this synecdoche works to define all women on the basis of their reproductive function; it is thus assumed that they are “predisposed” to nurture the social peripheries of family, community, and world.

5.4 The Link Schema

The link schema draws an imaginary line between two entities in space, which Lakoff (1987: 274) describes experientially, as follows:

Our first link is the umbilical cord. Throughout infancy and early childhood, we hold onto our parents and other things, either to secure our location or theirs. To secure the location of two things relative to one another, we use such things as string, rope, or other means of connection.

Pro-Choice advocates are inclined to use this schema asymmetrically, according to the logic that (Lakoff 1987: 274) “If A is linked to B, then A is constrained by, and dependent upon, B.” On this basis, they draw distinctions between full persons and “potential persons” — that is, between members of the moral community and those of the human species. Thus, both prospective mother and child may be seen as distinct entities; however, only the adult female will be metaphorized as a social agent with civil rights (Fig. 11).

In contrast, Pro-Life advocates tend to conceptualize this schema symmetrically (Fig. 12) — “[i]f A is linked to B, then B is linked to A” (274). Through propositional elaboration — if A is linked to B, then A is constrained by and dependent upon B; and if B is linked to A, then B is constrained by and dependent upon A — they evaluate the “mother” and “child” relationship in terms of reciprocal experience and mutual dependence. In other words, they reason that if the mother is essential to the survival of the fetus, then the fetus is necessary to the health and well-being of the mother. The assumption of joint vulnerability rests on the observation of physical proximity, which is then conflated with emotional closeness: (“America” 1996: 41) “what hurts one party in this most intimate of human relationships
[pregnancy] hurts both parties.” Subsequently, Pro-Life writers warn not only of the possible physical consequences of abortion, such as infection, perforation of the uterus, haemorrhaging, sterility, and death (however remote) but also of the “likely” psychological repercussions, which include depression, long-term grief, sexual dysfunction, self-reproach, anger, repressed memories, flashbacks, anxiety, paranoia, schizophrenic reactions, psychotic breaks, and suicidal ideas. Symmetrizing the link schema affords Pro-Life groups the rhetorical advantage of presenting themselves as either feminist or pro-women on the basis that caring for fetuses is tantamount to caring for prospective mothers. As Ohio Right to Life (“Post-Abortion” 2000: 3) notes:

Immediately after an abortion, many women report a feeling of relief . . . which is all abortionists want you to hear. What you won’t hear of is the guilt and depression that frequently follows. A national poll found that at least 56% of women experience a sense of guilt over their decision . . . It goes without saying that we want to save babies from abortion. Let it be said we’re helping save the mothers too.

The current tendency among Pro-Life activists to refer to the patients of clinical abortions (aborters) as “Aborted Women” reveals the rhetorical extremes, and perhaps the limits of, such symmetrization. Popularized by the 1987 publication of David Reardon’s Aborted Women, Silent No More, this expression now frequently appears in Pro-Life headlines. For example, Tuscarawas County Right to Life piteously declares that Aborted Women are “the second victim[s]” of the abortion industry while Priests for Life absurdly “Invites Aborted Women to Return to Catholic Church.” The idea that an aborted fetus amounts to an aborted woman entails, at the very least, a false equivalency between bonafide physical expulsion and apparent psychological loss. In addition, it suggests an illusive symmetry between women and mothers (once again, the mother functions as a synecdoche for the female sex). If the Pro-Choice writers were to remain consistent with the symmetrical link schema, they would deduce: if the fetus, once severed from the maternal body, is no longer a fetus, then the mother, once separated from the fetal body, is no longer a mother. But what they in fact ascertain is: if the severed fetus is no longer a fetus, then the separated mother is no longer a woman — that is, the abortion industry interferes with her apparent biological destiny. Here, the link schema is symmetrized through propositional logic; the mother is used to stand for womanhood; and the woman is then metaphorically “aborted.”

More aggressive Pro-Life campaigns will concede an asymmetry in the maternal-fetal relationship, but will interpret it as an unnatural balance of power — e.g., undue authority is granted to the prospective mother through perverse abortion laws. In this case, pregnancy is seen as a potentially
inhumane form of containment (and the maternal agent is thus implicated as a potentially cruel guardian); fetuses are often compared to either the scapegoats of WWII who were confined to concentration camps, only to be tortured and murdered, or to the victims of American slavery (‘‘Abortion: Slavery’’ 2001: 2), whose fates were cruelly tethered to the financial interests of the nation:

[Ours is] a culture that inappropriately acts with the belief that mothers and children cannot co-exist; thus, it is a culture that pits mothers against their own children. . . . [T]he truth of the injustice of the whole situation is revealed vividly through a parallel to slavery. The culture that allowed for slavery did not value human life. Humans were enslaved and tortured so that their tormentors could reap the benefits of their labor and pain. . . . [T]he mentality that allows for each is the same. Just like abortion terminates the natural relationship between mother and child, slavery terminated the natural relationship of brotherhood and sisterhood between human beings. In both situations, the victimizer damages or destroys the victim so that he or she may live better.

