‘Thinking More’ as a Function of Metaphors in Philosophy

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Abstract

Philosophy makes us think – this is certainly not a new finding. Also, many readers are familiar with Kant’s claim that in artworks, representations of the imagination – among which are metaphors - force our minds to ‘think more’. In this article, I borrow Kant’s ‘thinking more’ notion which he confines to the realm of art, and argue that metaphors in philosophy sometimes force our minds to ‘think more’ than they would without these metaphors. However, the application of this notion to the realm of philosophy will not correspond exactly to the Kantian ‘prompt to thought’, for reasons that have to do with the nature and purpose of philosophy as this article attempts to demonstrate.

1. Introduction

In 1579, Sir Philip Sidney ‘defended’ poetry by his infamous claim: “Now for the poet, he nothing affirms, and therefore never lieth” (Sidney 2001: 348). Four centuries later, Jacques Derrida inferred the following from the Aristotelian theory of metaphor: “What is proper to man is doubtless the capacity to make metaphors, but in order to mean some thing, and only one. In this sense, the philosopher, who ever has but one thing to say, is the man of man.” (Derrida 1982: 248). Doubtless, Derrida is unhappy with the whole notion of philosophical affirmation, as he is with considering metaphors as ‘mere’ tools for expressing philosophical ideas.

It may be understandable why poets should be apologized for on the basis that they do not affirm or say one particular thing. But it remains rather perplexing why philosophers, who have always proudly attempted to make truth-claims, should be criticized – by Derrida for example - for trying to say one thing at a
time, and for not using metaphors in a ‘free’, ‘uncontrolled’ manner. For even if a philosopher is criticized for an alleged ‘uncontrollable’ use of metaphors (as Paul de Man has claimed for Kant), this does not cancel the fact that Kant does indeed intend to communicate specific thoughts whether in abstract or metaphorical formulas. Metaphors in philosophy, even after the attempts of its rhetoricization and poeticization by deconstructionists, do seem to say one particular thing at a time. When Derrida uses ‘White Mythology’ as a metaphor for ‘colorless’ Metaphysics, he does not want ‘white’ to mean ‘pure’ or ‘innocent’ or any other meanings that ‘white’, as a metaphor, would suggest outside the context of his text (Derrida: 213). In other words, his metaphor tries to express one, or at least some specific, controllable meaning(s). Even in the texts of Nietzsche, the perspectivist and outspoken apologist for metaphors against concepts, the use of ‘less colorful concepts’ and ‘worn coins which have lost their stamp and become metal’ (Nietzsche 2001:878-879)— hopes to express and even affirm a particular idea through these metaphors. The vast majority of philosophers spell out what they mean by their metaphors and analogies, making sure that these devices are not interpreted ‘wrongly’, although their aspiration to clarity can sometimes fail. This has perhaps saved philosophy from losing its distinction from poetry and art, even after the tempest of Deconstruction and its attempts to eliminate all borders between these discourses.

It is not impossible, however, to maintain such a distinction while, at the same time, observing the many similarities between philosophy and poetry concerning the function of metaphors in these texts. The similarities include the theories that revolve around the nature and function of philosophy or of art. In other words, the claims that some theorists make for art may at times apply to philosophy, and vice versa. The aim of this article is to demonstrate how Kant’s ‘thinking more’ claim which appears in his discussion of art, can be used to explore one possible, somewhat similar function of philosophical metaphors. The choice of Kant is in no way imposed. Rather, his ‘thinking more’ idea seems to impose itself on most contemporary discussions of metaphor, one of the most well-known examples being Paul Ricoeur’s extensive discussion and expansion of the same idea in his The Rule of Metaphor. Moreover, a more recent book entitled Metaphor and Continental Philosophy, further emphasizes the significance of this particular
Kantian idea and its usefulness for - or even its inescapability in – any attempt to explore the function of mundane, poetic or philosophical metaphors.

As a method for exploring the possibility of applying Kant’s claim on art to philosophy, I chose to:

- First: discuss this claim in its original context; i.e. confined to the realm of ‘aesthetic ideas’;
- Second: highlight Ricoeur’s interpretation of what Kant may have meant by ‘thinking more’ and ‘aesthetic ideas’;
- Third: try to apply both Kant’s and Ricoeur’s claims to two works of art: one is a recurring figure in Dali’s works, the other is a poem by Baudelaire, both of which seem to share similar ‘rational ideas’;
- Fourth: decontextualize Kant’s ‘thinking more’ and naturalize it in the context of philosophy to test its validity through examples, before making clearer claims as to how philosophy can make us ‘think more’ in ways that are similar to art in parts, and different in others.

Although the focus of this article is philosophical metaphors, I found it important to discuss examples of artistic metaphors in Section 2 of this article before discussing examples of philosophical metaphors in Section 3. The choice of examples does not follow an historical order but is still not arbitrary, for it depends on the usefulness of each example in illustrating and in examining the validity of the corresponding argument. In section 2, I apply Kant’s idea to Dali then to Baudelaire to observe the similarities and differences between the Kantian ‘prompt to thought’ in two artworks (that may be considered metaphors), only one of which, i.e. poetry, share with philosophy the medium of language. Yet since philosophy, for Kant, does not involve an aesthetic indeterminacy of concepts as do poetry and art in general, the comparison between painting and poetry, and between art and philosophy in terms of the cognitive function of metaphor is indispensable, I think, for making specific, not-too-general claims as to how philosophical metaphors may help us ‘think more’ in a near-Kantian sense.

Philosophy is a space for abstract concepts and propositions, but this paper shows how Kant’s _artistic_ ‘prompt to thought’, caused by representations of the
imagination, can be expanded to embrace this philosophical space. This space contains:

1. dead metaphors which are the roots of some supersensible concepts;
2. living metaphors which provide new conceptualizations of these concepts;
3. and metaphors which are part of extended analogies and allegories that may support the persuasiveness of an argument.

However, all three types can contain truth-claims: the ‘container’ dead metaphor of the mind involves as much a proposition as Freud’s living ‘iceberg’ metaphor of the mind and Plato’s allegory of the cave. The article shows how these three types can force us to ‘think more’ in the following sense: in examining 1. the identity of the concepts and 2. validity of the propositions which metaphors illustrate.

It is worth noting that Kant, in The Critique of Judgement, Part I: Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, briefly refers to metaphors in philosophy when he discusses symbolic hypotyposes. He refers to words such as ground (support, basis) and flow (instead of follow), noting that there are ‘countless others’, but adding that this Critique “is not the place” to dwell upon “such indirect presentations modeled upon an analogy” (Kant 1978: 223). Thus Kant’s ‘thinking more’ in its original context; i.e. the aesthetic part of the third Critique; does not include neither ‘dead’ not ‘living’ philosophical metaphors, but only artistic ones. The next section discusses this function in its original context, and the section to follow explains how it can be expanded to embrace the realm of philosophical discourse.

2. ‘Thinking More’ in its original context: aesthetic ideas

The ‘thinking more’ notion appears in an infamous part of The Critique of Judgement which discusses ‘aesthetic ideas’:

[B]y an aesthetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e., concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible.—It is easily seen, that an aesthetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which, conversely, is a
concept, to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate (1978: 175-176).

Both aesthetic and rational ideas, for Kant, cannot become cognitions. They are merely ideas in the sense that they are mere “representations” that refer to an object according to principles that are either subjective (aesthetic ideas) or objective (rational ideas) (209-210). Aesthetic ideas, however, are the ones which “induce much thought”; an inducement which, for Kant, is provided by art, and precisely poetic art, which is the domain where the faculty of aesthetic ideas, or the “talent of the imagination”, “can show itself to full advantage” (177). Still, this does not mean that Kant excludes concepts of reason from the aesthetic experience. Rather, he states that when a representation of the imagination presents Jupiter’s eagle with the lightening in its claws, as an aesthetic attribute of the “mighty king of heaven”, this representation (i.e., the aesthetic idea), has a “kinship” with rational ideas like “sublimity” and “majesty of creation” (177). The aesthetic idea serves these concepts as a substitute for their logical presentation, animating the mind “by opening out for it a prospect into field of kindered representations stretching beyond its ken” (177). The concepts of reason have no representations of the imagination “adequate” to them, but the kindered representations given by the aesthetic ideas help these concepts by provoking “more thought than admits of expression in a concept determined by words” (177). Kant also uses the expressions “wealth of thought”; “extension of thought”; “unbounded expansion to the concept” to explain what happens when a representation of the imagination is “attached” to a concept (177). He further stresses that such a representation is indeed “germane” to the concept although the ‘thinking more’ it invokes exceeds what admits of “comprehension in a definite concept” (177.).