Here, the reader faces a dichotomy: either the prospective mother is linked symmetrically (or sororally, as the ‘‘brotherhood-sisterhood’’ analogy suggests) to the fetus or she is ‘‘pitted’’ against it. Whereas the symmetrical relation is inherently ‘‘natural’’ and good, the asymmetrical one is necessarily artificial (forced) and abusive (Fig. 13).

From a Pro-Choice perspective, this binary is false insofar as it masks not only the qualitative differences between intrauterine beings and moral persons but also the gradient features of social relations, which are commonly (and not always barbarously) disproportionate. For example, in Euro-American culture, adults are allowed more autonomy than children; teachers are granted more institutional power than students, law-abiding citizens are entitled to more civil rights than criminals; specialists are allotted more privileges, within their areas of expertise, than lay-people. Pro-Choice advocates argue that although slavery and the holocaust were marked by unequal and unjust relations, not all asymmetrical relations are unjustified.
6. Closing Remarks

This paper has aimed to retrieve the concept of organicism — as exemplified by the cognitive linguistics of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson — in response to its persistent rejection by poststructuralism, which favours a dualistic approach to language. The problem, in my view, is not that poststructuralism has given too much credence to the disempowering effects of binary thinking but that it has placed too much faith in the mastery of the binary structure itself. Content with either subverting hierarchical oppositions or “collapsing” their boundaries, poststructuralists risk confining the complexity of lived relations, and the imaginative possibilities of those relations for the future, to the austerities of logic.

My attempt to reassess organicism has been motivated by my conviction that feminism, in particular, needs to move beyond the narrow confines of binary logic, its inversions and disintegrations. In an effort to reveal the inadequacy of poststructuralist strategies to feminist concerns, I have focused on representations of the pre-partum body. In so doing, I have challenged one of the main organizing principles of poststructuralism – that is, the apparent division between “masculine” metaphor and “feminine” metonymy.

Cognitive linguistics, through its integrative vision, surpasses the limits of poststructuralism, which is based on hierarchical binaries. In contrast, the connectionism of Lakoff, Johnson, and Gasser does not begin with the premise of a/b (e.g. male over female) and end with either the inversion of b/a, or its collapse (of masculine autonomous metaphor into feminine relational metonymy) in the hopes of liberating the contingencies, contingencies, deferrals, and diversities of Derridean “freeplay.” On the contrary, it begins with a pluralistic vision, such as a-b + a-c + a-d + b-c + b-d + d-a, etc. (or whatever the scope of a given study allows). Thus, unlike poststructuralism, it considers various uses of metonymy (and its subcategory, synecdoche), degrees of gradience, the influence of conceptual frames, and – especially pertinent to the historical treatment of the female as a reproductive “vessel” – the impact of image-schemas to cognition and rhetorical contrivance.

Indeed, the flexibility of language is clearly evidenced by the myriad ways that image-schemas — along with metaphoric mappings, and metonymic mappings — contribute to the production of meaning. The Woman-Mother may be conceptualized as either a container or a “thing contained,” whole or part, center or periphery, or as an integral link, and still be denied autonomy. For, despite
poststructuralist assumptions to the contrary, she is not disempowered by any binary structure or logical basis in and of itself: neither metaphor nor metonymy, similarity nor contiguity, phallic plenitude nor perceived lack. Rather, her oppression involves the socially sanctioned — and sometimes illogical — motivated use of the embodied linguistic gestalt.

By treating metaphor and metonymy as fundamentally conjoined, cognitive linguistics curtails the perpetuation of sexually divisive binaries and myths that either degrade or pedestalize the female on the basis of her apparent reproductive role (e.g., the poststructuralist conflation of metonymy with “feminine servitude” and metaphor with “masculine mastery”). For although metonymies and metaphors may be gendered, Lakoffian experientialism suggests that our cognitive framework is not. If the Phallus is not positioned as the central metaphor of conceptualization but is located as a figurative effect of (Lakoff 1987: xiv) “ecological structure,” then a broader space is opened up to consider representations of the female body in terms of human experience, rhetorical motivation, and social struggle.

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