As known, works of art for Kant are subject to a judgment of taste which is not a cognitive judgment although it rests upon a concept: a rational indeterminate one which the aesthetic idea can help to expand (207-208). Paul Ricoeur has grappled with this complex “situation” to analyze the process of interpreting metaphors and to find the link between metaphorical and speculative discourses. He observes that interpretation functions at the intersection of these two domains: it “seeks the clarity of the concept” but also “hopes to preserve the dynamism of
meaning that the concept holds and pins down” (Ricoeur 1986: 303). He reads Kant’s notion as meaning that the presentation of an idea by the imagination “forces conceptual thought to think more”, and since he clearly considers metaphor to be a form of such presentation (note that Kant never uses the word ‘metaphor’ in this context), he states that metaphor “introduces the spark of imagination into a ‘thinking more’ at the conceptual level” (1968: 303). The ‘struggle to ‘think more’’ is the ‘soul of interpretation’, Ricoeur adds (303). To further explore the complex notion of ‘thinking more at the conceptual level’ through an aesthetic idea, it may be useful to give some examples of interpretation. I shall follow Ricoeur in assuming that metaphor is one form of aesthetic ideas, and will discuss one example from fine art, and another from poetry.

Many readers are familiar with Salvador Dali’s sculptures and paintings which contain opened drawers in human figures (e.g. The Anthropomorphic Cabinet, Venus De Milo with Drawers, The Burning Giraffe). In Kant’s framework, these works may be considered to present an aesthetic idea (the drawers in the figures) which expand indeterminate supersensible concepts such as ‘secret’, ‘mystery’, and ‘memory’ among others, while this aesthetic idea is not itself ‘adequate’ as an intuition to any of these concepts. Although it remains hard to explain, a ‘wealth of thought’ is induced at the conceptual level, but it does not rest upon one concept; determinable or indeterminable. The mind is ‘quickened’ and ‘animated’ as Kant says, and - although Kant does not suggest this for aesthetic ideas - it might be that the very process of moving from the ‘drawers in humans’ (an intuition of the imagination) to ‘secret’ (a rational idea) entails observing a resemblance (between secrets and what is kept in drawers; between drawers and the human soul); something which indeed requires some conceptual effort that force the mind to ‘think more’, given that, for example, we will have to reflect deeply on the concept ‘secret’ in order to observe the resemblances it shares with things kept in drawers.

In the absence of one particular concept exhibited through the aesthetic idea, and no matter how much ‘thought’ is induced, it remains impossible to suppose that this idea presents us with a specific interpretation, objective proposition, or with a logical exhibition of a concept. Dali, as Sidney says, ‘nothing affirms’ through
these works, and he certainly does not have ‘one thing to say’ through his drawers as Derrida would put it. For one observer the drawers that open out of human figures may bring about the concepts of ‘secrets’ and ‘pain’ for example, and allude to the – subjective - proposition that ‘revealing secrets (opening the drawers) is painful (as is pulling something out of the body)’, and thus it is healthier and ‘tidier’ to keep the secrets unrevealed, as in things kept in a chest of drawers. ‘Secrets’ may be replaced by ‘memories’ or these may come to mind together. For another observer it might give some meaning as to the ‘mysteries’ of the female body; and for a Feminist it might concern the pain inflicted on the female body and soul from outside intrusion and dictation. Dali himself interpreted his work as meaning that Freudian psychoanalysis is capable of revealing the secrets of narcissism concealed in the subconscious of man, after having been kept hidden for a long time. Doubtless, such a declarative statement is unlikely to come to mind when viewing these works without previous knowledge of Dali’s view, and whether he likes it or not, all we can get out of his aesthetic idea is a confused interpretation. Yet the confusion is not without a struggle to ‘think more’ conceptually, and, again, it certainly requires rational means to get from ‘drawers opening out of a figure’ to ‘the pain of secrets when revealed from the soul’. If Kant is right, the drawer representation will induce more thought than is provoked by the concept ‘secret’ as determined by the word ‘secret’.

It may be true to say that in poetry, there is much less confusion given the strong connection between language and thought. And although poems throughout the ages differ greatly in their directness and predisposition for a controlled interpretation, it is perhaps correct to say that they lie somewhat in the middle between philosophy on one hand, and fine art on the other. Like Dali’s drawers in human figures, Baudelaire’s poem “Spleen” exhibits the ideas of secrets and memories (among many others) through metaphors which resemble Dali’s drawers, but with considerably more conceptual limits and much less indeterminacy. The title of the poem is ‘Spleen’, and the first line contains the concept “memory” (souvenir): “J’ai plus de souvenirs que si j’avais mille ans”. After these ‘limits’, Baudelaire gives several aesthetic ideas that are germane to their rational correspondences:
Un gros meuble à tiroirs encombré de bilans,
De vers, de billets doux, de procès, de romances,
Avec de lourds cheveux roulés dans des quittances,
Cache moins de secrets que mon triste cerveau.

[…] Je suis un vieux boudoir plein de roses fanées,
Où git tout un fouillis de modes surannées,
Où les pastels plaintifs et les pâles Boucher
Seuls, respirent l’odeur d’un flacon débouché.

The concepts are more defined in this poem than they are in Dali’s drawers (the ideas of psychoanalysis and the human unconscious do not seem as valid options for interpreting this poem), but they are not doubt expanded by Baudelaire’s chest of drawers and boudoir and all the things that fill them. Still, Baudelaire’s metaphors or ‘kindered representations’ do not present us with a distinct, declarative proposition based on objective principles. It does not have ‘one thing to say’ and does not ‘affirm’ anything; although we might find ourselves ‘thinking more’ than we do when presented with the mere wordings of ‘memory’, ‘spleen’, ‘secret’, and ‘aloneness’.

The majority of philosophical texts has – and perhaps should have – more determinacy and limitations than Baudelaire’s poem and Dali’s sculptures, even if they address our imaginations with rich metaphors. But exactly how can metaphors in philosophy help us to ‘think more’, and to what extent can this function in philosophy be similar to – or different from – its function in poetry and art as Kant understood it?

3. ‘Thinking More’ expanded into a new context: philosophical metaphors

The recent decades have witnessed what seem like metaphor ‘festivals’, celebrating the role which metaphors are believed to play in our conceptual and epistemological upbringing. Indeed, many concepts are dead metaphors, and much of our use of language is metaphorical, perhaps because our conceptual
system is, to some extent at least. We may be living by metaphors to use Lakoff and Johnson’s infamous book title, and we may be able to find hundreds of philosophical texts whose “entire” surfaces are “worked by a metaphorics” to use Derrida’s phrase on Aristotle’s definition of metaphor (Derrida: 231-232). Surely it seems appealing – and easy – to express such enthusiasm concerning metaphor; to return back to the texts of philosophy since Plato and Aristotle to infer cognitive claims for metaphor; and to enjoy Nietzsche’s metaphorical assertion that concepts are worn-out, metamorphosed metaphors, and his catching statement that truth is “a mobile army of metaphors and metonymies”. But it may be best to take a step back as Ricoeur has done in The Rule of Metaphor, where he argues for a distinction between “metaphorical order” and “conceptual analysis”, claiming – quite convincingly - that without this distinction there would be no difference between Hegel’s Idea and Plato’s Idea (Ricoeur: 293). The life of the concept may be in the death of the metaphor as Ricoeur puts it, and he gives the example of ‘comprendre’ [comprehend, understand] which “can have a proper philosophical sense because we no longer hear ‘prendre’ [take, to take hold of] in it” (239). Taking such a step back and resisting the temptations of the metaphor festivals may protect us from “transvaluational” views as Arthur Danto says; i.e. the views which use the fact that many concepts are metaphorical to jump to the conclusion that “the first shall be last or that the meek shall inherit the earth” (Danto 1987:21).

Now that we have become able to ‘think’ with the support of – and perhaps because of – metaphors, my question is this: are we able to ‘think more’ about concepts in view of their metaphorical origin, and by the fresh metaphors which illustrate these concepts and perhaps make new claims about them? Can metaphors force us to ‘think more’ about philosophical propositions and assess their validity? If so, how would Kant’s ‘thinking more’ be naturalized into this new context?

I shall begin with the dead metaphors which have helped to form concepts. Perhaps the most dead and most omnipresent of all these metaphors is the optic metaphor, which is used for almost everything that has to do with knowledge. Derrida notes that this metaphor “opens up every theoretical point of view under the sun” (Derrida: 224); and his use of “point of view” here is no coincidence. The
concepts “theory”, “idea”, “perspective”, “speculation” and “reflection” are optic metaphors originally, and our everyday language where we use “I see” to mean “I understand”; “view” to mean “opinion”; “blindness” to suggest “ignorance”; reflects the dominance of this metaphor. Now that the metaphor is very dead, it may be difficult to argue for its ability to make us ‘think more’. However, this may still be possible under one condition: if one intentionally decides to reflect upon this concept as a metaphor (note that our everyday use of ‘ idea’, ‘viewpoint’, ‘I see’, and countless others rarely involves any reflection upon their metaphoricity). In this case of deliberate reflection, what would presumably happen is this: the reflector will re-realize that he has a concept of knowledge different from his concept of seeing and viewing. He will remember that they are not the same even though he constantly uses the latter to think and talk about the former. In other words he will rephrase his use of ‘I see’ in its original, metaphorical phrasing: understanding is seeing. This ‘is’, as Ricoeur explains, signifies both ‘is not’ and ‘is like’ (Ricoeur: 7), but not ‘the same’. Such sorting and separating of much-entangled concepts and metaphors (‘understanding’ and ‘seeing’) allows the reflector to look for the similarities in dissimilars, and also for the dissimilarities in what he has long considered to be similars. This reflection is indeed one form of ‘thinking more’; a form where there is much tension between “identity and difference in the interplay of resemblance” (see Ricoeur: 247). This particular tension might help the reflector to ‘think more’ about the concept and its identity, probably more than he would if it never occurred to him to reflect upon its metaphoricity. The ‘field’ of this tension does not exactly correspond to the ‘field of kindered representations’ which expand the thought in the Kantian appreciation of art, for we are dealing here with one concept, though rational, i.e. ‘empty’ and indeterminate according to Kant. The mind here is indeed quickened and animated yet not without the many conceptual limits that the death of the root-metaphor has provided for the life of the concept. The experience here is far more controlled than it is in art, as it is intentionally directed at finding limits and controlling our understanding of the concept in the first place. Unlike art, thought here is expanded in order to be narrowed down to finite possibilities, but this nonetheless provokes the mind to ‘think more’.
As for fresh metaphors, these will also stimulate the mind and induce a ‘thinking more’. ‘Mind’ for example, has been given many metaphors throughout the histories of philosophy and science. These range from: the dead and immortal ‘container’ metaphor (mind is a box) which exists abundantly in perhaps all languages, and it includes Plato’s famous aviary metaphor; mind is a wax tablet (Plato and Aristotle); Locke’s ‘white paper’ that is void of all characters and ideas; Freud’s ‘iceberg’; to the more recent metaphors of cognitive science: mind is a ‘computer’; ‘brain’ or ‘rhizome’. My point is that the more metaphors we have of the same concept, the more interplays of resemblance we will have; the more tension between identity and difference there will be; which all means that there will be more ‘thinking’ to do. This exceeds the effort needed in the case of dead metaphors, but it is still directed towards the indeterminate concept, in the hope of rendering it less indeterminate. Even Nietzsche, for whom all concepts are mere worn-out metaphors, and who rejects all ideas of ‘things in themselves’ observes that we get nearer to the identity of the concept through looking at it from many perspectives. In our context, metaphor can be considered as a ‘perspective’:

[L]et’s guard ourselves against the tentacles of such contradictory ideas as “pure reason,” “absolute spirituality,” “knowledge in itself”—those things which demand that we think of an eye which simply cannot be imagined, an eye which is to have no direction at all, in which the active and interpretative forces are supposed to stop or be absent—the very things through which seeing first becomes seeing something. Hence, these things always demand from the eye something conceptually absurd and incomprehensible. The only seeing we have is seeing from a perspective; the only knowledge we have is knowledge from a perspective; and the more emotions we allow to be expressed in words concerning something, the more eyes, different eyes, we know how to train on the same thing, the more complete our “idea” of this thing, our “objectivity,” will be. (Genealogy: III.12).

Here Nietzsche’s philosophical argument is not expressed in a pure abstract formula but contains an optics-based analogy where ‘perspective’ is given the metaphor ‘eye’, or re-given its optical origin as a metaphor for its prevalent meaning: ‘mental outlook’. The passage above can help us explore our final
inquiry: how do metaphors and analogies help us to think more of a proposition and question its validity and claim to truth?

“Analogies, it is true, decide nothing but they can make one feel more at home” — that’s what Freud thought (Freud 1964: vol. 22, 72). My point is that, on the contrary, analogies do help us to ‘think more’ about a proposition’s capacity to ‘decide’. In Nietzsche’s passage quoted above, the argument in its abstract exposition is this: the more perspectives we have on one thing, the more complete our knowledge of that thing will be. For Nietzsche this is similar to having more ‘eyes’ which help us to see something in a better, more complete way. At first glance, the analogy may do the trick: we know that a one-eyed person cannot see things as clearly as a person with normal vision, and this is correspondent to Nietzsche’s claim concerning the limits of one perspective as regards cognition. However, a one-eyed person who has no vision deficiencies in that particular eye may be able to see things more clearly than a two-eyed person who suffers from severe short-sightedness. This point pushes us to ‘think more’ about Nietzsche’s argument: wouldn’t one ‘far-sighted’ perspective give us better, more complete knowledge of something than several ‘short-sighted’ perspectives? Does not the history of philosophy, which is full of competing perspectives, dismiss all short-sighted perspectives and render few ones convincing and immortal? Surely, great philosophical ideas cannot be likened to one-eyed vision – at least not without many points of contention –, but we can still argue that in general, one person with ordinary vision can see something more clearly and completely than a vast number of people with vision deficiencies. This may be an exaggeration, as we do know that people in general have comparable visual abilities, which does not correspond to Nietzsche’s ‘different eyes’. This invokes a ‘thinking’ more even beyond Nietzsche’s argument (although it emerges from reflecting on the interrelations within the analogy): to what extent are the different perspectives really and genuinely ‘different’? Even if we imagine different eyes looking at something from different angles, we know that eventually they are similar eyes which all function in the exact same way. This suggests that the ‘different’ perspectives all emerge from our human intellectual capacities just like our naked vision emerges from similar sense faculties, and therefore we cannot have very different perspectives regarding one thing—an idea which seems closer to
Hegel’s view of the compatibility of perspectives than Nietzsche’s view of their conflicting nature.

However, if we take Nietzsche’s ‘different eyes’ merely as a metaphor for different angles, and reflect upon how looking at something from a variety of angles can indeed give us a better, though not necessarily complete view of something, Nietzsche’s argument will seem more valid. True, the more cameras we use to take a shot of an object from various standpoints, the more complete our knowledge of that object will be. This strengthens Nietzsche’s critique of ‘pure reason’ and ‘knowledge in itself’, since it is impossible to have a look at something from all angles at once with an eye that ‘has no direction at all’ as Nietzsche says. But if we are to assume that the ‘many eyes’, the ‘many angles’ will help us grasp a better knowledge of something, we must keep in mind the following: just as we cannot ask a person with deficient vision to tell us how a building looks from behind, or use a damaged camera to take a shot of that part of a building, we cannot assume that all perspectives will help us get more knowledge of something, no matter how many we have. Many scholars have grappled with the question of the evaluation and selection of perspectives in Nietzsche’s theory, arguing that the perspectives for Nietzsche are not all neutral, but that some of them are cognitively superior than others according to Nietzsche (See Cazeaux 2007: 104-123). This idea can be derived from studying the analogy as has been illustrated, and perhaps more answers concerning the question of ‘evaluation’ can be drawn from a deeper reflection on the correspondences and non-correspondences between Nietzsche’s argument and its corresponding analogy.

Such reflection can be considered as a form of ‘thinking more’ about Nietzsche’s argument, since it can reveal its problems and limitations as attempted above. It is not a demonstrative method of assessing the proposition’s objectivity and truth-value, but it is perhaps one way of thinking about it dialectically in a form of rhetorical reasoning. This experience, although enjoyable for many people, may not be termed ‘aesthetic’ in the Kantian sense at least, especially since the imagination here is much more constrained by the existence of a rather obvious argument, which was not the case with Dali’s figures. The reflection is directed towards knowledge and not mere ‘disinterested’ pleasure, and the interpretation
of the meaning of the analogy does not have to struggle with aesthetic indeterminacy, and its univocity is secured by the fact that we have a good idea about what Nietzsche is saying, unlike our confused situation with Dali’s drawers. In other words a claim is being made by Nietzsche, with the support of the analogy. In this case we do not suffer from a ‘semantic shock’ in Ricoeur’s words (Ricoeur: 296), and the philosophical discourse here “sets itself up as the vigilant watchman overseeing the ordered extensions of meaning” (Ricoeur: 261). There is no a ‘vast array of kindred representations’ emerging from a free play of imagination and understanding, and invoking indefinite number of meanings in this ‘thinking more’ experience. Yet perhaps because philosophy is based on concepts and is intentionally directed to them (Nietzsche’s ‘perspective’ is an example); because it cannot be really independent of determination; because its analogies work within a limited play of possibilities; and because the rational ideas are not freely attached to a representation but rather illustrated in order to make a claim; perhaps for all these reasons the ‘thinking more’ that philosophical metaphors can provoke is unique; for it will have to be ‘more’ focused and directed towards understanding the identity of concepts, and assessing the validity of propositions. In simpler words: it will be searching for knowledge and truth, which is the never-changing aim of philosophy.

This is not to say that art does not search for truth. It does, and invites us to think. But in the Kantian sense, art makes us think more of the concepts that may come to mind when we experience representations of the imagination, but this experience is rarely targeted at reaching a definite or near-definite understanding of one concept, or at deriving a truth-claim or an objective proposition. We do, however, get to think about the rational ideas (such as secrets, memories) through their imaginative correspondences (such as drawers). Such interplay may result in an interpretation; but this interpretation is seldom subject to judgment according to clear-cut criteria of correctness. It is forever subjective, intersubjective, and cannot be entirely ‘wrong’ even if it is far from what an artist himself claims to be the ‘one thing’ he tried to communicate through his representation. In philosophy, conversely, there is always one particular thought at a time, or one abstract proposition, which a philosopher tries to communicate and prove valid, which is why philosophical metaphors and analogies are, as it
were, ‘pre-interpreted’ most of the time. The concepts and propositions may be served by representations of the imagination which will invite us to think more about them: about the identity of the concept and the validity of the proposition. Such ‘prompt to thought’ including the interplay between resemblance and difference that revolve around identity and validity, happens in a ‘controlled environment’, and is targeted at a definite thought and proposition. This is dissimilar from the case of aesthetic ideas in art which, for Kant, have no specific, definite thoughts adequate to them, and even if they make us ‘think more’, the identity of the rational ideas produced in the process and the validity of the derived claims are not the targets and do not control or force limits on we can think about when experiencing metaphors in poetry and art. This explains why Kant chose to use the expression ‘vast array’ when he discusses the ‘kindred representations’ invoked by aesthetic ideas.

On a final note: certainly not all philosophical metaphors provoke our minds to think more than they would do in the absence of such metaphors. This will probably depend on the ‘genius’ of the philosopher, as much as invoking the artistic ‘thinking more’ for Kant depends on the ‘genius’ of the artist. Great poets and great philosophers share the mastery of observing resemblances in things far apart as Aristotle has taught us, which is why great poetry and great philosophy have both always pushed us to ‘think more’, although not in the exact same ways.

References


